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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Product quality issues for trade can be analyzed from 
many different perspectives. In a legislative context, 
traded goods must meet the quality standards specified in 
contracts between sellers and buyers. Contracts are 
instruments designed to compel both the seller and buyer to 
behave predictably and to facilitate the settlement of 
disputes that may arise. Because asymmetry of information 
can occur when either party has more knowledge than the 
other, the terms of the contracts may need to be regulated. 
For example, minimum quality standards are often imposed 
with the purpose of protecting consumers who have no access 
to information or who simply cannot process all the 
available information efficiently. These regulations are 
argued to be welfare improving, creating contracting in the 
public interest. In a more practical sense they reduce the 
number of disputes not only over quality, but also over 
such matters as delivery and pricing. 
In economics, quality issues have been avoided, under 
the guise of 'simplicity' until recently. On a theoretical 
basis, it has been argued that goods of different quality 
must be treated as different goods; yet, goods of 
heterogeneous quality are often treated as homogeneous for 
legal purposes, such as in customs assessment and in 
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available data systems. But, it is undeniable that goods, 
like agricultural commodities, do differ in their intrinsic 
characteristics, such as visual appearance, weight, and 
nutrient content. An alternative argument, which states 
that goods with similar factor intensity and serving the 
same functions be treated as the same, has been only 
recently challenged. The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S) 
model, outlined in Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1983) and used 
frequently by international trade theorists, assumes that 
products are homogeneous. It is, therefore, incapable of 
explaining the intra-industry trade prevalent between 
industrialized countries. Empirical analyses perhaps due 
to the aforementioned data features, often make no 
distinction between goods of different quality. This 
happens most frequently in demand analysis and commodity 
modeling. To simplify models empirical researchers 
abstract from the fact that different varieties may have 
distinct income effects (ex., Hard versus Soft wheat). The 
interpretation of results from these models using aggregate 
variables is frequently difficult. 
In trade analysis, many economists have viewed a 
legislated minimum quality standard as an instrument whose 
main function is to protect domestic producers from foreign 
competition. Unfortunately, these standards can also 
deprive many consumers of the opportunity to purchase a 
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preferred quality. Legal issues regarding quality are 
different from economic issues. Legal issues restrict to 
the quality specified in a contract, whereas economic 
issues, such as expectations about quality and competition 
based on quality, go beyond contract specifications and 
concentrate on their influence on purchasing decisions and 
efficiency. 
This dissertation uses wheat as an example of a 
commodity often differentiated on the basis of intrinsic 
characteristics. Seven types of wheat are sold in the 
United States. Each is differentiated by physical 
appearance, protein content, and milling and baking 
characteristics. They include; Hard Red Spring, Durum, 
Hard Red Winter, Soft Red Winter, White, Unclassed, and 
Mixed. The Hard Red wheats sell at a premium and are used 
for bread making. White and Soft Red wheats are used in 
bakery products, and Durum wheat is used to make pasta. 
Motivated by depressed export sales and by increasing 
large number of complaints over quality, new regulations on 
the marketing of grain were introduced in 1986 (United 
States House of Representatives, 1986a). Wheat, which had 
drawn more than half of the complaints in 1985, seems to 
have been the main target. Related to the issue of market 
regulation are questions of the existence and 
identification of market failure(s) and the evaluation and 
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implementation of policies. Questions about the efficiency 
of the grading system and inspection services are also of 
interest. Can the quality of exported wheat be adequately 
assessed? Is quality deterioration occurring between the 
the points of export and destination being minimized in the 
current marketing system? 
The competitiveness of the U.S. grain export industry 
has been questioned in the quality debate. Are U.S. 
private grain exporters at a disadvantage by competing with 
government agencies? Assuming no other market failure, is 
the U.S. grain export market competitive enough for the 
exporters to have incentives compatible with public 
interest? Assuming that quality is not observable ex-ante 
(which implies that the price received by the firm depends 
on its reputation), is the number of exporters too high or 
is the structure of the industry causing export problems? 
History of Grain Quality 
Grain quality regulation goes back to thirteenth 
century Britain where a town ordinance barred London 
merchants from blending good corn with moldy corn (Hill, 
1985). Ordinances from thirteenth century records also 
indicate that attempts were made to regulate the quality of 
corn in the cities of medieval France (Hill, 1985). 
5 
During the eighteenth century, the Parisian police 
were ordered to check grain and flour quality (Kaplan, 
1984). They were concerned about grain, flour, and bread 
quality for two reasons. First, it was believed that, next 
to air, bread was the most common cause of epidemic 
maladies due to fraudulent bread making using contaminated 
water and bad grain. Secondly, Parisians demanded high 
quality bread, as depicted in their slogan, "Liberte, pain, 
et bon pain!" (Liberty, bread and good bread!). Millers 
were forbidden to mix any foreign matter, such as bran, 
barley or crushed chalk, into their flour. 'Honest' 
blending of flours of different quality was allowed only in 
1752. A 1697 ordinance even regulated the use of fecal 
matter for fertilization of wheat land because of its 
supposed effect on wheat quality (Kaplan, 1984). 
Historically, then, the grain industry was just as (if 
not more) regulated than it is today in the United States; 
and, the regulations used in the past were surprisingly 
sophisticated. Grain traders needed a license to operate, 
and police conducted spot inspections at every level of the 
industry. People who measured flour quality acted as 
arbiters of justice and of good faith between sellers and 
buyers, as well as keeping records of prices and supply. 
They were the 'watchdogs of commerce' (Kaplan, 1984). 
However, measures of grain quality differed in every 
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province, district, and almost in every French town. This 
made the marketing of grain and flour very inefficient by 
provoking disputes between sellers and buyers, and by 
reinforcing insular trade patterns. 
The first grain quality grades in the United States 
were established in 1856 for wheat by the Chicago Board of 
Trade. A year later, grades were assigned to corn, oats, 
and barley. In 1858, official grain inspectors were 
appointed by the Boards of Trade in Chicago and Milwaukee 
(Hill, 1983). Later, in an effort to improve their 
marketing systems, individual states developed their own 
grading and inspection rules that were applied on a state­
wide basis. Much confusion followed, since the standards 
used in each state were quite diverse. Kitchen (1940) 
claimed that 338 names or grade titles existed in 1906: 
133 for wheat, 63 for corn, 77 for oats, 53 for barley, 10 
for rye, and one each for 'no-grade' and 'no established 
grade'. These grades did not serve their purpose very 
well. As of January 1st, 1899, the president of the 
Chicago Board of Trade had already received several 
complaints from individual exporters and English merchants 
about the unreliability of grain quality certification 
methods. 
As early as 1890, Congress proposed that the federal 
government should control grain quality standards in the 
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U.S. The proposition was not popular among the Grain 
Dealers Association who were trying to establish their own 
voluntary standards. When their efforts failed, the 
Association eventually shifted their support to federal 
legislation. Twenty-seven years later, in fiscal year 
1917, official grain inspection and grading under federal 
control was finally established. 
The Grain Standards Act of 1916 prohibited both 
interstate and foreign grain shipments unless the grain had 
been inspected and graded according to appropriate U.S. 
.standards. Only people who were granted a license by the 
Secretary of Agriculture were allowed to inspect grain and 
to issue U.S. certificates of quality (Ek, 1985; Hill, 
1983; Kitchen, 1940). A system of appeals was established 
whereby dissatisfaction or disputes could be resolved by 
federal employees using the appropriate standards and 
procedures (Hill, 1985) 
In 1940, soybeans were added to the list of 
commodities subject to official inspection (Ek, 1985; Hill, 
1983), and the act was further modified in 1956, making 
both grain samplers and shippers liable for complicity when 
issuing false grade certificates (Ek, 1985; Hill, 1983). 
In an effort to speed up the movement of grain and to lower 
the cost of distribution, interstate inspections were made 
voluntary, rather than mandatory, in 1968 (Ek, 1985). 
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The most dramatic changes in the U.S. grain grading 
system took place in 1976 after numerous abuses of the 1916 
law were uncovered. With the passage of the Grain Standard 
Act of 1976, the Federal Grain Inspection Service was born. 
Previously, grain inspection was the responsibility of the 
Agricultural Marketing Service whose role was restricted to 
inspection supervision, license granting, and appeals. 
This agency had had no jurisdiction over the weighing of 
grain shipments (Ek, 1985). Among other things, the 1976 
law: (1) required federal weighing of grain arriving at, 
and inspection and weighing of grain leaving, U.S. export 
facilities; (2) extended Federal jurisdiction over weighing 
activities; and, (3) permitted the U.S.D.A. to delegate 
inspection duties to qualified state agencies (Ek, 1985). 
In 1980, an amendment to the 1976 law was passed which 
exempted the following from official weighing requirements : 
(1) intra-company shipments of grain into an export 
elevator at an export port location; (2) grain transferred 
into an export elevator at an export port location by 
transportation methods other than barge; and (3) grain 
which is transferred out of an export elevator at an export 
port location for a destination within the United States; 
unless in each case either the shipper or receiver requests 
official weights (United States House of Representatives, 
1980b). 
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In response to the large number of official complaints 
about U.S. grain quality from foreign purchasers, such as 
Egypt, Kenya, Japan, Korea, Portugal, Ecuador, Russia, and 
Israel (United States House of Representatives, 1986a), and 
to the decline in U.S. grain exports. Congress passed a 
bill in 1986 which was to improve the quality of U.S. grain 
provided to both domestic and foreign buyers. As stated in 
the Grain Quality Amendment Act of 1986, "... no dockage or 
foreign material, as defined by the Secretary, including 
dust, once removed from grain shall be recombined with any 
grain; and no dockage or foreign material of any origin may 
be added to any grain" (United States House of 
Representatives, 1986a). 
Patterns and Trends in World Grain/Wheat Trade 
The U.S. has been the dominant wheat exporter since 
the mid-fifties. This position in the world market had 
previously been held by Canada. Half of the total U.S. 
wheat production is Hard Red Winter wheat. Hard Red Spring 
wheat, which makes up roughly 90 percent of the Canadian 
production, accounts for only 20 percent of production in 
U.S. These production figures reflect the harshness of 
Canadian winters which prevent the higher yielding Winter 
wheat from being successfully grown in Canada. The limited 
rainfall in western Canada contributes to a widening of the 
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gap between the yields of U.S. and Canadian wheat. On the 
other hand, the dryer climate increases significantly the 
protein content of Canadian wheat. It is for these reasons 
that strategically, the U.S. and Canada have historically 
focused on quantity and quality, respectively, in 
production and marketing policies. The export market for 
medium quality wheat has more participants than the market 
for high quality wheat. This is consistent with the 
technological advances which have taken place in the 
milling and baking industries, reducing the premium for 
hard wheats. The increased degree of substitution between 
medium and high quality wheat has forced Canada to 
reevaluate a strategy, which has concentrated on production 
and marketing of harder, higher quality wheat. 
It has been widely publicized that U.S. wheat exports 
decreased steadily during the interval from 1981 to 1985 
(Figure 1-1) . While the United States is still the leading 
exporting country for wheat, it has recently lost a 
significant share of the market. In contrast, countries 
like France and Australia have seen their market shares 
raise substantially between 1982 and 1985. Argentina's 
wheat exports boomed between 1982 and 1984, only to return 
to their previous 1981 level in 1985 and 1986. In 
contrast, Canada's exports have been fairly stable overall. 
Like the U.S., Canada lost part of its market share to 
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other major exporters during the period 1983 to 1985. 
Coinciding with the passage of the 1986 U.S. Grain 
Improvement Act and the heavy export subsidies of the 1985 
Farm Bill, the trend turned in 1986 and the U.S. regained a 
small share of the market it had lost, while Canada's 
exports were very close to their 1983 level. 
U.S. wheat production and stocks, the highest among 
the main wheat exporters, increased between 1981 to 1986 
(Figures 1-2 and 1-3). Given the overall increase in 
stocks and the decrease in production, we can conclude that 
.the depressed exports were not the consequence of higher 
domestic demand. France's production increased slowly but 
steadily until 1984. This contributed significantly to the 
metamorphosis of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.), 
which was the largest wheat importer, into a major 
exporter. As a rule, the wheat production of U.S. 
competitors has experienced fluctuations of a smaller 
magnitude than U.S. production with perhaps the exception 
of Australia between 1977 and 1986. A striking difference 
between the U.S. and the other wheat exporters is the size 
of U.S. stocks (Figure 1-3). Having distinctive different 
agricultural policies, Argentina, Australia and France do 
not hold Government controlled stocks. 
The exported share of the wheat produced by the five 
largest exporting countries are displayed in Figure 1-4. 
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The shares of exports in the total disappearance of wheat 
in the U.S. and Argentina were below 50 percent in 1986. 
Australia, Canada and France had relatively smaller 
domestic demand with export shares of 0.90, 0.70 and 0.55, 
respectively. Figure 1-5 shows that the importance of feed 
in the domestic demand of wheat is lowest in Argentina 
(five percent) and in the U.S. (30 percent). This figure 
also reflects differences in feeding practices between 
Canada, where wheat and barley are popular feed grains, and 
the U.S., where corn is more commonly used as feed. 
Several reasons can be advanced for explaining the 
performance of American exporters in recent years. For 
example, the U.S. dollar may have been over valued, thus 
rendering U.S. exports more expensive for foreign 
importers. This argument has short term merit, but, if one 
believes in the strong form of purchasing power parity and 
in relative prices determining the exchange rate, it is 
limited as a longer run explanation. Political scientists, 
on the other hand, might hypothesize that there has been a 
growing unpopularity for U.S. foreign policy, contributing 
to the fall of U.S. grain exports. The explicit and 
implicit export subsidies used by U.S. competitors have 
also contributed to the decline, and relegating these 
arguments to a minor role would be misleading. 
60 
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FIKURE 1-5. Ratio Of feed use to total use of domestic wheat by country 
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Recognizing the potential role of exchange rates, 
export subsidies, and foreign policy is one thing, but 
these factors may not be the only significant ones. Many 
people, including Iowa Congressman Neil Smith, believe that 
the uncertain (and/or lower) quality of the grain exported 
has been a major factor contributing to the decline in U.S. 
grain exports. With high hopes of remedying problems with 
grain quality, the U.S. Congress passed the Grain Quality 
Improvement Act of 1986 to amend the Grain Standards Act of 
1916. This bill has been controversial, and has not 
effectively reduced the number of foreign complaints, nor 
has it increased exports. 
Grain Quality Issues 
Wheat is not a homogeneous product. The grain differs 
in kernel size, protein content, moisture level, number of 
broken kernels, amount of foreign material, etc. Full 
information for buyers and sellers or simply 
standardization of grain quality grading systems 
contributes to efficient marketing. In the absence of 
standardization and if history repeats itself, the market 
for information about grain quality will be inefficient and 
production, selling, and purchasing decisions will not be 
Pareto optimal. Quality uncertainty does not necessarily 
imply inefficiency. Pareto optimality can be achieved if 
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perfect contingent markets exist. Identical attitude 
toward risk by all the market participants is obviously a 
sufficient condition to prevent the creation of such 
markets since for every market there has to be a supply and 
a demand. These contingent markets have to be competitive 
for the economy to be Pareto efficient. Alternatively, a 
standardized grading system improves marketing efficiency 
by enabling the warehousemen to mix grain of the same grade 
rather than segregating loads that individual producers 
bring to the elevator. 
Marketing flow 
As illustrated in Figure 1-6, a typical flow from 
seller to buyer in the U.S. consists of grain transported 
by truck from the producer to the initial purchaser, 
usually a local county elevator. Before the grain is 
turned over to the elevator, the warehouseman weighs the 
grain and checks it for moisture, foreign material and 
broken kernels. After storage, the grain may again be 
weighed and sampled by the next buyer before it is 
transported by truck or rail to a large terminal elevator 
(additional 'subterminal' elevators may also be part of the 
distribution chain). 
At this point, the grain may move either into domestic 
channels, in which case the terminal elevator sells 
Official 
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Weigh and 
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FIGURE 1-6. Marketing flow for U.S. wheat 
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directly to a U.S. processor, or the grain may be 
contracted to an overseas buyer. In the latter case, the 
terminal elevator will ship the grain by train, truck, or 
barge to a U.S. port elevator. While official grain 
weighing and inspection at inland locations, by either the 
Federal Grain Inspection Service (F.G.I.S.) or an agency 
contracted by F.G.I.S., is not mandatory, it may be 
performed upon request. In contrast, the grain is weighed 
and inspected by F.G.I.S. when it is loaded from a port 
elevator onto an ocean vessel (Ek, 1985; United States 
House of Representatives, 1980b). 
In Canada, the Canadian Wheat Board (C.W.B.), is 
responsible for the marketing of wheat with the exception 
of feed wheat which is under the jurisdiction of the 
Canadian Livestock Feed Board. Like their American 
counterpart, the Canadian wheat growers have the option of 
selling feed wheat directly to livestock producers, feed 
mills or to private elevators, such as Pioneer or Cargill. 
Their other option is to market wheat as a foodstuff 
through the C.W.B. which allocates delivery quotas among 
wheat growers. A fundamental concept employed by the 
C.W.B. in paying producers is price pooling. The farmers 
receive an initial payment for the wheat they deliver at 
the country elevators as contracted with the C.W.B. At the 
end of the year, the profits made by the C.W.B. are shared 
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among pool participants, according to the size of their 
quotas. Export sales are either negotiated directly by the 
C.W.B. or by private trading companies acting as agents for 
the C.W.B. The Canadian Grain Commission is responsible 
for grading wheat. A distinction between U.S. wheat 
exporters and the sole Canadian exporter is that, according 
to the Wheat Board Act of 1967 (Wilson, 1979), the goal of 
the C.W.B. is to maximize the wheat growers (long-run) 
profits. In the U.S., exporter and farmer interests can be 
in conflict, given the potential use of monopsony power by 
exporters. 
Grading of wheat 
Wheat is first judged as a class, then as a grade. As 
noted before, classes are differentiated by such features 
as physical appearance, hardness, and growing habit (North 
American Export Grain Association, 1986). In contrast, 
wheat grades are influenced by seven specific factors: 
test weight, heat damage, total damaged kernels, foreign 
material, shrunken and broken kernels, total defects, and 
wheat of other classes (Ek, 1985). A wheat quality 
designation must include not only the class and grade 
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number, it must also indicate the amount of dockage^ in the 
wheat, and whether it contains infestation (Ek, 1985). 
If a given load of wheat scores high on six of the 
grading factors and fails to meet the minimum requirement 
for a seventh, it will be given a grade corresponding to 
the grade scored on the lowest factor. Consequently, 
farmers or warehousemen who anticipate that their grain 
will score low on one factor have no incentive to maximize 
scores on the remaining factors. It can be deduced that 
this grading system may not operate in the best interests 
of all parties involved. Substantial variability in 
quality may exist within a designated grade. 
Test weight is a measure of grain density. It is 
determined by weighing the quantity of grain required to 
fill a one quart bucket. This weight is then converted to 
bushel equivalent (Hill, 1983). When buyers purchase a 
bushel of wheat, they receive sixty pounds of wheat, 
regardless of its test weight. Test weight is computed to 
determine the space that will be needed to store or 
transport the wheat. A bushel of wheat with a low test 
^The U.S.D.A. defines dockage as, "All matter other 
than wheat which can be readily removed from a test portion 
of the original sample by use of an approved device.... 
Also, underdeveloped, shriveled, and small pieces of wheat 
kernels removed in properly separating the material other 
than wheat which cannot be removed by properly rescreening 
or re-cleaning." 
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weight will need more space than a bushel with a higher 
test weight. According to Hill (1983, p. 136), test weight 
has little economic importance, especially for corn, and 
should not be included in grain grading systems. He notes 
that, "Research at several universities has shown almost no 
relationship between test weight and feeding value, nor has 
research shown any relationship between test weight and 
processing value, yet we continue to downgrade and discount 
light test weight corn." Charles Hurburgh, an authority in 
grain quality issues at Iowa State University, disagrees. 
He hypothesizes that many grain buyers associate high test 
weight with low occurrence of grain quality problems and 
desire to know test weights. He claims that recent 
research validates the use of test weight as a quality 
criteria. 
In the past, moisture content has also been a grading 
factor for corn and soybeans.% Though moisture content is 
no longer a factor in grading, a given moisture content may 
be specified separately on any contract. When such an 
arrangement is requested by a buyer, grains with low and 
high moisture contents are often mixed together in order to 
achieve the given requirement. Unfortunately, this 
practice also makes the grain more susceptible to spoilage 
^Moisture was a factor in grading corn, sorghum and 
soybeans until September, 1985 (Ek, 1985). 
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or infestation when the difference in moisture levels is 
higher than four percent (North American Export Grain 
Association, 1986). 
When moisture was a grading factor, it had two 
opposite effects on the price farmers received for their 
grain. It had the direct effect of discounting prices when 
grain failed to meet maximum moisture requirements, but a 
beneficial indirect effect resulted from the positive 
correlation between moisture and weight. Most farmers were 
storing grain at moisture levels below the maximum allowed. 
Some would then then add moisture to attain the maximum 
allowed because the loss of weight associated with dryer 
corn was not compensated for by higher prices (Hill, 1985, 
p. 412). Moisture standards for pricing were inefficient 
since they were not compatible with optimum moisture levels 
for storage and processing. 
Hill (1985) has suggested that grain should be sold 
solely on dry matter per bushel without consideration for 
water content. His rationale was that buyers are seeking 
grain with high quality feeding value, and water does not 
contribute to feeding value. However, wheat moisture level 
is important, not only because it can change weight, but 
because it can affect the reporting of protein content. In 
the past, protein was reported as a percent of the total 
weight of a sample. Proteins at different moisture levels 
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can be converted for comparison, but unless otherwise 
requested/ F.G.I.S. did not adjust the protein content for 
a standard moisture level. Now, as proposed by the North 
American Export Grain Association (1986, p. 6), a 12 
percent moisture basis is used as a standard. 
Many factors contribute to the broken kernels and dust 
found in grain shipments. The problem starts at the farm 
level. For corn, the Dent variety, which is predominantly 
grown in United States, is very susceptible to breakage. 
Breakage is most likely to occur during the drying process, 
especially during a high speed drying process. Breakage 
will also occur each time the grain is loaded or unloaded, 
and, as a result, dust will accumulate. As a rule, it is 
estimated that each time U.S. grain is handled, there is 
one percent breakage (Ek, 1985). When grain is loaded, 
dust filters to the top of the container due to its light 
weight. This dust gives a negative impression to a buyer 
looking into the hold of a ship, and will contribute to 
quality heterogeneity within a load. 
Hill (1983) suggested that brittleness should be a 
factor in grading corn so that farmers would have an 
incentive to produce corn less likely to break, by drying 
it at lower temperatures and by growing varieties more 
resistant to breakage. Hill (United States House of 
Representatives, 1986a) recommends that foreign material 
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and broken grain be reported separately, as in Argentina, 
and that grade limits be set near zero with discounts for 
grain delivered below standard. While broken kernels are 
not desirable, producers prefer broken kernels over weed 
seeds or dirt; therefore, the grading system should be 
adjusted accordingly. 
The high number of broken kernels is a serious problem 
for countries importing wheat from the U.S. Malaysia, 
Italy, Sweden, Venezuela and Jordan have all officially 
voiced their dissatisfaction with the number of broken 
kernels in their wheat purchases from the U.S. Until 1986, 
U.S. exporters would over clean their grain by removing 
dust and foreign material. Then, in order to efficiently 
satisfy the requests of different importers, a given amount 
of foreign material, dust or broken kernels, would later be 
reintroduced to meet contract specifications. 
The Grain Quality Improvement Act of 1986 banned the 
reintroduction of dockage or foreign material of any origin 
into grain (United States House of Representatives, 1986a). 
However, Section 3, (c)(2) restrains enforcement of this 
ban by stating that exporters are not prohibited from, 
"(C) the blending of grain with similar grain of a 
different quality to adjust the quality of the result­
ing mixture; ... ; 
"(E) ...the recombination of dockage or foreign mate­
rial, except dust, removed at an export loading facility 
from grain destined for shipment as a cargo under one 
export official certificate of inspection when the re­
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combination occurs during the loading of the cargo, when 
the purpose is to ensure uniformity of dockage or for­
eign material throughout that specific cargo, and when 
the separation and recombination are conducted in accor­
dance with regulations issued by the Administrator; ... ; 
"(G) any other addition of foreign material that may 
be determined by the Secretary to be in the interest of 
grain producers and to be neutral or constructive in 
achieving the goal of ensuring the quality of grain mar­
keted in or exported from the United States" (United 
States House of Representatives, 1986a, p. 2). 
Since the cost of removing dockage is supposedly 
increasing at an increasing rate, most contracts allow for 
a specific tolerance level. To the displeasure of many 
foreign buyers, dockage was rounded to the nearest 0.49 
percent in the U.S. grading system until May of 1987 (i.e., 
grains with zero percent dockage received the same grade as 
grains with 0.49 percent, while grains with 0.51 percent 
will receive a lower grade). Foreign buyers paid dearly 
for that extra non-wheat material, especially when one 
takes into account costs for transportation of the dockage 
and import duties that are often set on a straight tonnage 
basis. The dockage is now rounded at the nearest 0.10 
percent. Also of concern was the possibility that the 
range of values between grades for some factors would be 
too small. For example, the probability of obtaining a 
correct grade for No. 2 corn on the basis of heat damage is 
less than one half (Hill, 1983, p. 136). 
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Foreign markets and quality 
In reference to foreign complaints and contract 
specifications, Dr. K. A. Gilles, Assistant Secretary for 
Marketing and Inspection Services at the U.S.D.A., reported 
that among 30 formal complaints filed by foreign grain 
buyers during the first ten months of 1986, none were valid 
(United States House of Representatives, 1986a).^ The 
grain, as documented, appeared to have met contract 
specifications, but this apparently did not mean much to 
these dissatisfied foreign buyers. Under current 
inspection regulations, grain is sampled as a vessel is 
loaded and the responsibility of the U.S. exporter for the 
quality of its grain ends. Any grain quality complaints 
that are based on the quality of grain received at 
destination are resolved with reference to the accuracy of 
the original certificate issued at the time of loading, not 
on changes in quality thereafter (Hill, 1983). As a 
result, foreign buyers are detrimentally affected if the 
imported grain is susceptible to breakage and infestation 
during the handling and shipping that occurs after it has 
been loaded. 
Occasionally foreign buyers receive infested grain. 
As noted by Ek, 
^During the last three years, 178 complaints were 
lodged and only one was judged valid after investigation. 
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"Insect eggs, because of their minute size, are extreme­
ly difficult to detect. Even though a grain shipment may 
be certified as 'insect free' before a vessel leaves its 
home port, eggs may hatch after the ship sails and the 
buyer may receive an infested load of grain. Infestation 
was cited nine of the 65 foreign quality complaints log­
ged in the first eleven months of FY 1985" (Ek, 1985, p. 
33) . 
If an importer can prove that the grain was infested at the 
point of export (i.e., if the samples taken from the vessel 
are found to be infested), the importer is entitled to some 
compensation. Yet, despite this compensation (adequate or 
not), the reputation of the exporting firm might suffer. 
As shown in Figure 1-7, the number of foreign 
complaints has recently been high; 13 in 1983, 22 in 1984, 
73 in 1985, 45 in 1986, and 59 in 1987. The high number of 
complaints in 1987 is disturbing for two reasons. First, 
it seems that the 1986 legislation on grain quality has not 
been effective in fulfilling the stated objective. 
Secondly, the importers may eventually stop complaining and 
will purchase their grain from other exporting countries. 
Alternatively, they may try to reach a higher level of 
self-sufficiency. As a result, the U.S. may become a 
supplier of last resort for many importing countries. 
Most U.S. competitors (except Canada who, like the 
U.S., uses the certificate final system) adopt a system in 
which grain quality is determined at the point of 
destination rather than at the point of loading (Hill, 
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FIGURE 1-7. Number of foreign complaints for all exported grains, 1977-87 
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1983). Under the "Fair Average Quality" system (F.A.Q.)» 
the price is determined by comparing the quality of a 
particular shipment with the average quality of all 
shipments received during a month for such grain. A 
standard for a given exporting country is made up of the 
average quality of all the grain delivered (at all 
destinations) each week by all the exporters of that given 
country. The samples, which are collected according to the 
contract specifications, are analyzed by the Grain and Feed 
Trade Association in London which set the quality 
_ standards. 
Foreign buyers face uncertainty when purchasing U.S. 
or other grains. The certificate issued by F.G.I.S. tells 
the importer that the grain was of acceptable quality at 
the point of export, but the quality of the grain, once it 
reaches its destination, may have deteriorated. The degree 
of deterioration is random, fluctuating from shipment to 
shipment and probably from one class of wheat to another. 
The F.A.Q. system generates uncertainty, too, since the 
standard of comparison used in pricing varies from year to 
year. In addition, there is uncertainty in the process of 
assigning quality grades. As noted previously, grain that 
scores low on only one factor receives the same grade as 
grain scoring low on all factors. This potentially creates 
heterogeneity within a given grade. Canadians, in 
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contrast, are known to export wheat with more consistent 
quality that tends to score higher on most grading factors 
than the minimum standards specified in contracts or in the 
Canadian grading system. This may partially explain why 
roughly half of the contracts negotiated by the Canadian 
Wheat Board are on a long term basis (Carter, 1983). 
As pointed out by Hill (1985), the most dramatic 
quality problem in the U.S. international markets may be 
that many of the quality factors important to foreign 
buyers are not reflected in the U.S. grading system. 
Consequently, there are no incentives at any point in the 
marketing channel to improve those quality characteristics 
that are important to foreign buyers. These factors can 
vary in quality irrespective of the grade assigned, thus 
further increasing quality uncertainty and rendering the 
grading system inefficient. 
Objectives of the Analysis 
The issues selected for investigation in this study 
were chosen primarily because they have been ignored or 
misunderstood in the past. Because of the private nature 
of data on wheat quality, some relevant empirical 
applications of the conceptual model were not investigated. 
Considerable attention has been devoted to the 
identification of the problems. We analyzed, from 
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different perspectives, the behavior of an importing 
country facing changes and uncertainty in the quality of 
its imported wheat. Once identified, the objective was to 
find the cause of the problem. Of interest are the factors 
responsible for the seemingly irrational behavior of U.S. 
wheat exporters.^ 
Quality issues are complex because the effects of 
wheat quality on imports cannot be isolated. This stems 
from the existence of other significant factors affecting 
jointly and separately the purchase decisions of importing 
countries. Even if there were data available, the choice 
of the key characteristics used to compare wheats of 
different origin would be an issue by itself, since 
different classes of wheat serving different purposes may 
define individual sets of characteristics. 
The issue of public versus private exporting firms is 
partially addressed in a reputation analysis. Questions on 
the need to create a government agency or to allocate 
licenses between exporting firms are raised. The barter 
trade issue between two countries, supposedly favoring 
government agencies, has been omitted. The effect of price 
uncertainty on the exporter's behavior regarding quality is 
^Under some conditions, a profit-maximizing firm can 
rationalize deterioration in its reputation. This is 
elaborated in Chapter Five. 
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investigated. The impact of quality changes and 
uncertainty on foreign demand for U.S. wheat is one of the 
main issues analyzed in this study. Of equal interest is 
the rationale used by U.S. exporting firms to justify 
supplying wheat of somewhat lower or uncertain quality to 
importing countries. These issues were selected as opposed 
to traditional pricing because the latter cannot be 
adequately resolved given the quality of data presently 
available. 
Theoretical Developments 
The endogenization of quality is a fairly recent 
phenomena in models of trade and consumption (Falvey, 
1979). The study of trade barriers in a quality context is 
even newer (Das and Donnenfeld, 1987; Krishna, 1987). And, 
the study of the impact of quality uncertainty on the 
volume of import and domestic production is novel. As 
noted before, the role of quality in the making of the 
reputation of an exporting firm is discussed. The 
reputation of the firm/country is introduced because of 
information problems related to. quality. 
Quality can be modeled in many different ways. In 
general, the approach chosen varies according to the nature 
of the good and the production function or preference 
structure of the users of the good. In the pioneering work 
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of Lancaster (1971), quality was modeled as a vector of key 
characteristics. Wheat is a commodity whose quality is 
represented by a scalar or grade. A quality parameter q 
for imported wheat is introduced to make a bridge between 
wheat of different qualities. The product of the volume of 
imported wheat Q and the quality parameter q can be 
interpreted as imported wheat in terms of domestic quality. 
The quality parameter is a relative grade which uses the 
quality of the domestic wheat as the numeraire. It can 
also be viewed as the relative number of 'indexed' 
characteristics of imported wheat. 
Borrowing from the 'reservation wage concept' used by 
labor economists, an alternative approach would be to have 
a reservation quality level q^. Wheat at or above the q^. 
threshold can be judged as usable. This implies that the 
production function of wheat importers must have the 
following properties: 
f(q,Q) > 0 for all q > q^ 
f(q;Q) = K for all q > q^ 
f(q,Q) ~ 0 for all q < q^. 
Again, the quality variable is defined as q; and, Q stands 
for volume of wheat used in the production process. The 
quality of the imported wheat is assumed to be normally 
distributed. The probability, 0, that imported wheat will 
be usable depends on the reservation quality level, q^, and 
can be defined as 
/• 
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This approach has the advantage of reflecting the notion of 
'minimum quality level'. Minimum quality level is the 
basis for most grading systems, and is intended to reflect 
the preference structure of the buyers. Another advantage 
is the introduction of a second quality parameter, 
variance. The 'frills' approach, used mostly by economists 
in the field of industrial organization, does not apply in 
this case because 'quality units' cannot really be added to 
a 'basic' kernel of wheat. The 'frills' approach would be 
appropriate for processed grain, such as sugar-coated 
cereal flakes. 
Finally, the first reputation model used in the 
analysis is similar to Shapiro's model, and is based on 
lagged quality supplied by the exporting firm. A second 
model hypothesizes that the reputation of an exporting firm 
is country-specific. This implies that the price received 
by a U.S. firm depends on the quality it supplies as well 
as the quality supplied other U.S. firms. Reputation can 
be viewed as a function of the different levels of wheat 
quality produced in the exporting country. This latter 
case is simply an attempt to analyze the externality impact 
associated with the introduction of lower quality/higher 
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yielding varieties which cannot be visually distinguished 
from the higher quality variety. 
Procedure and Application 
The general objective of the dissertation is to better 
understand the implications of the market failures in the 
wheat export market. This objective is achieved using 
simple theoretical models. The introduction of a quality 
dimension limits substantially the scope of these models. 
For clarity, the market power issue is, at times omitted. 
When this is so, introducing market power does not change 
the basic results but only raise the degree of complexity. 
The assumption of identical taste within an importing 
country is not relaxed anywhere. This subject is well 
documented and is not central to the theme of the research 
(Bridgeman, 1985; Bond, 1984). 
The main advantage of theoretical results are their 
flexibility. In a theoretical framework, there is no need 
for assumptions about functional form to fit the data. 
Effects of other factors can be abstracted, greatly 
facilitating the interpretation of the results. However, 
the fact that a theoretical framework does not enable us to 
rank model specifications is a shortcoming that should not 
be underestimated. 
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The absence of any econometrics is by design. There 
is little justification for performing an econometric 
analysis on very short data series of unreliable quality. 
No data on the 'relevant* characteristics of wheat of 
different origins have been assembled by an unbiased 
source. Moreover, the price series published by the 
International Wheat Council and others are asking prices, 
not transaction prices. These asking prices are the 
suppliers' first quotes in the bargaining process. 
To compensate for the absence of direct empirical 
testing of the hypotheses from the theoretical models, we 
use tables and graphs of relevant aggregates to add to the 
credibility to our results and to facilitate in a loose 
sense their quantitative impacts. 
Organization of the Dissertation 
The following chapter. Chapter Two, is a review of the 
relevant literature on quality and uncertainty. The first 
section of that chapter focuses on risk and uncertainty in 
economics. Papers on trade policies and the non-
equivalence of tariffs and quotas are reviewed briefly in 
the second section. Papers on quality of goods and trade 
policies are also included. The last topic investigated is 
that of the reputation of a firm. 
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In Chapter Three, a simple quality parameter 'q* is 
introduced in a standard utility maximization problem. In 
this problem, a country is importing wheat whose relative 
quality is summarized by q alone. It is assumed that the 
price of the imported wheat is not responsive to small 
changes in its quality and that consumers and producers can 
react instantaneously to such changes. The adjustments 
that necessarily take place in the importing country when 
quality fluctuates are analyzed by standard comparative 
statics methods. From the first order conditions, we show 
that an efficient equilibrium is reached when the domestic 
rate of transformation is equal to the price of the 
imported good divided by the quality parameter. It is 
shown that as the quality of the imported good decreases, 
the quantity imported decreases or increases depending on 
the size of the price elasticity for the imported wheat. 
The indirect utility function for this 'quality' problem is 
also used. It is reported that an increase in the quality 
of the imported good is welfare improving (when, as usual, 
distribution issues are ignored). 
Chapter Four deals with the model from Chapter Three 
in the case of uncertainty. Using an expected utility 
framework, it can be shown that imports of uncertain 
quality will induce the importer to increase domestic 
production. The impact of a marginal increase in 
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uncertainty on domestic production and imports (à la 
Sandmo-Ishii's mean preserving spread) appears ambiguous. 
The first part of Chapter Five builds on Shapiro's 
(1983) work. Political events, such as embargoes, may 
affect the behavior of a firm by changing the subjective 
probability of a shorter series of profits. In the end, 
the firm may be more susceptible to 'milk' its reputation 
in return for quick profits. It may market goods of low 
quality as goods of high quality to importers who take 'n' 
periods to discover the true quality of their purchase. 
The case of a country-specific reputation, where the 
reputation of a firm depends on the quality of the goods 
exported by all the firms in that country, is investigated. 
In this case, all firms behave as free riders, and, as a 
result, both quality and reputation decrease. Different 
policies are compared for a model in which the firms have 
some market power. 
The last section of Chapter Five develops a model in 
which the importers have imperfect inspection'systems and 
have a probability 'a' that they will be unable to 
discriminate low from high quality. It is assumed that the 
importers take only one period to discover the true quality 
when they cannot discriminate the goods in the current 
period. In one case, the importers are assumed to know the 
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exact levels of production of low and high quality wheats 
and they are able to use that information in conjunction 
with a to change their demand for the high quality wheat. 
Low and high quality wheat could be perfectly discriminated 
when a = 0, but when a > 0 (from the introduction of look-
alike new varieties) the price of the low quality wheat 
becomes relevant in the pricing of high quality wheat, even 
though both qualities may serve completely different 
purposes. It is demonstrated that the introduction of new 
varieties may involve a decline in the export sales of both 
wheats. 
In Chapter Six, the consumers of imported wheat have a 
reservation quality level. Wheat of quality below that 
threshold is not an argument in the utility and/or 
production functions of the buyers. In the first model, 
the importers of U.S. grain maximize their consumer surplus 
via a willingness to pay function (Bridgeman, 1985), which 
depends on the reservation quality level, the mean and 
variance of the quality. The inefficient price mechanism 
is characterized as a function of the mean quality, which 
implicitly means that blending is not discounted. The 
importers response to an increase in variance (the result 
of blending and/or the reintroduction of foreign material) 
is investigated. The response of the importers obviously 
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depends on the location of the threshold in the quality 
distribution. 
To analyze the effect of different trade barriers on 
the exporter's choice variables (quanticy, mean, and 
variance quality), a model in which the price received by 
the exporter depends on the probability that the quality of 
the exported wheat will be above the importer's reservation 
level was designed. In accordance with recent literature, 
trade barriers will induce the exporter to increase the 
(mean) quality. The new result is that variance will also 
be augmented. The last question addressed is how price 
uncertainty affects the quantity and quality choices made 
by exporters. 
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CHAPTER TWO; UNCERTAINTY AND QUALITY VARIABILITY 
> 
This study is about risk, uncertainty, trade and 
product quality. More specifically, it concerns trade 
policy and quality uncertainty. The review of the 
literature on this subject is divided into two sections. 
First, results from studies on risk, uncertainty and trade 
policy are reviewed. This is followed by a discussion of 
the quality issue as it has been treated in economics. 
Topics also included are intra-industry trade and product 
variety, reputations of firms and product quality, and how 
'trade restrictions are used by importing countries to 
influence the quality of the imported goods. 
Risk, Uncertainty, and Trade Policy 
Literature on risk and uncertainty is germane to the 
issue of grain quality because importers often face 
uncertainty in the quality of wheat supplied by exporting 
nations. The following review explores theoretical and 
methodological developments in the area of risk and 
uncertainty. The methodology and results presented in this 
section serve as a foundation or framework for analyzing 
the effects of uncertainty in the international trade of 
wheat. 
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Price stabilization 
Usually, risk and uncertainty are directly associated 
with price uncertainty and stabilization. Numerous results 
exist on the subject. The controversy surrounding price 
stabilization efforts emerged with the publication of a 
paper by Waugh in 1944. Waugh (1944) used Marshallian 
consumer surplus as a measure of welfare and compared a 
situation where price was uncertain (due to shifting of an 
upward sloping supply curve) with a situation where price 
was stabilized at its arithmetic mean. He concluded that 
consumers benefit from price instability. 
While Samuelson (1972) interpreted Waugh's findings to 
mean that managed or artificial price instability was 
beneficial, this seems not to have been Waugh's intention. 
Waugh's investigation was motivated by agricultural markets 
in which prices were initially unstable. He then analyzed 
the benefits of stabilizing the price at its arithmetic 
mean, not vice versa. As he wrote, "...consumers might 
make real gains by taking advantage of the price 
fluctuations, which were foreseen instead of prevented" 
(1944, p. 613). Thus, Samuelson's criticisms were not 
directly relevant to Waugh's result. Samuelson was 
actually discussing a related, but quite different problem. 
Using Waugh's framework, Oi (1961) analyzed the effect 
of price stabilization on producers. He also found that 
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instability (of the demand curve in this case) was 
beneficial when producers are allowed to react 
instantaneously to the associated price variation. Massell 
(1969) combined both Waugh's and Oi's analyses and 
concluded that stabilization is socially desirable given 
the assumptions employed by Waugh and Oi. 
Van Kooten and Schmitz (1985) replicated the stability 
analysis using the assumption that producers had to make 
their production decisions before the realization of the 
market price by picking a price ex-ante. In essence, they 
used a partial equilibrium model to assess the impact of 
price stabilization under price uncertainty, not under 
price instability. The supply curve was, consequently, 
infinitely inelastic as opposed to the upward sloping curve 
used in previous analyses. This somewhat modified previous 
results. 
Risk and decision analvsis of the firm 
Some of the most significant results on risk and 
uncertainty were obtained by Baron (1970) and Sandmo 
(1971). Using different methods, their studies prove that 
a risk averse producer will produce less than a risk 
neutral or risk lover when price is uncertain which clearly 
contradicts the result of deterministic theory. Their work 
provided a much needed extension of the neoclassical theory 
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of the firm which at the times could not satisfactorily 
explain observed behavior. The major departure from the 
work of Baron's (1970) contemporaries lies in the 
relaxation of the assumption of instantaneous output 
adjustment to uncertainty (instability). Baron (1970) 
showed that it is risk aversion, not uncertainty, that 
causes expected profits to be positive in a competitive 
equilibrium. Risk aversion explains why output is not at 
the most efficient level. It is also shown that the short 
run supply curve need not be positive under uncertainty. 
Sandmo's (1971) contribution can be seen as a very 
successful attempt to analyze the behavior of the 
competitive firm under uncertainty without assuming that 
the firm maximizes expected profits. Included in his paper 
is a stimulating discussion on risk aversion and market 
structure. However, the issues of product diversification, 
market power, and investment in a dynamic context still had 
to be addressed. 
Arrow (1971), Pratt (1964), and Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1970, 1971) also made substantial contributions 
to the field by defining and analyzing some of the 
implications of risk aversion. Pratt (1964) and Arrow 
(undated lecture notes) can be credited for being the first 
to define the concept of risk aversion and its reciprocal, 
the insurance premium. The implications of specific 
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functional forms for utility functions are analyzed by 
Pratt (1964). These specific forms have been used 
extensively since that time. Pratt's (1964) methodology 
has been particularly influential. His elegant derivations 
have inspired the work of many economists including Baron 
(1970). Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) prove that the 
concept of increasing risk is, in general, not equivalent 
to that implied by equating the risk of a random variable 
with the variance of that random variable. Their use of a 
mean-preserving spread of the distribution of a random 
variable has been borrowed by many. 
Factor demand 
The implication of output price uncertainty on factor 
demand became a very popular topic in the mid-1970s (Batra 
and Ullah, 1974; Holthausen, 1976; Hartman, 1976). Batra 
and Ullah (1974) claimed that a risk averse firm under 
output price uncertainty will produce less than when under 
certainty, and therefore it will use less of all inputs. 
Excess capacity would imply that the marginal value product 
of the factor will exceed its price. This holds only if 
the inputs are normal. Even if a risk averse firm produces 
less under output price uncertainty than in a situation of 
price certainty, it will still minimize its costs given the 
output level it has chosen and produce somewhere on its 
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expansion path. The levels of inputs used when output is 
reduced depends in the curvature of the expansion path. If 
the latter has at least one 'bubble', then Batra and 
Ullah's results will be wrong. 
Holthausen (1976) investigated the situation where a 
firm uses a predetermined level of capital and a variable 
amount of labor to produce its output. The firm faces an 
uncertain demand for its output, and, because of the fixity 
of capital, must choose the desired level of capital before 
the uncertainty disappears. The perfectly competitive firm 
.selects the same input combination as under certainty for 
the same output level (i.e., the firm selects output and 
capital levels ex-ante and implicitly chooses the amount of 
labor by examining the expansion path). A different input 
mix is used by a price-setting imperfect competitor who is 
allowed to determine its output ex-post (i.e., labor is 
used to compensate for changes in output). 
In yet another model, Hartman (1976) assumed that a 
firm uses two inputs, and that one of those inputs must be 
purchased ex-ante. It is shown that uncertainty alters the 
relative demand for factor inputs. The direction of the 
change is ambiguous and depends on the assumptions made 
about the nature of the production function. 
In the late 1970s, a number of results were developed 
examining the topic of factor-price uncertainty (Stewart, 
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1978; Perrakis, 1980). According to Stewart (1978), 
"Compared with a risk-neutral firm, a risk-averse firm uses 
less of the risky input and more of the fixed-price 
input...." Perrakis's (1980) paper was written as a 
critique of Stewart's earlier work. Among other things, 
Perrakis argued that risk neutrality and uncertain input 
prices yield a different input mix than under certainty, 
and that Stewart's main result holds only when there is a 
single variable input. 
International Trade 
In Chapters Five and Six, different trade restrictions 
are compared. In Chapter Five, regulations are imposed on 
the wheat export industry with the objective of forcing the 
firms to supply a quantity and quality mix more in line 
with the country's relative position in the world market. 
In a situation where the wheat importers have a reservation 
quality level, the effects of trade restrictions are 
compared in Chapter Six. For this reason, major articles 
on the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas are reviewed 
in this section. 
Trade restrictions 
International trade theorists had studied various 
aspects of the equivalence (or non-equivalence) of tariffs 
and quotas. In 1965, Bhagwati found evidence of non-
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equivalence when the import sector is not competitive. 
Rodriguez (1974) also found that tariffs are superior to 
quotas when foreign retaliation is considered. Since some 
trade remains when the countries involved in a trade war 
use tariffs, they still derive a potential benefit from 
trade. Building on Rodriguez* work, Melvin (1986) 
explained that the possible equilibria reached when two 
trading countries simultaneously use trade barriers differ 
depending on the type of trade barriers used. Some of the 
equilibria attained with tariffs are not feasible if the 
two countries alternatively imposed quotas. 
Risk and uncertainty was only recently introduced into 
economic analyses of international trade. Weitzman (1974) 
compared price and quantity controls used to regulate 
production of a good with uncertain costs and benefits. 
Then in 1976, Fishelson and Flatters (1975) and Pelcovits 
(1976) compared the use of tariffs versus quotas in 
international trade in the presence of uncertainty. The 
methods used in these papers were similar, but 
unfortunately incorrect. Uncertainty was introduced by 
shifting, in an additive manner, the linear foreign supply 
and domestic demand curves. Implicitly, they were assuming 
that the agents were risk neutral or were not aware of the 
uncertainty since an Expected Utility framework was not 
used. Their methods also did not consider the impact of 
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revenues from trade restrictions. In terms of 
microeconomic theory, they failed to include income effects 
or implicitly imposed the assumption of a zero income 
elasticity. 
In making comparisons for the large country case, 
Fishelson and Flatters (1975) concluded that, under 
conditions of uncertainty stemming from an inelastic 
foreign supply curve, the flexibility argument no longer 
favors tariffs. In fact, tariffs appear to be a liability. 
Pelcovits (1976) compared tariffs and quotas for a small 
country by limiting imports for non-economic reasons. 
Quotas were superior to tariffs (above 100 percent) only 
when uncertainty was attached to the foreign supply curve. 
However, analyses using import, production, or government 
revenue constraints are ad-hoc, since the use of such 
constraints is not justified.^ A function to measure 
welfare losses when the economy operates below or above the 
constraint would be required to account for increasing 
welfare costs associated with violations of the 
constraints. 
In 1977, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1977) published a 
paper comparing tariffs and quotas as revenue raising 
devices under uncertainty. To facilitate their 
^This argument is credited to Dr. Harvey Lapan, 
Department of Economics, Iowa State University. 
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calculations, they unfortunately used an incorrect 
approximation in one of their mathematical equations. In 
using this approximation, they assumed that targeted 
government revenue was very low. As a result, their 
conclusion that an ad-valorem tariff dominates a quota 
holds only under that condition. 
Young and Anderson, jointly and separately, have also 
provided several results on quotas and tariffs under 
uncertainty. In 1980, they found that a fixed specific 
tariff is best when the goal of a small country is to limit 
expected imports. By using a fixed specific tariff, the 
country can achieve a higher expected consumer surplus. 
However, if a small country wishes to constrain foreign 
exchange, a fixed ad-valorem tariff is recommended. On 
examining revenue-raising trade restrictions. Young (1980) 
found that the choice of trade restriction depends on the 
form of uncertainty in the demand and supply functions 
(i.e., additive or multiplicative), and on the functional 
forms of supply and demand. As a second best comparison, 
Young (1982) also compared expenditure quotas versus quotas 
on the volume of imports when the non-economic objective of 
the country is to restrict either import expenditures or 
the volume of imports. His conclusions depended on the 
elasticity of the demand curve, but, in general, for an 
elastic demand curve, an expenditure quota is preferred. 
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Young and Kemp (1982) analyzed different instruments 
used to achieve optimal stabilization of prices received by 
domestic producers from international trade agreements. 
They determined that if the importing country is small, a 
variable subsidy is the best instrument. In contrast, 
large countries should use tariffs coupled with either a 
tax or subsidy (depending on the target price level) for 
domestic producers. If a country uses either a subsidy or 
tariff to achieve its goal, the range of target prices for 
which a variable subsidy is preferred over a variable 
.tariff increases as price uncertainty increases. 
During the same time period. Young and Anderson (1982) 
replaced the expected consumer surplus framework with an 
expected utility framework that was less restrictive (for 
elaboration, see Turnovsky, Shalit and Schmitz, 1980; 
Helms, 1984, 1985; and Choi and Johnson, 1987). By using 
an expected utility framework, Young and Anderson (1982) 
were able to demonstrate that tariffs are generally 
preferred over quotas, with one exception. Quotas may be 
optimal for small countries that are highly risk averse 
since they are often heavily dependent on revenues from 
tariffs or quotas (Prest, 1985). However, the measure of 
relative risk aversion must be extremely high for a quota 
to be the preferred instrument. 
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In a recent attempt to justify the increasing use of 
non-tariff instruments, Lloyd and Falvey (1986) compared 
tariff and non-tariff barriers, including quotas, used to 
protect industry. The primary justification for the use of 
non-tariff instruments is based on feasibility. Arguments 
in favor of non-tariff barriers included the transparency 
argument (which states that non-tariff import barriers are 
more acceptable because the extent of protection is 
hidden), the information argument, and the tariff binding 
argument. Before fixing a tariff rate, the government of a 
small country should know its domestic demand and supply 
elasticities. If the country is large, the foreign supply 
elasticity must also be known. Unfortunately, this 
information may not be available, or, if available, it may 
not be reliable. Because of the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs (G.A.T.T.), the tariff rates on many imports 
are bound, thus inducing countries to substitute non-tariff 
barriers (such as voluntary export constraints) for 
tariffs. 
Further arguments in favor of non-tariff instruments, 
the monopoly rent argument, Bhagwati and Srinivasan's 
revenue-seeking argument, and Meade's market growth 
argument, are based on non-equivalence (Lloyd and Falvey, 
1986). The first of these advocates that producers prefer 
quotas because they are valuable property rights (as long 
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as the quota restricts the allocation of imports among 
importers). The revenue-seeking argument assumes that 
tariff revenues can be distributed among groups who would 
thereby be induced to lobby (perhaps wasting resources that 
would otherwise be used in production) for those tariffs 
that would net them a greater share of the revenues. 
Finally, Meade's argument notes that tariffs allow the 
quantity of imports to increase if demand increases, while 
quotas force an upward price adjustment which is judged 
inferior. 
According to Lloyd and Falvey (1986), feasibility and 
non-equivalence arguments are not convincing enough to 
explain the growing popularity of non-tariff instruments 
used for industry protection. By assessing how the 
different instruments impact the distribution of random 
prices faced by producers, they were able to rank the 
instruments from the producers perspective. Since binding 
quotas set maximum levels for imports that help guarantee 
minimum domestic prices, risk averse producers will prefer 
quotas to tariffs that yield the same increase in the 
average domestic price. Variable levies also yield an 
optimal distribution by guaranteeing a floor price. More 
protection is given for the lowest part of the price 
distribution which is consistent with the fact that the 
marginal utility of income raises as price falls for 
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producers with utility functions concave in prices. Using 
the same rationale, a specific tariff gives more protection 
at lower prices and will be preferred to an ad-valorem 
tariff. The opposite results hold when the aim of the 
government is to improve the welfare of consumer groups 
given that some protection has to be given to the domestic 
factors of production. 
Optimalitv of free trade 
A question of great and somewhat recent interest for 
trade theorists was whether or not free trade is still 
optimal for a small country when uncertainty is present. 
The answer is no when the central planner is risk averse 
and makes production and export decisions ex-ante (Jabara 
and Thompson, 1982). Grossman (1985), unhappy with that 
conclusion, used a different model to validate the 
optimality of free trade. Helpman and Razin (1978) arrived 
at the same verdict when the free trade of goods is 
accompanied by free trade in equities. The optimality of 
free trade was also questioned when the quality of traded 
goods differs and/or is not observable at the time of 
purchase. The relevant papers on this topic are cited 
below in the product quality section. 
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Product Quality 
The quality of goods is a variable that appears to 
have been omitted from much of the modern economic 
analysis. Strangely enough, classic papers on the 
economics of smuggling (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1973; 
Bhagwati and Hansen, 1973; and Sheikh, 1974) did not 
incorporate a quality dimension. The literature on quality 
is evidently pertinent to the subject of grain quality even 
though the analysis of grain quality may require new 
assumptions given the specific nature of the problem. 
Commodity characteristics 
An early economist to investigate quality was 
Lancaster (1966, 1971). Lancaster was critical of 
traditional demand analysis; "A theory that takes no 
account of information that is readily available 
[properties of goods], and depends entirely on information 
that may be available in principle (preference orderings) 
but not in practice is surely a strange one" (Lancaster, 
1971, p. 2). He built a demand analysis framework based on 
the hypothesis that consumers derive utility from the 
characteristics (..."those objective properties of things 
that are relevant to choice by people" Lancaster (1971, p. 
6)) of the goods rather than from the goods themselves. 
The characteristics are assumed to be measurable, 
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objective, and the same for all consumers. The demand for 
the characteristics can be derived by a linear optimization 
procedure. This approach has been criticized on the ground 
that the assumptions of linear consumption technology 
(Lucas, 1975) and the non-negativity of the marginal 
utility of characteristics (Hendler, 1975) are too 
restrictive. Another limitation is dependence of the 
utility on the level of characteristics and not on their 
distribution among commodities. 
A relevant application of the characteristic approach 
, to the grain industry is provided by Veeman (1987). The 
price for wheat characteristics are estimated using cross-
sectional and time series data. 
Regulation 
Product quality has been analyzed in price regulation 
contexts (e.g., Anderson and Enomoto, 1986; Douglas and 
Miller, 1974) by studying industrial organization. 
Anderson and Enomoto (1986) analyzed the short and long run 
effects of price regulation on factor prices, factor 
allocation and product quality. Quality is entered as a 
separately produced intermediate good (e.g., chrome can be 
used as a quality indicator or as the quality good in car 
manufacturing). When the regulated price increases, the 
production of quality increases in the short run and also 
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in the long run as capital moves toward the regulated 
sector. Stiglitz (1987) in his survey article, reviewed 
papers on the relationship of quality and price and showed 
that when economic agents use the price as a gauge for 
quality, the demand for factors of production such as labor 
may be upward sloping. The resulting equilibrium may be 
characterized by excess supply, contradicting the classical 
factor price adjustment. Unproductive workers will not 
find employment even if they are willing to work for a much 
lower wage. 
Stewart (1981), in analyzing uncertain demand in a 
price-regulated market, employed the same technique as 
Anderson and Enomoto in the sense that better quality was 
defined as extra "frills" (e.g., free drinks on airplanes). 
He made three alternatives assumptions about how the cost 
associated with the quality variable varies with output 
(increasing, independent, and decreasing). By maximizing 
the expected utility of profits, he showed that a risk 
averse firm provides goods of higher quality than a risk 
neutral firm. Decreasing absolute risk aversion implies 
that smaller firms produce goods of better quality than 
larger firms in this model. It is also shown that if a 
firm can increase quality by reducing capacity, risk 
aversion and plant capacity move in opposite direction 
(e.g., a theater owner may augment quality by providing 
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more leg-room and in the process reduces his/her theater's 
number of seats). Stewart (1981) also analyzed the effect 
of a price reduction on the optimal quality level. It 
turned out that to conclude in one way or the other, 
additional restrictive assumptions are required. 
Quality, cmotas. and tariffs 
It was only in 1979 that tariffs and quotas were 
compared in terms of their effects on quality composition 
of the goods whose imports are restricted. Falvey (1979) 
was the first to investigate the effects of import 
restrictions (quotas, specific and ad-valorem tariffs, and 
value restrictions) on the quality of imports. In his 
analysis, which was largely influenced by the work of 
Borcherding and Silberberg (1978) on transportation costs, 
Falvey analyzed the effects of trade restrictions on 
relative prices of two grades of different quality within 
the same product. Like transportation costs, a specific 
tariff and a quota change the relative price of the high 
quality grade which induces a change in the composition of 
imports in favor of the higher quality variety. It is 
assumed that the relative prices of the two grades with 
respect to other products are not important because, as 
argued by Borcherding and Silberberg (1978, p. 135), two 
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grades assumed to be close substitutes are presumed to have 
similar interactions with other commodities. 
An ad-valorem tariff was shown to leave the relative 
price of the two grades unchanged and does not bias the 
composition of imports in this product category as long as 
the two grades are imported. The same thing can be said 
about value restrictions. The above results hold for a 
competitive exporter as well as for an export monopolist. 
It is also shown that a voluntary export quota influences 
the relative price in the same manner as a specific tariff 
making the cheaper variety relatively more expensive. 
Rodriguez (1979) addressed Falvey's topic but used a 
different approach. He assumed that consumers derive 
utility from the services provided by the goods and not by 
the goods themselves. It is assumed that the cost of 
production is constant for any output level and that the 
marginal cost increases only when quality is augmented. 
Output is undeterminate but free entry ensures that no 
excess profits will be made. The imposition of an ad-
valorem tariff is shown not alter the choice of the unit 
quality content. Total imports of services fall as the 
price of a unit of services rise in proportion to the 
tariff. 
When a quota on the volume of physical imports is 
imposed, the exporters still maximize their profits by 
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equating price to marginal cost. This implies that quality 
must increase. At this point, the marginal cost does not 
equal anymore the average cost which means that the average 
cost of a unit of services has increased. This loss is 
more than offset by the trade gain or the increase in the 
amount of services imported. The physical goods imported 
under a quota are of better quality and yield higher 
utility than the ones imported under an ad-valorem tariff. 
As in Falvey (1979), a specific tariff and a quota have 
similar effect on quality. 
If a quality standard is set so that it exceeds the 
quality level associated with a quota, then it can be shown 
that the increase in the number of services per unit of 
physical good and consequently in total services will not 
be enough to compensate for the loss of revenue or rent 
that can be generated by a quota. The increase in the 
average cost then captured by the exporters. When the goal 
is to restrict the amount of services (the price is then 
fixed and no more downward sloping), there are no trade 
gains that can be induced by a quota or quality control as 
in the previous case. In this case, the higher the price 
paid to the exporters, the higher the welfare loss. It is 
easy to show that a quality control is the most inefficient 
policy to achieve the specified goal. Under the ad-valorem 
tariff, the exporters receive the free trade price while 
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under the quota, they receive a higher price since they 
equalize it to marginal cost which is greater than average 
cost, the free trade price. The tariff is the preferred 
instrument even though less physical goods are actually 
imported Î 
Bockstael (1984), who was also interested in the 
effects of quality standards, demonstrated that when 
consumers can perceive quality ex-ante (e.g., they can see 
something wrong with grapefruits that look like lemons), 
minimum quality standards lead to social losses. It is her 
,opinion that quality standards are tools used by 
protectionists who for political reasons impose quality 
standards instead of tariffs or quotas. 
Santoni and Van Cott (1980) also analyzed the quality 
adjustment problem linked to the imposition of quotas. As 
in Rodriguez, they found that quality is upgraded following 
the imposition of a quota. Their main contribution is that 
the quality adjustment that takes place when importers are 
allowed to collude is less than when importers are price 
takers. 
Voluntary agreements and trade 
Orderly marketing agreements (OMAs) and voluntary 
export restraints (VERs) are now common instruments in 
international trade. Both of these instruments place 
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quantitative restrictions on imports of certain goods but 
unlike quotas and tariffs, are managed by the exporters. 
Aw and Roberts (1986) advanced that the OMAs and VERs boost 
import prices in two ways. The first effect is the one 
discussed in Falvey (1979) and Rodriguez (1979), that is, 
OMAs and VERs will lead the exporters to supply goods of 
higher quality and hence more expensive within a quota-
constrained product category. The second effect can be 
summarized by the tendency for the importing country to 
divert their import demand toward products from higher-cost 
non-controlled exporters. Aw and Roberts (1986) used index 
number techniques to analyze the quality effects of the 
1977-1981 OMA on U.S. footwear imports from Taiwan and 
Korea. They found out that substitution among products 
within each of their quota categories led to higher prices 
when an OMA was in effect. In three of their five 
categories product substitution reduced prices in the non-
OMA period. They also discovered that substitution among 
supplying countries acted to reduce the average price of 
footwear in the non-OMA years and raise prices when the OMA 
was in effect. 
Helpman and Krugman (1985) claimed that the Hecksher-
Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S) model fails to explain empirical 
puzzles such as the volume of trade, the composition of 
trade, the volume and role of intra-firm trade and direct 
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foreign investment, and the welfare effects of trade 
liberalization. The relaxation of the standard assumptions 
about constant return to scale and perfect competition is 
the key to their results. Conventional trade theory 
explains trade by differences in factor endowments (such as 
labor and capital) between countries. Consequently, one 
would expect that countries with similar factor endowments 
would not have a high volume of trade between them. 
However, in practice nearly half the world's trade consists 
of trade between industrial countries with relatively 
similar factor endowments. The theory also suggests that 
the exports and imports of a country should differ in their 
factor content. Again, an examination of the real world 
contradicts this proposition. Industrialized countries are 
engaged in trade of goods with similar factor contents. 
However the products differ in quality. West Germany 
exports expensive cars to the U.S. and imports Chevettes. 
Note, one way to salvage the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-0-
S) model is to change the perception of a country as being 
a point and allow for regional differences in factor 
endowments or by assuming that domestic transportation 
costs exceed international transportation costs as in 
Melvin's (1985) analysis. 
These arguments against the H-O-S model are nothing 
new. According to Linder (1961), factor proportions 
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analysis cannot possibly explain intra-regional trade, 
because by definition, a region has homogeneous factor 
proportions. He conjectured that intra-regional trade must 
be explained by reference to other relationships, such as 
economies of scale and transport costs. His main 
hypothesis was that countries tend to produce manufacture 
goods of the quality that were representative of the 
domestic demand, which in turn is hypothesized to be a 
function of the average domestic income. Scale economies 
implicitly restrict the variety of qualities that could be 
produced within a country, especially for consumers who are 
on the fringes of the representative demand. 
Krugman (1979) formalized one of Linder's arguments 
and showed that intra-industry trade is likely to take 
place when there are scale economies internal to the firm. 
His model has only one factor of production, namely labor 
and consequently rule out the factor proportions analysis 
to explain trade. Growth in the labor force and trade 
yield the same result. In both cases, output for every 
variety and the number of varieties increase. Factor 
mobility is hence a perfect substitute for trade as long as 
the productivity of labor is the same in the two countries 
engaged in trade. 
The pattern of trade is undeterminate and this 
weakness of Krugman's model motivated Guy Bridgeman to 
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write a dissertation on the subject. He adopted a larger 
share of Linder's arguments by trying to capture the 
effects of scale economies and demand differences between 
countries. He showed that the distribution of people's 
willingness to pay for quality within and between countries 
and the monopolists' ability to discriminate are critical 
in determining the pattern of trade and the number of 
varieties that will be produced. 
Reputation and quality 
Product quality is also captured in models that 
account for a firm's reputation. In Shapiro's (1983) 
paper, it is assumed that consumers cannot observe the 
quality of the goods ex-ante and that the price they pay 
for the goods is function of the firm's reputation. 
Reputations take time to build and firms have to sell below 
cost early in their life cycle. For firms to recuperate 
their investment in their reputations, the equilibrium 
market price for quality products has to be above the 
average cost of production even when the market is 
competitive. Firms selling low quality items at the price 
for high quality, eventually get caught and the market 
price at equilibrium is high enough to prevent firms from 
"milking" (i.e., being honest for an infinity of periods is 
just as profitable as being dishonest for a few periods). 
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What Shapiro did not consider is that the infinite 
series of profits may be subject to huge variations over 
time because of changing supply and demand at home and 
abroad. Also, the length of the series for the honest 
firms may be uncertain because of political decisions or 
events that have nothing with normal market forces. Under 
these conditions, risk averse firms should command higher 
premiums for producing quality items. 
In Allen (1984), a rational-expectations, Nash-
equilibrium is used thus making consumers more 
sophisticated than in Shapiro's model. For example, 
equilibria characterized by price equal to average cost but 
above marginal cost are possible. The consumers know the 
cost functions of the firms and know that firms which would 
cut their price would have an incentive to produce low 
quality products. The firms know that the consumers are 
aware of this and do not reduce their price. 
This section of the literature review discussed the 
modeling of quality and the distinct effects of some trade 
restrictions when quality is endogenous. Finally, some 
papers on the reputation of the firm were summarized. 
Conclusion 
From the literature reviewed in the area of risk and 
uncertainty, the papers of Baron (1970) and Sandmo (1971) 
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had the greatest influence on this study. Baron's 
methodology is used in Chapters Four and Six to analyze 
quality uncertainty and the effects of price uncertainty on 
the wheat exporters choice variables. Sandmo's 
contribution is mostly felt in Chapter Four where his mean-
preserving spread technique is used, and in Chapter Five 
for a discussion on market structure. The work of Falvey 
(1979), and Young and Anderson (1982) stimulated most my 
interest for the comparison of trade restrictions under 
different conditions such as the ones in Chapters Five and 
Six. 
The reputation models were reviewed because of their 
potential to explain the behavior of U.S. wheat exporters. 
The reputation of a firm may be country-specific or may 
depends on the level of diversification of the firm. These 
reputation schemes are natural developments of Shapiro's 
original work and will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Five. 
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CHAPTER THREE: QUALITY VARIABILITY AND CERTAINTY 
The results of a model in which import price does not 
adjust to quality variability are analyzed in this chapter. 
This situation depicts a problem many importers of U.S. 
grain have argued they are facing. In this instance, the 
price of the imported grain (wheat) does not internalize or 
reflect quality variability. For the system to be 
efficient, quality fluctuations must be small, centered at 
the mean, and, likely, but not necessarily, observable at 
low cost ex-ante.1 As mentioned in Chapter One, the grades 
used to identify wheat quality are not precise indicators 
of all the characteristics the ultimate consumers (foreign 
buyers) use to make purchase decisions. 
The U.S. grading system and the inspection services 
permit wheat with different characteristics, and, hence, of 
different quality, to be given the same grade. The final 
grade given to wheat is the lowest of the characteristics 
monitored for purposes of ascribing the grade. For 
example, a bushel of No. 2 wheat scoring at or above 
tolerance levels for all but one factor necessary to be a 
^Given the manner with which disputes over quality are 
settled by F.G.I.S., it is possible to have a (imperfect) 
market in which price does not adjust to small observable 
quality changes. 
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No. 1 wheat is sold for the same price as a bushel of No. 2 
wheat scoring at No. 2 levels on all factors. 
To facilitate the analysis, a simple model for a small 
country importing a good of variable quality is presumed. 
The small country assumption is critical to the analysis. 
If the country can exert enough market power to change the 
terms of trade by modifying imports, it can influence the 
grading system of the exporting country. It is assumed 
that the importing country is a price taker, unable to 
influence the existing grading system. Effects of quality 
fluctuations are analyzed under certainty, with the 
introduction of a quality parameter q. This parameter can 
be interpreted as the 'relative grade* of the imported 
wheat, implying the grade of the domestically produced 
wheat is the numeraire. Results of this analysis provide a 
foundation for evaluating quality effects under uncertainty 
in Chapter Four. 
Even with certainty or the assumption of perfect 
knowledge, the impact of grain quality on import and 
domestic production levels for the small price-taking 
country is not trivial. For example, it is not evident 
that the volume of imported wheat will increase as quality 
increases, given the opposite impacts of substitution and 
income effects. It is shown that the direction of the 
change in imports of wheat as quality changes, depends on 
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the size of the import price elasticity. This implies that 
if the price elasticity of U.S. wheat were smaller than 
one, export sales would not increase if exporters were to 
bear a higher cost to raise U.S. wheat quality. 
The Structure of the Model 
The objective of this section is to elaborate on the 
structure of the model used to analyze the problem. The 
model is designed to capture the intricacies of the 
decision-making of a small country importing wheat of 
heterogeneous quality. For simplicity, it is assumed that 
a central planner exists in the importing country, who 
directly or indirectly (i.e., import quota) controls one or 
more importing firms. This arrangement is prevalent in 
many less-developed countries, such as Haiti. The central 
planner's preferences are complete, reflexive, transitive, 
continuous, strongly monotonie, and strictly convex, thus 
guaranteeing the existence of a continuous utility function 
(Varian, 1984, p. 112). The arguments in the central 
planner's utility function are the consumption levels of 
the n different goods available (including wheat) in the 
importing country, {U = U(X3^,... ,Xjj)}. 
Heterogeneity in the quality of wheat can be addressed 
by treating different wheats as different goods or by 
adding wheats together using a weighting procedure to 
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account for different grades. Wheats serving distinct 
purposes should be handled according to the first 
alternative since they have little in common but their 
product code. Hedonic models, which do not make 
distinctions between different grades and different 
classes, are flawed. The utility function must have more 
structure when the second alternative is considered. For 
different grades of wheat to be treated as an aggregated 
argument in the utility function, the latter must be 
separable. 
The production side of the model has been influenced 
by Bhagwati and Srinivasan's (1973) model on smuggling. 
Income is function of the production of only one commodity 
and can be defined as I = Y+G(Y), where G(Y) is the 
production of another single or aggregate commodity. It is 
assumed that the first and second partial derivatives of 
G(Y) (i.e., Gy and Gyy), are both negative. This ensures a 
concave production possibility frontier. Hence, both 
commodities are competing for the same scarce inputs. Full 
employment results from the assumption that the central 
planner operates on the frontier of the transformation 
curve. Production adjustments to changes in the quality of 
the imported wheat are costless and instantaneous. 
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The Small Country Model and Heterogeneous Quality 
The importing country is assumed to maximize the 
utility function 
(3-1) U(Xi, X2+qQ), 
where x^ and Xg are the consumption of the domestically 
produced aggregate good^ and wheat respectively. The 
quantity of imported wheat is defined by Q, and q is the 
quality adjustment factor that transforms the imported 
wheat into characteristics or services consistent with 
those of domestically produced wheat Xg. For example, a 
higher q would be associated with a lower amount of foreign 
material in the wheat and vice versa. The expected value 
of q, E[q], is assumed to equal one, implying that, on 
average, imported and domestic wheat are identical. It can 
be assumed either that a one to one relationship exists 
between the domestic wheat and the services yielded, or 
that domestic wheat can be used as a numeraire, thus 
eliminating the need for an additional quality parameter. 
The aggregate good is simply a vector of all the 
other goods produced in the economy. The underlying 
assumption is that the production function is separable, 
used subsequently in two-stage optimization. The 
allocation of resources within the aggregate good being 
independent of the real price of wheat, we define the 
production of the aggregate good as G(Y). 
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The utility function is maximized subject to a budget 
constraint which insures that the value of imports always 
equals the value of exports, 
(3-2) P(Y-X2)+G(Y)-Xi-PQ = 0, 
where G(Y) and Y denote the domestic production of the 
aggregate good and domestic wheat, and P is the relative 
price of wheat. Finally, i is the Lagrangian multiplier 
used in the optimization process. The Lagrangian 
multiplier can be interpreted as the marginal utility of 
income. 
First order conditions with respect to the choice 
variables of the importing country, namely x^y Xg, Q and Y, 
are expressed in equations (3-3) through (3-7). 
(3-3) Ui-$ = 0, 
(3-4) Ug-SP = 0, 
(3-5) Ugq-tP = 0, 
(3-6) P+Gy = 0, and 
(3-7) P(Y-X2-Q)+G(Y)-X^ = 0, 
where Ug, and Ugg are the first, cross, and 
second partial derivatives of the utility function (3-1). 
From these first order conditions^, observe that, when 
q > 1, the imported wheat is more valuable than domestic 
wheat. This implies a corner solution with the country 
^It is implicitly assumed that the second order 
conditions for utility maximization are met. 
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exporting all of its domestic wheat and consuming only 
imported wheat (Xg = 0 and Q = Y+[G(Y)-x^]/?). When q < 1, 
a corner solution is also yielded, since the consumers 
derive less utility from imported wheat than from the 
domestic wheat (Q = 0, and Y = Xg). For q = 1, the 
standard results are observed, where imported and domestic 
wheat are equivalent in utility to the consumers. 
For q > 1, the above discussion makes the questionable 
assumption that there is sufficient demand for the lower 
quality domestic wheat that the importing country can 
export at the import price P (for the higher quality 
wheat). This implies either that the importing country can 
mislead the other countries or that the other countries 
have different preferences (i.e., different ways of 
assessing q, based on differences in the grading systems of 
the exporting and importing countries). 
The first alternative incorporates the premise that 
there is a signal extraction problem^, and it may be more 
or less realistic. The second explanation rests on the 
supposition that tastes and preferences vary among 
countries, perhaps due to culture and education. Intra-
commodity trade, the simultaneous importing and exporting 
^The countries interested in the importing country's 
domestic wheat are not aware that intra-commodity trade is 
occurring. This situation may arise in free trade zones, 
for example. 
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of what is apparently the same product, is common and has 
been well documented in the literature (Helpman and 
Krugman, 1985). However, since most countries buying 
primary products like wheat use them for the same purposes 
(feed, milling, and baking) and theoretically have access 
to the same technology, they are all likely to value the 
same characteristics. 
For this reason, we impose the assumption of 
homogeneity in tastes and preferences among countries. A 
good whose quality is perceived as inferior in one country 
will also be perceived as inferior in the other countries. 
This does not rule-out intra-commodity trade per se, but 
rules-out the exporting of low-quality wheat at the high 
quality price. For the present analysis, the domestic 
production of wheat is always entirely consumed 
domestically, Y = Xg. On this condition, the utility 
maximization problem can be simplified, 
(3-8) U(Xi,Y+qQ)+«[G(Y)-Xi-PQ]. 
The corresponding first order conditions differ somewhat 
from those in equations (3-3) through (3-7). Specifically, 
(3-9) Ui-$ = 0, 
(3-10) Ug+OGy = 0, 
(3-11) Ugq-OP = 0, and 
(3-12) G(Y)-Xi-PQ = 0. 
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From (3-9) and (3-10), Ug/U^ = -Gy, or the domestic 
marginal rate of substitution equals the domestic rate of 
transformation. Similarly, from (3-9) and (3-11), Ugq/U^ = 
P or the marginal rate of substitution of imported wheat 
for the aggregate good is equal to the relative price. 
Finally, from the ratio of equations (3-10) and (3-11), we 
obtain an equality between the domestic rate of 
transformation and the world price weighted by the quality 
adjustment factor, -Gy = P/q. 
If consumers are capable of discerning quality 
variations, domestic production will adjust, and hence 
change the real price P/q. Even if the price of the 
imported wheat does not change, some adjustment will occur 
through the price of the domestic wheat. For example, if 
the quality of the imported wheat deteriorates (q < 1), the 
value of the domestic wheat will appreciate and its 
relative price will reflect the quality differential. As 
long as the buyers can discriminate among goods of 
different quality, there is no market failure. The 
adjustment that takes place does not matter, whether 
through the domestic price or through the import price, 
since the relative prices remain the same. This result 
holds only when the agents in the importing country know 
the quality of the imported and domestically produced wheat 
and can react instantaneously to quality change. 
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For the second order conditions of the utility 
maximization problem (3-8) to hold, the sign of the 
determinants of the border-preserving principal minors of 
the bordered Hessian matrix must alternate in sign (Varian, 
1984). Totally differentiating the above first order 
conditions and constructing the bordered Hessian matrix 
yields. 
11 12, Ui2<3 -1 
liir" -f 
B 
dx, 
dY 
dQ 
d$ 
0 
0 
« 
Q 
dP + 
-U12Q 
-U22Q 
0 
dq. 
The notation makes extensive use of subscripts which denote 
partial derivatives, unless stated otherwise. For example 
represents the second partial derivative of the utility 
function with respect to the consumption level of the 
aggregate good, x^. Domestic or imported wheat, adjusted 
for quality differential, form the second argument in the 
utility function. The subscript '2' denotes a derivative 
with respect to wheat. The usual assumptions on the signs 
of and U22 are made (i.e., Ujj < 0 for j = 1 or 2). 
This implies that utility is increasing at a decreasing 
rate as the consumption of wheat or the aggregate good 
increases. Barring saturation, the marginal utilities from 
the consumption of the aggregate good and from wheat are 
positive. By using results from the first order conditions 
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and rearranging the terms, we obtain the following 
expression for the determinant of A. 
Since Gyy < 0, the expression 
is unconditionally negative when > 0 and will be 
negative if (-PU^^/g, -qU22/P) > -U^g, when < 0. The 
expression for the determinant of the 3x3 minor, 
^11 ^ 12 
Ujl U22+*Gyy Gg = -[U^2Gy^+2U]^2Gy+U22+$Gyy] > 0, 
is clearly positive when the above condition for hold, 
thus guaranteeing that the second order conditions are met. 
Price and Quality Change 
The comparative statics for the model developed in 
Section 3 are revealing. Of principal interest is how the 
volume of imports and the consumption and production of 
domestically produced goods are affected by changes in the 
price and quality of imported wheat. These results are 
summarized below. 
(3-13) dQ/dP = [-$U2iGy2-2$U]^2GY-$U22-$^Gyy+$U]^]^QPGyy-
4Ui2gQGyy]/I AI < 0. 
(3-14) dY/dP = [-$U^2PGy-2$Ui2P+$U22q]/|A| > 0. 
(3-15) dx^/dP = [$2pGyy-p$GyyQqU^2+0^22^^]/ I^I > = < 0. 
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(3""16) dQ/dg — 2U2U2^2Gy^*U2U22'^U2^11^Y^""^^X2^^^YY*^^^22^^^YY'^ 
tU^Gyy ^ or ^ 0 • 
(3-17) dY/dq = [-U2g(Ui2Gy+U22)]/|A| < 0. 
(3-18) dx^/dq = [P$Gyy(PUi20-^2290-^2)] ^  or < 0. 
As expected, equation (3-13) shows that as the price 
of imported wheat increases, the substitution and income 
effects move in the same direction, and demand for imported 
wheat decreases. Equation (3-14) shows that an increase in 
the price of imported wheat will increase the domestic 
production of wheat, if the quality of imported wheat is 
held constant. When the price of imported wheat rises, the 
domestic producers of wheat augment their production and 
the consumers substitute the domestic wheat for the 
imported wheat. 
The result from equation (3-15) is, as anticipated, 
ambiguous since the substitution and the income effects 
move the demand for the aggregate good in opposite 
directions. A relatively higher price for domestic wheat 
induces the domestic producers to produce less of the 
aggregate good, and the consumers to consume more of it. 
The three results from equations (3-13) through (3-15) 
are standard and can be found in most textbooks (e.g., 
Varian, 1984). The remaining results are interesting, 
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since quality is not a characteristic for which extensive 
comparative statics analysis exists. It is particularly 
important to note that equation (3-16) is ambiguous. Can 
equation (3-16) be interpreted as a contradiction of 
Samuelson's proposition that more is always preferred to 
less (Samuelson, 1983; Varian, 1984)? The answer is 
simple. It is possible for an importing country to reduce 
the volume of imported wheat and still be maximizing 
utility depending on preferences and on the extent to which 
quality can compensate for quantity. When q (the quality 
variable) increases, fewer units of imported wheat are 
needed to achieve the same level of utility. In addition, 
decreasing marginal utility may result in the consumption 
of fewer units of imported wheat, and higher consumption of 
the aggregate good. The importing country, therefore, may 
achieve greater utility from purchasing a lower volume of 
wheat. 
Equation (3-17) demonstrates that when the quality of 
imported wheat increases, the demand for domestic wheat 
falls. The necessary condition for signing equation (3-16) 
can be derived by first rewriting the utility function as 
(3-19) U = U(G(Y)-Se,Y+e), 
where 6 = P/q and 0 = qQ. Note, dQ/dP = [d(e/q)/dS]/q^, 
therefore, equation (3-16) can be expressed as 
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(3-16') dQ/dq = d(e/q)/d5 dS/dq l/q-0/q 
= [d0/d5(-P/q)-8]/q2 
= (eQ-l)Q/q. 
The sign of (3-16) is hence positive if and only if 
(3-20) -Oq > 1. 
Thus, it is obvious that (3-16') is positive, if the price 
elasticity of Q, defined as -P/Q(dQ/dP), exceeds one. 
An alternative and more tedious approach uses the 
unambiguous sign of equation (3-17) to determine under what 
condition higher quality of imports will result in 
increased imports. Equation (3-16) can then be rewritten. 
(3-16") dQ/dq = [(dQ/dP) (P/Q) (-Q/q)]+|A| (-Q/q)/|A| . 
This is equivalent to the condition expressed in (3-16), 
and to take a positive value, again condition (3-20) -eg > 
1 must hold. Intuitively, an increase in q can be treated 
as an increase in the real price of domestic wheat P/q, 
also the price of the imported wheat when the latter is 
expressed in terms of the grade of the domestic wheat. 
Hence, the sign of (3-16') depends whether the demand for 
wheat is elastic or inelastic. 
Recently, this result as shown in (3-20) was obtained 
by Murphy (1980) who used a characteristic model with 
exogenous income. Equation (3-16'') is identical to his 
equation (11) and is rather tedious to derive. The 
alternative proof given in (3-16') is derived in a much 
85 
more intuitive and straightforward manner by taking into 
account the definition of 6 (P and q are symmetric). 
Murphy's objective was to identify the relationship between 
quality and consumer demand. He demonstrated that the 
parameterization of quality in a demand equation could lead 
to erroneous results since an assumption has to be made 
about the effect of quality on demand. 
The result obtained in (3-20) is very important. If 
the price elasticity of imported wheat from the U.S. was 
smaller than one, it could not be hypothesized that the 
decrease in the volume of U.S. wheat exports is 
attributable to lower wheat quality. However this is 
unlikely since firms with market power (like U.S. wheat 
exporters) will try to operate in the elastic portion of 
the demand curve. 
The result implied by equation (3-18) can be 
rationalized by the same argument used for evaluating 
equation (3-16). When the quality of imported wheat 
improves, the production and consumption of domestic wheat 
decrease. This implies that the domestic production of the 
aggregate good, G(Y), increases if the country remains on 
the production possibility frontier. This increase in the 
production of the aggregate good can be used to increase 
domestic consumption or to increase exports which, in turn, 
will be traded for more high-quality imported wheat. Total 
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FIGURE 3-1. The effects of an increase in the quality of 
imported wheat on production and consumption 
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consumption of wheat, as deduced from (3-18) or from (3-16) 
and (3-17) is ambiguous relative to quality. If equation 
(3-16) is positive, (3-18) will be negative and vice versa. 
Figure 3-1 illustrates the effect of an increase in 
the quality of imported wheat on both domestic production 
and the volume of imports. Initially, domestic and 
imported wheats are identical in quality, and production 
and consumption of wheat are indicated by Pq and Qq. When 
the quality of imported wheat increases, domestic 
production falls to while consumption of physical units 
of wheat falls to Q^. The volume of imported wheat 
characteristics has risen from Qg to q^, enabling the 
importing country to achieve a higher level of utility. 
The change in import volume is in general ambiguous, and 
depends on the curvature of the production possibility 
frontier and preferences. The number of physical units of 
wheat consumed may decrease, but the number of wheat 
characteristics consumed is likely to increase. The strong 
monotonicity assumption is not violated because utility is 
defined in terms of characteristics, not physical units. 
One should note that differences in expressing imports in 
terms characteristics or in terms of physical units are 
reconciled when imports are measured in terms of exports 
(Pi* - Qi*). 
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Results in this section may explain trends in data on 
U.S. wheat imports for Brazil, Japan, U.S.S.R., Chile, 
Ecuador, and Portugal, all of which have complained in the 
past about the quality of U.S. wheat. In general, these 
countries have decreased their dependency on U.S. wheat by 
obtaining a higher proportion of imported wheat from other 
countries and/or by increasing domestic production. Figure 
3-2 shows U.S. wheat imports as a percentage of total wheat 
imports between 1965 and 1986 for these six countries. 
Decreases in the percentage of U.S. wheat imports are 
especially marked in Brazil, U.S.S.R., and Portugal. Chile 
had roughly a 20 percent decrease of U.S. wheat as a 
percentage of their total wheat imports, while Japan and 
Ecuador had a relatively constant share of U.S. wheat 
imports. 
Figure 3-3 illustrates the relative volume of U.S. 
wheat imports with respect to domestic production between 
1965 and 1986 in the these countries. In 1977, Japan 
imported 15 times more wheat from the U.S. than it 
produced. In 1986, that percentage had decreased by more 
than three fold. The proportion of U.S. wheat imports as a 
share of domestic production in Brazil grew steadily 
between 1978 and 1984; however, it dropped suddenly in 1985 
and approached zero in 1986. The series for Portugal and 
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Chile began to converge toward zero in the early 1980s, and 
by 1986 had fallen to zero. 
Welfare Effects of Quality Change 
The welfare effects of quality changes can be 
evaluated more conveniently using the indirect utility 
function. From the indirect utility function, the 
Marshallian demand for wheat can be easily derived. 
Equation (3-7) can be rewritten as 
(3-21) Max. U(X2,Y+8)+${G(Y)-Xi-5e}. 
Note that since utility is in services that consumers 
derive, it makes sense to express all the arguments in this 
form. The domestic consumption of the aggregate good, x^, 
and of domestic wheat, Y, yield one unit of aggregate and 
wheat services, respectively. The services derived from 
imported wheat, 0, depend entirely on the value of the 
quality parameter (q) and the volume of imported wheat (Q), 
since 0 = qQ. A higher q implies that a larger quantity of 
services are derived from a unit of imported wheat. The 
price of imported wheat services, 6, is simply P/q, so that 
the budget constraint remains the same as in equation (3-8) 
(i.e., PQ = 50). 
Let X2 = Y + 0 be the total consumption of wheat 
services or characteristics. By maximizing (3-21) for the 
choice variables, x^, Y, and 0, we obtain the first order 
\ 
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conditions found in (3-9) through (3-12). Notice that q is 
no longer a parameter, since it does not appear 
(individually) in the utility function, nor the budget 
constraint. As well, q is not a separate argument in the 
implied demand functions. The only parameter appearing in 
the demand functions is 6, defined as P/q. This is why the 
impact of changes in quality can be expressed as multiple 
of the impact of changes in price as shown by (3-20). From 
the first order conditions for (3-21), -Gy(Y) = 5 is 
derived. The domestic production of the imported good 
wheat, Y, can then be expressed in terms of 6. 
Using equations (3-8) and (3-10), 0 can be expressed 
in terms of and 6, 0 = 0(X2,5). By inserting Q(x^,S) 
into the budget constraint, I = G(Y)+6Y = x^+SXg, x^ can be 
obtained in terms of 5. The same procedure can be used for 
the remaining variables, 
0 = 0{S,I(S)} and Y = Y{6,I(6)}. 
Now if these expressions are inserted into the direct 
utility function (3-21), 
(3-22) U[X3^{6,I(6)),Y{S,I(S)}+0(6,I(5)}], or V[6] 
is obtained. 
The first derivative of the indirect utility function 
(3-22) with respect to the parameter 5 is 
(3-23) dV/d6 = Vg+VjY = -Vj0, 
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since by Roy's identity, Vg = -VjX2, where X2 = Y+0. 
Equation (3-23) provides valuable information about 
fluctuations in welfare resulting from changes in the real 
relative price (quality) of imports. The sign of (3-23) 
indicates that an increase in the real relative price of 
wheat services will lower welfare. This is intuitive since 
the country is a net importer of these services. The 
demand for imported services from equation (3-23) is 
similar to one obtained by Woodland (1980), and confirms 
the usefulness of Roy's identity when income is endogenous. 
Woodland's indirect trade utility function expresses the 
maximum level of utility a trading nation can attain, 
assuming the existence of a direct community utility 
function, as a function of a vector of prices for 
commoditiesf a vector of factor endowments and the balance 
of trade. In the above analysis, factor endowments were 
omitted and a market clearing condition has been imposed, 
rendering the balance of trade component redundant. The 
novelty in (3-22) is that quality change has been 
introduced with relative ease into a model with endogenous 
income. 
Equations (3-24) and (3-25) describe effects of 
augmenting the quality parameter and the price of imports 
on welfare, 
(3-24) dV/dq = SVj-e/q, and 
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(3-25) dV/dp = -VjS/q. 
In equation (3-24), welfare increases when the quality of 
the imported good is augmented. Of course, these 
ameliorations are not beneficial to all the groups in 
society. But, overall welfare is improved, assuming that 
the gainers can appropriately compensate the losers. In a 
way, the case of q > 1 can be interpreted as dumping 
(because P is not allowed to adjust). The appropriate 
response from the importing country is to thank the 
exporter. Equation (3-24) could have been derived from the 
direct utility function (3-7), where dU/dq = UgQ is 
identical to (3-24), since from the first order conditions 
Ug = $5 = VjS and Q = 0/q. Equation (3-25) shows that a 
jump in the price of imported wheat, holding q constant, 
will hurt the domestic consumers more that it will help the 
domestic producers of wheat. 
Indeed all the above welfare statements are made in 
the context described in the second section of this 
chapter. If a domestic factor market was introduced, some 
of the results derived above would not hold if some of the 
factor were product specific. An increase in q would not 
necessarily make the country better off. It follows that 
in such a situation, trade restrictions may dominate free 
trade. If nothing precludes the movement along the 
transformation curve, free trade is optimal and an increase 
97 
in quality will improve welfare. Let 5* and P* be the 
world prices for imported wheat services and imported wheat 
respectively. The domestic prices are as before given by 5 
and P. The difference resides in the fact that these 
prices are now function of the amount of characteristics on 
the market and on world prices. If a quota or tariff is 
imposed the income of the importing country can be 
represented by: I = G(Y)+6Y+(S-5*)0. 
The following equation determines the optimal volume 
of imported wheat. 
(3-26) dV/dQ = {-VjX2+Vj (Y+S) ) (dS/dP) (dP/d (Gq"^)+qV3. ( 5-6*) 
= Vj(P~P*) = 0. 
Because the marginal utility of income is always positive, 
an optimal solution is reached when the domestic price 
equals the world price. 
Conclusion and Implication 
The model provided a basis for assessing the impact of 
changes in quality, while keeping the level of complexity 
to a minimum. The main result is the link between import 
response to a change in quality and the price elasticity of 
the imported good. Given a price elastic import demand, 
imports will decrease when the quality of the imported 
product deteriorates. 
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Because the export of U.S. wheat has significantly 
decreased during recent years, one can hypothesize from 
these results that a quality problem exists in the wheat 
export industry in the U.S. As emphasized in Chapter One, 
the quality of U.S. wheat may or may not have met contract 
specifications. The economics of the question go beyond 
legal dimensions, since the importers' expectations and 
evaluations of imported wheat determine the value of the 
quality parameter q. 
It is evident that the behavior of U.S. exporters 
depends on the importing country's ability to measure 
quality. Consequently, there must be an optimal scheme for 
quality adulteration that will keep importers from 
improving their inspection services, and, at the same time, 
will lower the costs of the exporters. The optimal scheme 
should also take into account the behavior of competitors. 
It is conceivable that if there is a leader in the 
industry, all major exporters might lower their wheat 
quality if the leader did so. Perhaps the U.S. grain 
quality problem results from the fact that no U.S. firm can 
emerge as a leader given the structure of the U.S. grain 
export industry. This argument will be investigated in 
Chapter Five. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND QUALITY UNCERTAINTY 
It was previously shown that for a small country 
producing two goods, demand for the imported good (wheat) 
does not necessarily increase with increased quality. 
Assuming utility maximizing behavior under certainty, the 
rate of transformation (-Gy) and the marginal rate of 
substitution (Ug/U^) were found equal to P/q, where P is 
the price of imported wheat, q is the quality parameter for 
the imported wheat and P/q can be interpreted as the price 
of domestic wheat adjusted for quality of imported wheat 
under certainty. It was also confirmed that an increase in 
the quality of the imported good (wheat) was potentially 
welfare improving, irrespective of the response of the 
import schedule to changes in the quality parameter.^ 
Distribution issues were excluded from the analysis. 
However, assuming the existence of a social welfare 
function, it is easy to conceive that the new equilibrium 
may not be superior in the absence of an efficient 
compensation scheme. 
From these results we hypothesized that the decline in 
U.S. wheat exports during the 1980s was perhaps in part due 
^Even if the importing country does not adjust its 
domestic production and import schedule as the quality of 
imported wheat improves, it will be better off than before, 
but not as well off as if it were reacting to the changing 
environment. This is akin to Le Chatelier's principle. 
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to an inefficient marketing strategy focusing too much on 
the numerator and not enough on the denominator of the 
relevant parameter P/q. The U.S. grain marketing system, 
as discussed previously may not provide sufficient 
incentives to improve export grain quality. The above 
results indicate some consequences from being uncompetitive 
in terms of quality.% During Congressional Hearings, the 
grain export industry defended its practices, arguing that 
the blending of the grain is very accurate, rendering 
virtually impossible any systematic bias (United States 
•House of Representatives, 1986a). What if the industry's 
claim were true? Would that put an abrupt end to interest 
in quality of exports? No, the stochastic nature of the 
quality parameter, discussed in the description of the 
grading system and inspection services, forces risk averse 
wheat importers to be concerned about higher moments of the 
quality distribution. Again, the final certificate system 
determining quality at the point of export forces the 
importers to bear the risk of significant wheat 
deterioration during transit. Since the grading system is 
based on the lowest scoring factor, there is a strong 
potential for quality heterogeneity within a grade. 
^Again, this abstracts from the legal aspects of 
quality. A valid inspection certificate could hardly be 
used as a proxy for the relative quality of U.S. wheat with 
respect to wheat of different origin. 
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Moreover, because some important characteristics cannot be 
measured yet by F.G.I.S., there is genuine uncertainty 
about the scores on these factors. The rounding of the 
dockage was a major quality problem in the past. Today, 
the measure appearing on the certificate is closer to the 
true level of dockage. However, for importers, uncertainty 
about the representativeness of the sampling procedure 
continues to discredit the gain in measurement accuracy. 
In the short-run, the true quality not being fully 
observable is almost irrelevant in determining the price of 
wheat. The key factor is importers expectations of 
quality. Good behavior by exporting firms is not 
immediately rewarded except when the firm has an 
established reputation. Chapter Five will hopefully shed 
some light on this point. 
It can be hypothesized that, on average, the quality 
of U.S. wheat is equal to the quality of wheat for 
competing exporters, and that the major quality problem of 
U.S. exporters is quality consistency. The behavior of a 
risk averse, small country importer purchasing wheat of 
uncertain quality is now investigated. The direct utility 
function approach used in Chapter Three is well-suited for 
the analysis under uncertainty. The corresponding indirect 
utility function derived in Chapter Three is of little 
value since the argument S (S = P/q) is unobservable and 
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cannot be verified by the importers under uncertainty. The 
usual convenient properties of the indirect utility 
function unfortunately do not hold in this situation. 
It will be shown that under reasonable conditions, 
uncertain import quality induces the small country to 
become more self-sufficient. The marginal impact of 
uncertainty on the importing country's demand for imports 
and domestic production will be discussed. These results 
can be interpreted as a partial explanation of the lower 
import demand for U.S. grain experienced since 1980. 
Quality Uncertainty 
It was shown that the direct utility maximization 
problem (3-8) for the importing country can be rearranged 
in the more tractable form represented by (3-19). The 
first argument in (4-1) is the consumption of the 
domestically produced aggregate good. Because the budget 
is always in equilibrium, it is equal to the domestic 
production of the aggregate good minus the value of 
imports. The second argument consists of the number of 
wheat characteristics consumed in the importing country. 
Maximizing the expected value of this expression over 
domestic wheat Y and the volume of imported wheat Q, we 
obtain 
(4-1) Max Eg {U[G(Y)-PQ,Y+qQ]). 
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The first order conditions, for the maximization problem 
are 
(4-2) EtUiGy+Ug) = 0, and 
(4-3) E{-UiP+U2q} = 0, 
where and Ug are the marginal utility of the first and 
second argument, Gy is the negative of the marginal rate of 
transformation and q is the random quality variable. From 
equation (4-2), it is apparent that the domestic rate of 
transformation (-Gy = ) is not equal to the 
expected value of the marginal rate of substitution 
EEUg/U^] anymore. This is the first contrast between the 
utility maximizing behavior under certainty and 
uncertainty. Also, the second first order condition (4-3) 
for the certainty problem can be rewritten 
(4-4) E[Ui]P = E[U2]E[q]+cov[U2,q] = 0, 
where E is the expectation operator and cov the covariance 
between two terms. The covariance term on the right hand 
side is clearly negative since dUg/dq = U22Q < 0. Then it 
follows that 
(4-5) -Gy = P/E[q]-cov[U2,q]/E[Ui]E[q] > P/E[q]. 
It is clear from equation (4-5) that uncertainty about the 
quality of imported wheat will drive up the domestic rate 
of transformation (or expected price of the domestic 
wheat), assumed to be of stable, known quality. Domestic 
wheat adjust to the uncertainty in the quality of imported 
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wheat because its quality is known with certainty. Since 
the impacts of an increase and a decrease in q of the same 
magnitude will not offset each other (given the concavity 
of the utility function), domestically produced goods of 
stable, known quality in this model, are valued more highly 
ex-ante. The increment in the expected price of the 
domestic wheat is related to the concept of risk premium 
developed by Pratt (1964). An important difference lies in 
the nature of the arguments of the utility function. 
Unlike Pratt's utility function which was increasing in 
wealth, the utility function represented in (4-1) is 
function of goods and services. The risk premium as 
defined by Pratt (1964, p. 125) is equal to one half times 
the variance of an actuarially neutral risky source of 
revenue times the measure of absolute risk aversion (-
U''/U'). The risk premium is usually a measure of risk 
expressed in terms of cash. Because of the dimensions of 
this problem, it would be expressed in terms of 
characteristics. 
This risk premium notion is compatible with the 
production processes of food processing industries. Wheat 
can be seen as an intermediate good whose quality has to be 
above a certain level to prevent partial or total loss in 
the production of the final goods (e.g., bad flour can ruin 
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Figure 4-1, The effect of quality uncertainty on production 
and import of wheat 
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bread). In such instances, the buyer may be concerned by 
the higher moments of the distribution of quality, as well 
as by the mean. Figure 4-1 illustrates the effect of 
quality uncertainty on domestic production and consumers 
choices. Uncertainty induces domestic wheat production to 
increase (Pq to P^) and wheat imports to decrease (PqQq to 
P^Ql), resulting in a higher degree of self-sufficiency. 
It is assumed in Figure 4-1 that q still equals one. This 
need not be the case since q can fluctuate around one 
implying that the real price of imported wheat remains P. 
A decrease in q would result in a lower level of utility 
as indicated by U^'. 
Quality Uncertainty and Protectionism 
Is quality uncertainty a case for protectionism? 
Consumer knowledge of the variability of the quality of 
imported wheat and the exclusion of other factors leading 
to market failure preclude market intervention by 
government. However, the presence of asymmetry of 
information (consumers not being able to discriminate 
foreign from domestic wheat) makes a strong case for a 
tariff. The tariff could potentially increase welfare but 
would not be a first best policy (Bond, 1984). A tariff 
(positive or negative) would have the effect of adjusting 
the consumption and production of domestic wheat to levels 
107 
doser to what they would be if the consumers were fully 
aware of quality variability. However, a tariff would 
penalize domestic consumers by having them pay a similar 
price for both imported and domestic wheat. The first best 
policy is to differentiate the products in the eyes of the 
consumers by informing them about the variability in 
quality. Then, consumers with different reactions to the 
variability in quality can maximize their utility. 
If the consumers in the importing countries cannot 
discriminate quality, trade may allow goods of inferior 
quality to enter the domestic market and lower the average 
quality of the products available. Domestic producers 
would lose from trade since the domestic price would be 
lower due to trade and this price would be insensitive to 
fluctuations in the quality of the imported wheat. The key 
issues are whether the consumers can discriminate wheat of 
different origins, and if so, how long it will take for 
them to learn about the variability of quality.^ In some 
cases the first best policy may not be feasible. The costs 
associated with grading, inspecting, labelling and 
diffusion of information designed to hasten consumer 
^The need for identical quality standards and 
marketing regulations was voiced during free trade 
negotiations between the U.S. and Canada. If consumers 
have the ability to quickly learn about quality 
variability, a unique set of rules would constitute a 
redundant investment. 
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learning processes may be prohibitive. A tariff could then 
be seen as a practical solution to improve welfare. 
The problem analyzed here is similar to the one 
evaluated by Bond (1984), where consumers cannot 
discriminate the imported low quality products from the 
high quality domestic goods. In our case, the domestic and 
imported goods have the same expected or average quality 
but the quality of the imported good is allowed to vary. 
Marginal Impacts of Quality Uncertainty 
Uncertainty about the quality of imported wheat 
induces the importing country to increase the production of 
domestic wheat. This can be regarded as what Sandmo (1971) 
called the overall impact of uncertainty on domestic 
production. In this section, the effect of a 'marginal' 
change in quality uncertainty will be investigated. The 
objective is to discover whether the domestic production of 
wheat is increasing, decreasing, or constant when the 
quality of the imported wheat becomes more uncertain 
(through a mean-preserving spread of the quality 
distribution). Also of interest is the marginal impact of 
quality uncertainty on imports. 
In the previous section, it was implicitly assumed 
that the second order conditions were satisfied. The 
current analysis will begin by more closely evaluating the 
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second order conditions. The first step is to 
differentiate equations (4-2) and (4-3) with respect to Y 
and Q. The resulting equations can then be stacked in 
matrix form and the conditions under which the sign of the 
determinant will be positive can be determined. The 
corresponding matrix is 
(4-6) 
E [ -Ui 1 PGy fUg 2 q+U]^ 2 Gy q-Ui 2 P ] E[U^j_P^-2V^2'^q+V22^^ 1 
Before proceeding, some of the terms in (4-6) must be 
rewritten to facilitate the analysis. (Recall that E[q] = 
1.) 
(4-7) E[U22q] = E[U22]+cov[U22/C[3 / with cov[U22,q] > 0. 
(4-8) E[U22Gyq] = E [U;l2 ^ ' covfUigGyrq] > or 
<  0 .  
(4-9) E[U22Pq] = E[U22]P+COV[1:22^/9] , covEU^gP/Q] > or < 0. 
Assuming a positive marginal utility from the consumption 
of both the aggregate good and wheat (U^ and Ug > 0) and 
that U22, Gy and Gyy are negative, we can find the 
determinant of (4-6) (Appendix, Table A-1). Note that 
E[q2] = 1 + CTq, where Og is the variance of q. Sufficient 
conditions for this determinant to be positive are that 
Uii? < U22 ^ UigGy (which implies ^ 2.1^22 - ^ 12^)' 
GyCov(U22,q) « cov(U22/q)/ E[Ui2q], E[U22q] < 0 when < 
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0, and cov(U-j^2'*3) >0» In other words, the degree of 
substitutability between wheat and the aggregate good has 
to be limited for an interior solution to exist. When 
> 0 and cov(U22,q) < 0, sufficient conditions are EfU^gg] > 
0, E[U22q] ^ 0/ — ^22 ~ ^ 12^Y' 
cov(U22»q)" The magnitude of complementarity must also be 
limited, as does the negative effect of uncertainty on 
complementarity. It is also assumed that U22 0q+cov(U22><3^) 
< 0, regardless of the sign of 1122» 
We can now proceed to analyze the effect of a marginal 
.increase in uncertainty on the volume of imports, 'Q', and 
on the domestic level of production 'Y'. To accomplish 
this task, let the random variable q be defined as follows 
(Sandmo, 1971) : 
(4-10) E[q] = E[Tq+n]. 
To preserve the mean of the distribution of q when 
stretched, the expected value of q should remain the same. 
(4-11) dE[q] = lidT+dn = 0 or dfî/dT = -n, 
where n is defined as the mean of q and is set to one. 
The first order conditions can now be differentiated 
with respect to T, and, by applying Cramer's rule, dQ/dT 
can be obtained. Since the determinant of the Hessian 
matrix is positive, the sign of dQ/dT is given by the sign 
of the determinant below. 
Ill 
(4-12) 
E [UiiGy2+UiGyy+2Ui2Gy+U22] E[-Ui2GYQ(q-n)-U22Q(q-K)] 
E[-UiiGYP-Ui2P+Ui2GYq+U22q E[U12PQ -"2235 
+GyCOV(U22, q) +COV(U22,q) ] -U2(q-M.) 3 
To make any inferences about the sign of the determinant 
(4-12), the terms on the right hand side must be 
simplified. The terms in the upper right corner can be 
rewritten as, 
(4-13) -E[U22GyQ]E[q-H]-COV(U]_2GYQ,q)-E[U22Q]E[q-|i] 
-cov(U22Q,q) = -cov(U22GyQ,q)-cov(U22Q,q) > 0. 
Note that from the second order conditions when U22 < 0, 
this expression should not differ significantly from zero. 
In this case, the sign of the déterminent should be the 
same as the sign of the product of the expressions in the 
upper left and lower right quadrants of (4-12). The first 
and third terms in the lower right corner of (4-12) can 
then be simplified by taking advantage of the scheme used 
in (4-13). The second term {-U22Qq(q~M') ) seems ambiguous 
and necessitates a step borrowed from Ishii's (1977) 
attempt to sign the effect of.marginal price uncertainty. 
(4-14) E[Ui2PQ]E[g-^]+cov(Ui2PQ,q) -E[U22Q(q-H) ( (q-|i)+M.}] 
-E[U2]E[q-M.]-cov(U2,q) = E[U22PQ]E[q-|i] 
+COV(U22PQ,q) -E[U22Q(q-H) ^] -E[U22QT (q-M-) ] 
-E[U2]E[q-|Ji]-cov(U2,q) = cov(U22PQ,q) -U22Q(^g 
-cov(U22,CTq)-cov(U22Q/q)-cov(U2,q) > < 0. 
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The above expression is positive when < 0 and 
cov(U22,q) > 0, and ambiguous when the signs of U22 and 
cov(U22,q) are positive and negative respectively. In the 
latter case, a small covariance term implies a positive 
sign. In light of the signs obtained from equations (4-13) 
and (4-14), (4-12) is negative when 17^2 < 0 or when U^2 > 0 
and (4-14) > 0. When wheat and the aggregate good are 
substitutes, uncertainty induces a rise in domestic 
production of wheat (domestic wheat is substituted for 
imported wheat) and a decline in the production of the 
aggregate good. Less of the aggregate good means smaller 
export potential, and, consequently, smaller imports given 
the budget constraint used in (3-8). However, as 
substitutability increases, the effect of uncertainty on 
production is not as pronounced since wheat is more 
"replaceable". It follows that the variations in 
production of domestic wheat and imports of wheat will be 
smaller the higher the degree of substitutability. This is 
consistent with the fact that consumption decisions are 
made ex-post. When U22 > 0» the production of domestic 
wheat increases to ensure that enough wheat characteristics 
will be available to complement the volume of aggregate 
good produced. The production of the aggregate good 
declines, thus reducing the import capacity of the country. 
The higher the degree of complementarity, the sharper the 
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decline in the production of the aggregate good and the 
lower the volume of imports. In general, the higher the 
degree of substitutability, the smaller the changes in 
production and imports following a marginal increase in 
uncertainty. (4-12) can be expanded as, 
[-cov(U22,q) -GOV(Ug,q)Q'^J-U^gCOV(Ug, q) Gy+ [cov(Uig , q) PQ 
—cov (U2 , q) —cov (^22 ' 9) Q] [^1®YY"^^22"'"^12^Y^ ~^12 ^ (^12 ' ^Y^ 
+cov(U22/q)]t[Gycov(U22,q)+COV(U22,q) 
From the second order conditions, (U22f^q+cov(U22;q^) < 0 
and the covfU^g) is small especially when U22 > 0). The 
above expression, dQ/dT, is clearly negative despite the 
apparent ambiguity in (4-12). This ambiguity vanishes 
immediately if one imposes a quadratic functional form for 
the utility function. A quadratic functional form does not 
have as many indirect or covariant effects being only twice 
differentiable and will nullify (4-13). In general, it can 
be concluded that under reasonable conditions, it is 
possible to infer that the movement in the volume of 
imports is inversely related to quality uncertainty. A 
grading system, coupled with inspection services and a fair 
dispute settlement mechanism, each designed to reduce 
quality uncertainty, should positively influence the volume 
of U.S. exports. The rounding of dockage to the nearest 
0.10 percent, instead of to the nearest 0.50 percent, will 
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surely positively affect U.S. exports. Dockage is an 
important characteristic for a buyer. It has been the 
source of substantial quality uncertainty, and may have 
contributed largely to the decline in exports between 1981 
and 1986. 
The sign of dY/dT can be determined by the sign of the 
determinant represented by (4-15). 
(4-15) 
—cov (U2^2GyQ/ q)  — cov (U22Qf ^)  E [  —Q^GyP—^^^22^ 
+Gycov(U12/q)+COV(U22,q)] 
cov(U]^2PQ'q)-E[U22Q(q-T)^] E[U3^ip2]-2{E[Ui2P]E[q] 
-cov(U22Q»q)-cov(U2,q) +cov(U22P,q))+E[U22q^] 
As in the previous case, the expression in the upper 
left quadrant is equal to zero when 13-^2 < 0/ while the 
upper and lower right quadrants contain terms which, when 
summed, are negative. The sum of the terms in the lower 
left quadrant are clearly positive when U22 < 0 and 
ambiguous otherwise. It follows that the sign of the 
determinant is positive when 11^2 < 0 and if covtu^g/g) is 
small when U22 > 0. The déterminent is expanded in the 
Appendix (Table A-2). If one was willing to assume (for 
simplicity) that the form of the utility function is 
quadratic, then the sign of dY/dT would clearly be 
positive. If this were the case, it could be concluded 
that a marginal increase in quality uncertainty induces an 
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augmentation in the domestic production of wheat. An 
increase in the substitutability of wheat and the aggregate 
good still implies dY/dT > 0, but the increase will be 
smaller given the higher demand for the aggregate good. 
Canada is currently debating the costs and benefits of 
introducing triple-m wheat varieties. These high yielding, 
lower quality varieties are unfortunately difficult to 
discriminate from the traditional lower yielding, high 
quality Marquis wheat. The introduction of triple-m wheat 
would give Canada the opportunity to blend medium and high 
quality wheat and would increase the risk of contamination 
(involuntary blending). Importers would legitimately 
expect a higher degree of quality uncertainty and would try 
to be more self-sufficient. Indeed, the importers 
reactions depend on the substitutability between imported 
and domestic wheats. 
Conclusion and Application 
In this chapter, it has been demonstrated that 
uncertainty about the quality of imported wheat induces the 
importing country to achieve a higher level of self-
sufficiency in wheat supply. Factors which can lower the 
level of uncertainty should be considered by the U.S. grain 
export industry to aid in regaining the export markets it 
has lost. 
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Quality uncertainty is not in itself an argument for 
protectionism for an importer. Trade barriers are 
justified only if the economic agents in the importing 
country are unable or slow in learning about the 
variability in the quality of imported wheat. Informing 
the public or creating an environment that would ease the 
'learning process' (e.g., labeling by the country of 
origin) are instruments superior to tariffs and quotas in 
this instance. However, less developed countries may 
prefer to impose a tariff because of their limited 
capability for establishing quality and disseminating 
information. 
Though other exporters were not included in the model, 
this is not as damaging as one might think. The importers 
who buy wheat from the U.S. do so foi- economic and/or 
political reasons. U.S. wheat is perhaps the only imported 
wheat they can buy or afford due to these non-market 
factors. It is estimated that the U.S. subsidizes from 50 
to 80 percent of its wheat exports/* increasing their 
domestic production may be the; only way to substitute for 
U.S. wheat under quality uncertainty. If the importer's 
choice of a supplier is politically motivated, an economic 
^This range was provided by experts working in the 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development at Iowa State 
University. The U.S.D.A. considers this to be a 
'sensitive' issue. 
117 
model including many exporters would be redundant. For 
importers who must purchase imported wheat of variable 
quality, the only alternative is to move toward self-
sufficiency. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: REPUTATION AND QUALITY 
As mentioned in Chapter One, the wheat export market 
is dominated by five major exporting countries, the U.S., 
Canada, Australia, France, and Argentina. The structure of 
the U.S. wheat export industry differs significantly from 
that in Canada and Australia, where government agencies are 
responsible for marketing wheat exports. In the U.S., 
wheat is exported by a small number of private 
corporations, such as Union Equity, Cargill, Continental, 
Bungi, and Koch. The only government involvement is in the 
weighing, grading and inspection of wheat. 
Wheat is a very heterogeneous product. To discover 
its true quality, a buyer must invest in an inspection 
service. Because the cost of obtaining timely and accurate 
information about quality is rising rapidly along with the 
level of accuracy, the buyer may not have full information 
about wheat quality when ownership is transferred. When an 
importing country purchases grain, it takes into 
consideration what it knows about an exporting firm's 
reliability in supplying grain that meets quality 
expectations. Sometimes importers may not have all the 
information necessary to make an optimal purchase decision; 
however, it can be assumed that they efficiently use the 
information at hand to make a judgment about the reputation 
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of an exporter relative to the quality of the import. 
Exporters, in turn, know that reputation is important to 
importing countries, and are assumed to take economic 
advantage of this knowledge. 
This chapter analyzes different reputation schemes in 
an attempt to rationalize what Carl Shapiro (1983) has 
termed the "milking of a reputation". Two broad approaches 
are used to model reputation. First, the reputation of the 
firm is determined by a weighted average taking into 
account an estimate of the quality supplied by the firm and 
the average quality of grain supplied by all exporting 
firms in the country . Because of the costs involved in 
determining quality, the importer's estimate of wheat 
quality is not perfectly accurate. The reputation of the 
country as a wheat exporter is then used to complement the 
importer's set of information about quality. Such a 
reputation scheme can also be rationalized on grounds that 
government agencies are heavily involved in the world 
export market for wheat and that as a result, wheat is 
discriminated on the basis of origin regardless of the 
market structure for exported wheat that prevails in the 
exporting countries. This signal extraction problem 
appears to induce exporting firms to behave as free-
riders', especially when the weight on the country's 
reputation is large. 
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A second broad approach assumes that the importer has 
firm-specific historical information about quality 
supplied, but, perhaps because of an inadequate inspection 
system, the information about current quality is available 
with a lag. Thus, an exporting firm must sell high quality 
products at low quality prices until it has established a 
positive reputation with the importing country. 
Reputation and Country-Specific Information 
This section begins with an analysis of the U.S. wheat 
export market. The reactions of the remaining world to 
changes in the U.S. export market are initially assumed to 
be exogenous. This micro approach facilitates an analysis 
of the implications for the market structure of the U.S. 
wheat export industry. The number of firms appears to 
affect the quality and quantity of exported wheat. It is 
assumed that there are n firms in the U.S., and N in the 
world. The subscripts j and i are firm- and country-
specific. 
In this section, a firm's reputation for grain quality 
is determined by the reputation (R^) of all exporting firms 
in the country from which it operates and by the importer's 
estimate of the quality supplied by the firm (qy). Both R^ 
and qj are used to discover the true quality of imported 
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wheat, q*.l Specifically, qj = q* + ey, while = q* + 
+ <p. The e's denote the sampling error associated with 
obtaining the information and <f> accounts for the noise 
caused by the quality supplied by other firms in country i. 
It is assumed that the e's have an expected value of zero. 
The weight on the country's reputation can then be derived 
as 
a = (Cgj + cov(ej ,e i )  + cov(ej , ( ) !»)) / (Ogj + 
(7ei + o* + E[02]). 
Indeed this general expression can be simplified without 
loss of generality by presuming that the covariance terms 
and E[#2] equal zero. Country i is assumed to be a major 
exporter with market power. Reputation is denoted by R and 
firm j's profit can then be expressed as 
(5-1)  TTj =  P(SqkQk) [R]Qj-C(qj,Qj)qjQj,  
where R = aR^+(l-a)qi, R^ = Sq^Q^/Q^, and = SQ^). The 
quality expected from firm j by the importer depends 
partially on the quality supplied by all the firms in 
country i, and not solely on the quality supplied by firm 
j. Sqj^Qj^ is the sum over N exporting firms, and, 
therefore, represents the total supply of grain 
^An alternative way of looking at the problem is to 
have the importer take two samples of imported wheat. A 
first sample would be taken as wheat is unloaded from a 
ship. The wheat would then be stored in a bin containing 
wheat of the same grade from the same country of origin. A 
second sample would then be taken. 
122 
World Market 
Country i 
Firm j 
Figure 5-1.  The environments determining the export price 
of wheat supplied by firm j 
characteristics on the world market, qj and Qj denote 
quality and quantity supplied by firm j, and the product, 
qjQj, can be interpreted as the number of characteristics 
supplied by firm j. C reflects the cost of supplying a 
wheat characteristic given the existing technology. The 
dimensions of the problem are illustrated in Figure 5-1.  
The price received by firm j depends on country i's 
reputation and the volume of characteristics supplied by 
the remaining world. 
The first order conditions with respect to Qj and qj 
for this maximization problem are 
(5-2)  PR+P0qjQjR+Pa[ (qj/QT)-(Ri/Q^)]-Cqj-CQqjQj = 0 ,  and 
(5-3)  PeQj2R+P(l-a+aQj/Q'^)Qj-CQj-CqQjqj = 0 .  
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Pq is the derivative of P and Q with respect to the 
specific characteristics determining the market price. 
All firms from country i have access to the same 
markets and, consequently, face the same demand for their 
products. They also pay the same price for their inputs in 
terms of characteristics and are assumed to behave in a 
similar manner. Because of this symmetry, the subscripts 
can be dropped and the equations rewritten. This implies 
that reputation is equal to quality (R = q), and that price 
can be written P = P(nqQ+Sqj^Q]^), with the summation going 
from n+1 to N. An individual firm's market share of the 
total volume of wheat exported from country i is equal to 
1/n (Qj/Q? = 1/n). 
(5-4) Pq+P@q^Q+-Cq-CQqQ = 0. 
(5-5) P(l-a+a/n)Q+P0qQ2-CQ-CqqQ = 0. 
The term P(l-a+a/n)Q in (5-5) can be interpreted as a 
firm's marginal revenue from improving the reputation of 
the country by increasing the quality of the export product 
(wheat) while holding volume constant. 
In this model, a firm does not receive the full 
benefit of the improved reputation since it shares the 
benefit with n-1 other firms in its country. This is 
obvious when looking at the difference between CqQ and Cgq. 
The gap between CqQ and Cgq is non-existent at a=0, but 
becomes positive as the importance of the country's 
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reputation (8^) rises. This implies that quality is lower 
when a > 0. A similar model (DM model) was developed by 
Donnenfeld and Mayer (1987). The present model differs 
from the DM model in three basic ways. First, in the 
current model, firms are assumed to have market power. 
This is perhaps more descriptive of the U.S. grain export 
industry. Secondly, the labor market present in the DM 
model has been omitted and a grain input market included. 
Since U.S. agriculture is not labor intensive, analyzing 
the effect of different governmental regulations on prices 
received by farmer's (grain inputs) is more important than 
analyzing the labor market. Finally, and most importantly, 
the use of the country-specific reputation is rationalized. 
Our model is more general, and appears to be more 
realistic, since the case in which reputation depends 
entirely on the country's reputation is a special 
occurrence. 
The first order conditions given by (5-4) and (5-5) 
indicate that export firms have strong incentives to behave 
as free-riders by supplying lower quality wheat to the 
market. Since each firm assumes that the remaining n-1 
firms will maintain the country's reputation, they will 
supply wheat of lower quality and still expect to receive a 
price for a higher quality wheat. If all n firms behave in 
this Cournot-Nash fashion, they will all become free-riders 
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and quickly lower or destroy the reputation of the 
exporting country. 
While the costs of this behavior are shared by all n 
firms in country i, individual firms suffer greater losses 
from their free-rider behavior when there are few exporting 
firms in the country. In contrast, profits from 
maintaining higher quality standards, and thus a good 
reputation, increase when n decreases and a exceeds 0. It 
is hypothesized that by reducing the number of exporting 
firms, country i can improve its reputation; however, other 
constraints could be utilized to force exporting firms to 
supply wheat of higher quality. Country i should also be 
concerned with its ability to take advantage of its market 
power (Johnson's optimal tariff argument), as well as with 
factor prices since the welfare of farmers appears to be 
politically important. 
Quality and number of firms 
For this model, comparative statics can be used to 
determine the consequences of increasing the number of 
exporting firms that exhibit free-rider behavior. Equation 
(5-6) shows how the number of exporters will affect the 
quality of wheat exports. 
(5-6) dq/dn = 1/|a| [-GDq/n+GaPQ/n^-ECQq+DCQq^/n-aPCgqQ/n^ 
-ECQQqQ+DCQQq2Q/n-aPCQQqQ2/n2-EDq2/Q2 
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+ECQqq2] < 0. 
Assuming that the second order conditions hold, D, the 
determinant of the Hessian matrix, will be positive. The 
quality of wheat supplied by all firms will decrease as the 
number of exporting firms increases, assuming that the 
demand for characteristics is convex. The implication of a 
convex demand is that the price of a 'wheat characteristic' 
will decrease (increase) at a decreasing (increasing) rate 
as the volume of characteristics offered increases 
(decreases). Convexity would not hold if a kinked demand 
curve had been assumed. It can be hypothesized that firms 
in the wheat export industry operate in the flatter portion 
of the demand curve. This implies that a small increase in 
price would be unprofitable. Therefore, rather than raise 
prices, exporters prefer to lower quality in an attempt to 
increase profits because they realize that importing 
countries often have inadequate inspection services. The 
convexity assumption is critical to a similar conclusion 
drawn from the DM model. The reputation of a country can 
be improved by decreasing the number of exporting firms. 
When an importer's expectations for quality are country-
specific, a competitive market structure (i.e., a large 
number of exporting firms) is not optimal since every 
exporter is likely to exhibit free-rider behavior. It 
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follows that dQ/dn is more negative as 'a' gets closer to 
one and when n is large. 
Comparative statics can also be used to analyze what 
effect an increase in the total number of exporting firms 
will have on the output of an individual firm. To 
determine this effect, 
(5-7) dQ/dn = 1/|A| [-EDq/Q-ECqq-ECqqq2+ECQqqQ-BaPq/n2+ 
aPCgqqQ^/n^-BPQ(a-a/n)qQ+PeCgg(a-a/n)q^Q^] 
>  =  <  0 .  
When a=0, dQ/dn < 0. However, when a « 1, dQ/dn is 
ambiguous, as it may be more profitable to lower the supply 
of wheat characteristics by considerably lowering q and 
increasing Q. Again, this stems from the fact that firm j 
expects the other firms to maintain the country's 
reputation. It is then possible for the volume of wheat 
supplied by firm j to decrease as the number of firms 
decreases. 
This contradicts a similar result from the DM model. 
The contradiction develops from the assumption that the 
exporting firms have market power, that a large number of 
firms are present, and that the weight of the country's 
reputation in R is large. Decreasing quantity leads to 
less influence in establishing the country's reputation, 
and, hence, to smaller returns from supplying high quality 
services. On the other hand, the increase in price due to 
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a decrease in quantity may more than compensate for the 
firm's weaker role in determining the country's reputation. 
An increase in the weight of the country's reputation in R 
will adversely influence quality and induce an increase in 
quantity as shown below. 
dq/da = 1/|A| [G-Cgq-CQQqQ](l-l/n). 
dQ/da = 1/|A| [BQ/Q-CQQQQ](L-L/n). 
Other things being equal, reducing the number of 
exporting firms from country i will induce the remaining 
firms to upgrade quality and reduce or increase the volume 
of exports. A smaller number of exporting firms will, 
therefore, improve the reputation of all firms from country 
i. What, then, is the optimal number of firms? From the 
firm's point of view, one is an optimal number since each 
firm could not only receive full returns from maintaining 
the reputation of the country, but could also exercise 
market power (in the factor and output market) without 
concern for 'domestic free-riders'. If this were to occur, 
farmers might be damaged because fewer firms in country i 
implies both a lower price and a lower export volume, 
assuming that demand and supply from other exporting 
countries remains constant. 
Since the well-being of farmers is a primary concern 
of policy makers in industrialized countries, it is 
important to develop a market structure that considers, and 
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perhaps maximizes, the welfare of grain producers. 
Presence of only one firm could create an optimal market 
structure for farmers if the profits of the monopsonist 
exporting firm were subject to a 100 percent tax. In this 
way, country i would extract maximum profits from the rest 
of the world. Those profits would then be distributed 
'costlessly' to farmers such that they obtain the same 
profit margin they would have received from marketing their 
own grain in the most efficient manner. 
In practice, a 100 percent tax on profits would reduce 
the incentives of private firms to maintain a good 
reputation. If an exporter's short-run gains from falsely 
marketing low quality goods as prime quality goods becomes 
detrimental to the reputation of the country, then taxing 
the exporting firm's profits at a rate of 100 percent would 
not be optimal for farmers. The solution to this potential 
conflict of interest is to lower the tax rate or the 
establishment of a governmental agency like the Canadian 
Wheat Board, a Crown corporation, chartered to act in the 
farmer's best interest. Presence of this public Board, as 
opposed to private firms, might explain why Canada's 
reputation for wheat exports is better than that of the 
U.S. 
U.S. wheat producers have organized an exporting firm 
(Union Equity) to compete with private exporting firms. In 
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organizing this firm, U.S. wheat producers hoped to make 
the factor market more competitive. Ruling out collusion, 
the addition of this firm does not optimize quality and 
aggregate quantity. However, if Union Equity was to be the 
leader of the industry, the end result would be similar to 
the one that would be obtained by a monopolist government 
agency. 
Export quota 
The U.S. could potentially benefit from decreasing the 
number of private exporting firms (through licensing), but 
this may not be politically feasible. Alternatively, 
restricting the output of exporters via an export quota or 
tariff might lead to an improvement in the U.S. reputation 
for export quality. Until recently, however, the effect of 
quotas on quality has not been critically examined. While 
the maximization problem remains the same, the choice 
variables over which optimization is carried out is reduced 
to one. The first order condition is given by (5-5) since 
Q is exogenously determined. Differentiating (5-5), 
solutions for the variables of interest can be obtained. 
When a quota is imposed, the change in the quality of the 
product can be expressed as, 
(5-10) -dq/dQ = [PeqQ(l+n-an+a)+P00nq2Q2-CQqQ-CQqqQ]/PQQ2 
(l+n-an+a)+pQQqQ3-2CqQ-CqqqQ > 0. 
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A binding quota on a specific firm's output will 
increase the quality of its output. This concurs with the 
findings of the DM model, and with the literature on 
voluntary export restrictions. A quota, which obviously 
has the intended effect on the level of output, also 
increases the quality of the output. Intuitively, this 
model being a characteristic model in which q can be 
substituted for Q (though marginal production costs of 
increasing q and Q may differ), a higher q has to 
compensate for the lower Q. 
It can be shown that a specific tariff will have the 
same effect as the quota in this model, which necessarily 
imply that a lower volume and higher quality follow the 
imposition of a specific tariff. An ad-valorem tariff will 
decrease the volume of wheat exported and will have an 
ambiguous effect on quality. This may seem paradoxical 
especially when considering that in this context, an ad-
valorem tariff is just like a tax on both q and Q. One 
would expect them both to decrease. Again, different cost 
structures can be assumed and using more q and less Q may 
be seen as a less expensive alternative of supplying wheat 
characteristics at a lower price. 
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Minimum quality standards 
Binding quality standards specified in (5-5) as q, 
will have the same effect as quotas (i.e., increasing 
quality and lowering output). Maximizing (5-5) over the 
output level Q (assuming q is fixed) and differentiating 
the resulting first order condition leads to this 
conclusion. 
(5-11) dQ/dq = -[PeqQ(l+n)+PeQnq2Q2-Cgq-CQqqQ]/Peq2(l+n) 
+Pee"<3^Q-2CQq-CQQqQ < 0. 
Quality standards move quality and quantity in consistent 
directions, and are, therefore, just as efficient as quotas 
or licensing. 
Unfortunately, these policies are not equivalent from 
a practical standpoint. Historically, enforcement of 
quality controls has been less than successful. False 
grades and weights have been relatively common in the grain 
industry (Ek, 1985). Given that licensing and quality 
standards yield the same result, the preferred policy is 
the one that can be enforced with the least effort. 
Policies that attempt to force a (country-based) behavior 
on an individual firm have not been and will not be 
successful. The case of one firm with its profits being 
taxed dominates the scenario with many firms constrained by 
a specific export tariff and/or a quality standard. 
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The market failure in this case is that the reputation 
of the firm is country-specific. The best way to remedy to 
the situation is to directly internalize the source of the 
market failure. When there is only one firm in the 
exporting country, there is no market failure since the 
reputation is firm-specific and there is no need for an 
optimal tariff. 
The reputation mechanism used above enables us to 
conjecture that the decline in the quality of U.S. wheat 
exports in the early 1980s may have been the result of the 
adoption of new hybrids. Many of these new hybrids were 
more difficult to discriminate, and, therefore, required 
better technology to maintain efficient grading and 
inspection services. Importers with obsolete technology 
and those who were unwilling to pay more for inspection and 
grading services relied more heavily on the exporting 
country's reputation. 
Foreign competition and oualitv 
The previous comparative statics exercises assumed 
that output from major foreign exporters is constant. In 
reality, firm j has to deal with the free-rider problem at 
both the domestic and international level. If the rest of 
the world increases the supply of wheat when firms from 
country i exercise their market power, then it is clearly 
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not optimal for firm j to reduce output unless it has the 
welfare of foreign firms in its utility function. This 
argument has been advanced quite often by critics of U.S. 
agricultural supply management programs. 
Countries in economic associations, such as the 
European Economic Community (E.E.C.), may also face the 
free-rider problem if the reputation of each country is 
association-specific. This may partially explain why 
France is the only major wheat exporter in the E.E.C. 
While disputes over pricing often contribute to the death 
of an economic cartel, quality may also be an underlying 
factor. When quality is difficult to assess, free-riders 
will lower their own product quality, inducing a drop in 
the profits of other cartel members unaware of the quality 
problem. Cartel members, whose profits are falling, have 
incentive to leave the cartel to increase their volume. 
Even if foreign firms had the same technology and were 
facing the same market conditions as the U.S., they would 
not produce the same quality of wheat because the number of 
firms in these countries differs. The fact that some 
countries have wheat boards responsible for wheat exports 
may have profound implications for the structure of the 
industry in the U.S. The free-rider problem does not exist 
in these countries, and, even if they had the same 
technology and faced the same market conditions as the 
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U.S., they would supply wheat of higher quality than U.S. 
exporters. 
If one of these boards were sophisticated and large 
enough to determine the reaction functions of its rivals 
and then base its decisions on these reactions, it would 
emerge as a leader despite the larger market share of the 
U.S. Because of their lack of unity, U.S. exporters would 
be followers, and the U.S. would not operate in an optimal 
fashion given its share of the world market. If this were 
true, it would be beneficial for U.S. wheat exporters to 
collude in an effort to exercise the country's market 
power. Legally, this strategy is precluded by anti-trust 
laws.2 The first best policy would be to either remove the 
anti-trust laws, reduce the number of exporting firms, or 
impose enforceable restrictions on their behavior. For 
political or practical reasons, these alternatives cannot 
be fully implemented. 
Perhaps U.S. wheat exporters do collude to some 
extent, and the lower quality of U.S. wheat exports 
reflects the use of their market power (q being their 
instrument). The fact that Australia and Canada are 
^This is a good argument against anti-trust laws in 
the U.S. 
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competitive in terms of quality^ could be perceived as a 
symptom of a Stackelberg disequilibrium situation. The 
U.S. cartel may have been challenged by foreign firms 
trying to establish themselves as market leaders. If this 
were true, the response of the U.S. cartel would be to 
increase quality and decrease prices to force the foreign 
firms to return to their role as followers. The turning 
point may have occurred in 1986, when U.S. exports began to 
rise again (Figure 1-1). The high number of quality 
complaints in 1986 and 1987 may have been a bargaining 
strategy used by importers or may have been the result of 
continuing pressure on individual U.S. firms to be free-
riders. Once again, the number of U.S. firms is critical. 
Reputation of an Individual Firm 
If the reputation scheme were not country-specific, 
why would an exporting firm risk losing market share for 
short-run gains? In this section, the focus is on firms 
with a reputation that is a function of lagged quality 
supplied. As before, the cost of obtaining timely and 
accurate quality information is prohibitive, thus an 
importer is forced to use reputation in making purchasing 
decisions. The actual discovery of imported wheat quality 
^Even as followers, Canada and Australia are expected 
to supply wheat of higher quality given the difference in 
the farmers' wheat productions function in these countries. 
137 
is lagged (n periods), and exporting firms can easily 
substitute lower quality wheat under this condition. 
Incentives for a firm to 'milk' its reputation are analyzed 
in the following subsection. 
Reputation and lagged quality information 
From Shapiro (1983), asymmetry of information enables 
reputation to be defined as a function of the quality 
supplied n periods previously, 
(5-12) R = qt-n-
This implies that it takes n periods for a firm to 
establish a reputation. During the first n periods, the 
importer does not trust the exporting firm. They assume 
that a lower quality wheat that 'appears' to meet contract 
specification will be supplied, and will be willing to pay 
the price for the lower quality (qg) wheat. Suppose, for 
example, that a firm is selling a U.S. No. 1 wheat to a new 
buyer. Assume further that U.S. No. 1 and No. 2 wheats 
appear similar, while U.S. No. 3 is easily recognizable. 
When purchasing U.S. No. 1 wheat in the first n periods, 
the new buyer will negotiate to pay the price for U.S. No. 
2 wheat instead of the price of the higher quality No. 1. 
Since substituting a U.S. No. 3 wheat for a U.S. No. 1 
would be readily detected, this would not be attempted by a 
rational exporter. 
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It is obvious that if a firm is to milk its 
reputation, it must do so after investing in a reputation, 
since no profits can be made until the firm has established 
a reputation. It is then reasonable for importers to 
consider the alternative behaviors of an established 
exporting firm when determining a price or policy that 
should prevent the firm from behaving erratically. The 
price must be high enough for the firm to recover its 
investment in a reputation and low enough not to generate 
excessive profits that would induce new exporting firm to 
enter the market. In this case, the exporters are using 
what Koutsoyiannis (1983) calls a 'limit-pricing strategy'. 
The exporters have market power, but are unable to use it 
due to uncertainty about provoking a massive entry of new 
firms (or countries) in the market. If the limit-pricing 
assumption seems unrealistic in this circumstance, an 
oligopolistic structure may be hypothesized. If there was 
a barrier to entry, the equilibrium price would be between 
the minimum price required to induce oligopolists to remain 
ethical and the price that would prevail if importers had 
full information. Asymmetry of information erodes the 
market power of exporters because it is more difficult for 
exporters to differentiate the quality of their product in 
the eyes of importers. In practice, factors exogenous to 
the model cause some exporting firms to establish better 
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reputations in a shorter time period than others, and hence 
these firms will not attempt to increase the flow of 
information to consumers. For simplicity, limit-pricing is 
assumed in the derivation of the results. 
If the firm behaves consistently (supplying quality 
q), it will receive the following compensation on a per 
unit basis; 
(5-13) TT = [p(q)-c(q) ] [l+(l/l+r) + (l/l+r)2+.. . + (i/n-r)°°] 
= [P(q)-c(q)][(l+r)/r], 
where p is the price established exporters receive for 
supplying wheat of quality q. The cost of a unit of 
quality q wheat is represented by c(q). Profits are 
discounted at rate r, reflecting the opportunity cost of 
capital. Profits under a quality inconsistency scenario 
are given by equation (5-14). 
(5-14) u = [p(q)-c(qo)][l+(l/l+r)+...+(l/l+r)"-l] 
= {[p(q)-c(qo)][(l+r)/r][1-1/r(1+r)""1]}. 
For n-1 periods, the firm can substitute lower quality 
grain (qg, the lowest possible quality that can be 
substituted for higher quality wheat), at a price 
corresponding to higher quality q. Then, in the n^h 
period, the substitution is detected. Per unit costs of 
grain of a given quality are denoted by c, and are 
increasing in q. Using (5-13) and (5-14) and solving for 
p(q) we obtain Shapiro's (1983) result: 
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(5-15) p(q) = c(q)+[(l+r)"-l][c(q)-c(qo)]. 
The importer will not buy wheat of quality q at a lower 
price than indicated by (5-15) because under such 
circumstances, the exporting firm would supply grain of 
lower quality. 
Length of information lag 
Equation (5-15) depicts an equilibrium with price 
exceeding average cost. The net present value of the 
profits equals the necessary investment to establish a 
reputation. If the equilibrium price is the one given by 
equation (5-15), why would a firm 'milk' its reputation? 
Two hypotheses will be discussed. First, future output 
prices and therefore profits may be uncertain. Assume that 
R = qt_i, or that an exporter can substitute lower quality 
grain for only one period before it is detected. If 
profits are uncertain, the firms will compare EU{[p(q)-
c(q)](l+r)/r) to U{p(q)-c(qQ)). A risk neutral firm will 
supply grain of quality q at price p(q) = c(q)+r[c(q)-
cfqg)], while a risk averse firm would require a higher 
monetary incentive to remain quality consistent.'^ The risk 
^Let the expected net present value of supplying q 
when p is uncertain be NPV^ = E[7r+7r(l+r)~^+.. .+TTil+r)" ]. 
This is equal to the net present value of supplying wheat 
of quality qg, NPV^q = iT+c(q)-c(qQ) . Then, U(NPV„)  <  
U(NPV„q) by concavity of the utility function in îr. The 
strict equality holding for risk neutral exporters. 
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neutral firm will force the risk averse firms out of the 
market since the latter will prefer to make a 'fast buck' 
with certainty rather than earning a series of variable 
profits with the same expected net present value. This 
subject was first discussed by Sandmo (1971). 
What if all the firms involved in grain exports have 
the same attitude toward risk? Would this imply that they 
command the same risk premium to sell output of consistent 
quality? Assuming that exporting firms from various 
countries have comparable risk attitudes, some of them 
could be expected to behave differently. Time preferences 
and the level of risk® may vary from one exporter to 
another. Because different time preferences is akin to 
different attitude toward risk, the focus of our attention 
will be centered on the second factor. The exporters may 
face the same price uncertainty but have to deal with what 
could be called higher political risk.® The effect of 
political risk is translated into a possible shorter series 
As documented in the literature on the Allais 
paradox, the attitude of the firm toward risk may change 
depending on the alternatives confronted by the firm. 
However, such a possibility is ruled out in our analysis. 
®The term political risk was chosen because trade 
barriers, in the absence of market failure, can only be 
justified by political motives. The (economic) argument 
for strategic trade barriers is not strong in a world in 
which trade partners would not hesitate to retaliate which 
seems to be the case in the real world. 
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of profit when the firm tries to maintain a reputation. 
The expected profit associated with a consistent behavior 
is given by equation (5-16). 
(5-16) TT = OA + (l-a)A[l-(l/(l+r)") ], 
where A = [p(q)-c(q)](l+r)/r and (l-a)? is the probability 
that the infinite series of profits will be shortened to n 
periods by some political event. 
The minimum price for the firm to remain consistent 
under such conditions is given by equation (5-17); 
(5-17) p(q) = {[r(l+r)'^-l]/[(l+r)"-^-r(l-a)]){[c(q) 
-c(qo)]+c(q)). 
Note that when there are no political risk (i.e., 1-a = 0), 
equation (5-17) becomes equation (5-14) for n = 1. Firms 
facing political risk must command a higher price than 
firms for which l-a = 0 since [ (l+r)'^~^]/[ (l+r)'^~^-r(l-a) ] 
> 1. Grain exporters from countries with controversial 
foreign policies, or dealing with importing countries 
contemplating protectionism, are probably more prone to 
'milk' their reputations. 
The Soviet Union's market, for example, is filled with 
uncertainty even for U.S. firms trying to build a good 
reputation. Certain short-run gains may exceed the net 
^Instead of a single probability of a shorter series, 
one can think of a probability distribution of shorter 
series. The implication remains the same in any case. 
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present value from a series of profits of uncertain length 
and this could be a potential explanation for grain quality 
complaints coming from countries like the Soviet Union and 
China. 
Many U.S. allies have complained about the quality of 
U.S. grain. Tendencies toward protectionism in these 
countries (e.g., E.E.C.) and complaining as a means of 
improving one's bargaining position could perhaps explain a 
part of this behavior. U.S. agricultural policies may also 
contribute to the uncertainty of foreign markets. The 
effect of a grain embargo may not be immediate due to the 
reputation mechanisms of some countries. First, it might 
take a long time (i.e., a large n in (5-17)) for the 
importer to discover that the quality of the wheat imported 
from the U.S. is not as high as anticipated. Secondly, the 
reputation mechanism may be such that the U.S. exporter may 
be able to substitute lower quality wheat more than once 
before the importer stops buying U.S. wheat. Consequently, 
the people claiming that the grain embargo imposed by the 
Carter Administration had no effect could be seriously 
mistaken. The decline in U.S. wheat exports during the 
eighties is consistent with this assertion. Past and 
current political and economic decisions can affect the 
distribution of the length of the period of time a firm can 
do business with a foreign customer and this in turn 
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influence the behavior of the firm in the current and 
future periods. 
Perhaps it can be conjectured that the increase in 
participation in the export market by additional firms or 
countries or the attainment of self-sufficiency in these 
countries has forced some exporters to substitute lower 
quality wheat in vanishing markets. The Green Revolution 
may have been a factor in the lowering of wheat c[uality on 
the world market. 
When price uncertainty is added, it can be shown that 
a risk loving firm facing risk of a series of profits of 
shorter length may commend a higher premium to supply wheat 
of quality q than a risk averse firm facing the same price 
uncertainty and less risk. It follows that a risk averse 
firm can drive a risk loving firm out of a market if the 
latter has to deal with a higher level of risk. This 
result complements rather than contradicts Sandmo's result 
since in Sandmo's article, the firms were supposed to face 
the same level of uncertainty. 
Detection probabilitv and the reputation model 
The main drawback of the results from the previous 
subsection is the implicit assumption that the importing 
country is unable to assess the quality of imported wheat. 
This is not realistic since all importing countries have 
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inspection services. However, many inspection agencies are 
understaffed, underfunded, and often corrupt. It can be 
argued that this characterization applies more to less 
developed countries, but, according to Ek (1985), F.G.I.S. 
and the agencies it contracts with should not be excluded. 
In this subsection, it will be assumed that the 
importing country purchasing wheat of quality q has an 
inadequate inspection service. Given that wheats of 
quality q and qg are difficult to visually discriminate 
from one another, the expected probability of discovering 
the true quality of look-alike inferior wheat of quality qg 
is defined as 1-a. Consequently, the importing country's 
probability of receiving wheat of quality qg from the 
exporter is a. If an exporting firm is discovered 
substituting wheat of quality qg for quality q, this 
automatically implies termination of all its selling 
activities in the high-quality market.® No profit can be 
realized in the low-quality market. When wheat of quality 
qg, sold as quality q, is not intercepted as it enters the 
importing country, it will take n periods to discover the 
Different penalties on price may be imposed. It can 
also be hypothesized that the firm must re-establish its 
reputation for supplying q. If the price received by the 
firm when it rebuilds its reputation is equal to c(qg), the 
firm will leave the market, which is a special case of 
price penalty. Penalties of differing severity change the 
equilibrium price, but the principle remains the same. 
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true quality of the shipment. Hence, the exporter can 
substitute lower quality wheat during n-1 periods with a 
detection probability of a. The reputation can be 
characterized by 
(5-18) R = aqt_n+(l-a)qt' 
Profits associated with supplying lower quality wheat qg 
are given by 
(5-19) E[7r°] = E[a((p-Co) (l+(l/(n-r)) + ... + (l/(l+r)"-^) )]. 
As before, profits under certainty are 
(5-20) E[7r"] = E[ (p-c) (l+{l/(l+r) ) + .. . + (l/(l+r) )°°]. 
Using (5-19) and (5-20) and solving for p we obtain 
(5-21) E[p] = E[ {( 1+r) "(c( 1-ct) +a(c-cq) ) -acg}/( 1+r)"( 1-a) +a 
which, when n = 1, reduces to (5-22). 
(5-22) E[p] = E[c+{ar(c-c0)/(l+r-ar))]. 
The importer will be willing to pay a minimum price p* for 
the imported wheat. This price is given by (5-22). Any 
price below p* would be considered an attempt to defraud 
the importer. Other exporting firms facing the same cost 
and time preference would be alternative suppliers if the 
exporter charged a price higher than p*. Even though there 
are positive profits to be made, there will not be entry 
into the market because the importer has no incentive to 
change supplier even if offered a lower price. 
In a world with technological innovations, the above 
statement would not apply if the importer were able to 
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recognize would-be exporters with newer technology from 
exporters with older technology. The exporter's R&D 
expenditures would then depend on the ability of the 
importer to discriminate low-cost from high cost exporters. 
R&D expenditures would lower the cost of imported wheat but 
would not necessarily lower the price. Large R&D 
expenditures can be seen as a barrier to entry which can be 
translated in market power for the remaining firms in the 
market. The price given by equation (5-22) would then be a 
minimum price, not necessarily the equilibrium price. If 
the exporters incur different unobservable costs to the 
importer, then the market may cease to exist as low cost 
exporters may be driven out of the market by high cost 
exporters that supply wheat of lower quality. If the 
exporters are allowed to collude, they will fix a price 
high enough to give high cost exporters the necessary 
incentive to supply wheat of quality q. The importing 
country would not benefit from changes in technology. 
Equations (5-19) and (5-20) assume that the exporter 
is risk neutral in the sense that U(n) = ir. It is quite 
evident that for a risk averse exporter, U(E[7r^]) < 
since a (the probability of escaping detection by the 
inspection services of the importing country) no longer 
carries as much weight. All other things being equal, the 
'a' risk averse exporter will need lesser incentive to 
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behave flawlessly. Under this circumstance, the importer 
will try to import wheat from risk averse suppliers if they 
could be identified. Risk averse exporters may force risk 
neutral exporters to provide wheat of uncertain quality, 
and, hence, drive them out of the market. If there is also 
uncertainty concerning future prices, and assuming that the 
risk averse firms are risk averse with respect to both p 
and a, the risk neutral firms may drive the risk averse 
firms out of the market if the risk aversion with respect 
to p offsets the risk aversion with respect to a. 
Reputation and Contamination: A Canadian Example 
Over the years, Canada has established itself as an 
exporter of high quality wheat. Because of the inverse 
relationship between quality and yield and the size of the 
market for medium quality wheat, Canada is considering the 
licensing of new high yielding medium quality varieties 
known as triple-m (medium hard kernel, medium protein 
content, medium gluten). According to some studies 
(Carter, Loyns, and Ahmadi-Esfahari, 1986; Klein, Webber, 
and Graham, 1986; Veeman, 1987), the introduction of these 
new varieties could increase aggregate Canadian farm 
income. While this is debatable, the extent of their 
recommended planted acreage of medium quality wheat is 
probably overestimated. 
149 
First, reactions from major exporters of medium 
quality wheat are difficult to predict thus creating a wide 
range of possible prices for medium quality wheat. In the 
short-run, if the major exporters were to maximize their 
market share instead of profits, the production of medium 
quality wheat in Canada would not be profitable. The 
profits for Canada from entering the medium quality wheat 
market cannot be predicted with confidence. Credit, prices 
(of wheat and other traded goods), and quality are 
instruments at the disposal of an exporter of medium 
quality wheat. If used efficiently, they can maintain or 
increase the exporter's market share. While the size of 
the pie in the medium quality wheat market may be very 
tempting, the cost to obtain a small piece may be 
exorbitant. 
Secondly, wheat in Canada is visually inspected, and, 
because new medium quality wheat varieties are not easily 
distinguishable from traditional Hard wheat varieties, they 
can negatively influence Canada's involvement in the high 
quality market. It is on this point that the discussion 
below will elaborate. 
Using notation from sections 2 and 3, qg denotes lower 
quality triple-m wheat and q denotes higher quality Hard 
Red Spring wheat. Recall that when the minimum price 
yielding sufficient incentive for an exporter to maintain 
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its reputation was derived, it was assumed that the 
exporter had enough low quality wheat to substitute for 
wheat of higher quality, and that the production of medium 
and high quality wheat was unknown to the importer.® In 
the analysis presented below, the importer is assumed to be 
aware of the level of production of medium and high quality 
wheat that is available to Canada's sole exporter, the 
Canadian Wheat Board (C.W.B.)»^^ The price that a 
knowledgeable importer is willing to pay should then be a 
function of the C.W.B.'s ability to substitute low quality, 
as well as the potential for contamination or error in 
Canada's grading and inspection services. In this 
instance, the production of low quality wheat would be 
detrimental to the price of high quality wheat, since, 
according to Gilmour (1986), high quality wheat commands 
premiums for its inherent attributes, consistency, 
tightness of grade specifications, and low contamination 
levels (i.e., the mixing of Qq and Q). 
®It could have been assumed that wheat of quality qg 
could be produced instantaneously. 
^°It is assumed that C.W.B. does not carry 
inventories. This is not too unrealistic for Canada; 
however, in the U.S., large inventories of medium quality 
wheat enable exporters to substitute lower quality for 
quality q. It follows that knowledgeable importers would 
not be as willing to pay high prices for high quality 
wheat. Huge inventories are therefore costly in more ways 
than one. 
151 
The introduction of this new reputation mechanism^^ is 
justified by the fact that it is easy for an importer to 
obtain reasonable information about planted acreages of 
different varieties of wheat in Canada. Again, it is 
hypothesized that the importing countries do not have 
efficient grain inspection agencies. In addition, the 
exporter does not have the required technology or personnel 
to perfectly discriminate Q from Qq. It follows that the 
higher the proportion of Qq relative to Q, the greater the 
likelihood of a grade misidentification by the exporter. 
The goal of the importing countries is to maximize 
their production function^^, fj = f (P, subject to 
a budget constraint. The parameter p can take positive or 
negative values depending on the difference in the 
properties of high and medium quality wheat and on the 
requirement of the production of the final product. The 
parameter 9 will in general be greater than or equal to p 
and the same rule applies for T and |i. 
The budget reflects the exporter contamination 
problem. The parameters (1-5) and (1-0) are the 
^^Such reputation mechanism seems to be used in other 
industries such as the photocopier industry. Their ads 
emphasize that a negative externality could be generated by 
product diversification. 
^^Maximizing production or profit yields the same 
solution for the one output case. 
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probabilities of the share of medium quality wheat in loads 
of high and medium quality wheat respectively. The budget 
constraint can be expressed as Mj = P[SQ+(l-S)Qo]+Po[0Q+(l-
#)QQ]. The maximum expenditure on wheat by importer j is 
represented by Mj, while P and Pq are the respective prices 
of high and medium quality wheats. Maximizing their 
production subject to their budget constraint, the 
importers can derive their demand for medium and high 
quality wheats. 
. Two-countrv example 
For simplicity, it will be assumed that Canada exports 
wheat to two countries. One of these countries, which will 
be referred to as the rich country, imports only high 
quality wheat while the other country, the poor country, 
does not sufficiently appreciate quality (i.e., p « 0 and 
T « |x) to purchase the more expensive wheat. 
Because high and medium wheat serve different 
purposes, a decline in the price of one should not affect 
the sales of the other. However, in the presence of 
^^The case of the rich country buying medium (^ality 
wheat to obtain high quality wheat at a cheaper price is 
ruled out if a negative p enters the production function 
and if S > <p. This implies that the production process is 
negatively affected by the use of wheat not meeting some 
minimum level of quality (ex. the opportunity cost of 
segregating the medium from the high quality wheat). This 
point was brought up to me by Harvey Lapan. 
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contamination and incomplete information about the quality 
of the wheat (in the sense that there is a probability a 
that the importers will not be able to discriminate wheat 
of quality q from wheat of quality qg), the price of medium 
quality wheat should matter when purchasing (contaminated) 
high-quality wheat. The degree of substitution between the 
two types of wheat (which could be close to zero when there 
is no uncertainty about the quality of wheat) increases 
with a. The price for the contaminated high-quality wheat 
can be represented by 
(5 -23)  P* = W(Q,Qo;a,T)P(Q)+{l-W(Q,Qo;a,T))Po(Qo)• 
The weighting variable W takes the following form, 
(5 -24)  W =  [S(Q/Q+Qo,T) f (« )+ ! ] ,  
where 5 is defined as above and T is a technology parameter 
assessing the exporter's ability to deal with the 
contamination problem. P(Q) in equation (5-23) refers to 
the inverse demand for high-quality wheat when the 
importers can fully discriminate Q from Qq or when the 
exporting country does not produce any Qq.  
The weights reflect the importers' ability to 
discriminate and the exporter's control over contamination. 
When the expected importers and exporter's probability of 
mistakenly grading wheat of quality qg as wheat of quality 
q is zero (i.e., f(0) = 0 and 5=1), then the price of 
medium-quality wheat becomes irrelevant. 
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The function f(o) reflects the attitude of the 
individual importer toward the risk of receiving qg. Such 
attitude should depend on the quality differential between 
Q and Qq and the production process wheat is used in. 
Contamination having more serious implications in some 
processes than in others, the function f can be expanded to 
f (a;P,e, T,M,,q ,qq)  . When mixed, the influence of Qq on Q 
should also be considered. If the moisture content 
differential (of Qq and Q) exceeds a certain level, Q will 
deteriorate rapidly, thus lowering the overall quality of 
the blend. Hence the quality parameters q and qg can also 
be thought of proxy variables for the level of risk. 
Without much loss of generality, we can express f(a) 
in a multiplicative form such as f(a) = $(P,e,T,(i,q,qQ)a. 
Higher risk aversion and/or higher risk is characterized by 
a large 4. When f(a) = 0, the importer's price will be a 
simple weighted average of the high and medium quality 
wheats. The reputation of the firm with probability 
weights discussed above is equivalent to the case where 5 = 
1.14 The exponent for 6 is always greater than or equal to 
one. Barring a positive externality originating from Qq,  
l^Previous studies on the benefits of licensing new 
varieties of medium quality wheat had implicitly assumed 
5=1. It will be shown that if this assumption does not 
hold, the benefits from licensing the new varieties could 
be grossly overestimated. 
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an exponent smaller than one is incompatible with 
rationality because it implies that the buyer would 'pay 
more for less'. 
The maximization problem of the exporter is defined by 
equation (5 -25) ,  
(5 -25)  TT =  P*(Q,Qo;a ,T)Q+Po(Qo)Qo-C(Q,Qo)  .  
The corresponding first order conditions are given by: 
(5-26) dTT/dQ = P+Q(dP/dQ)-(l-W) (P+QdP/dQ-Po)+dW/dQ(P-Po)Q 
-dC/dQ = 0, and, 
(5-27) dir/dQo = Po+Qo (dPg/dOo) + (1-W) Q(dP^/dQ^) 
+dW/dQQ(P-Pg)Q-dC/dQo = 0. 
The first two terms in (5 -26)  can be regarded as the 
marginal revenue of Q when there is no uncertainty about 
the quality of Q. Unless the remaining terms cancel each 
ot^er, the amount of Q produced and exported under a 
scenario with incomplete information about quality is 
likely to differ from the standard case of full 
information. Note that PQ and P are evaluated at Qg* and 
Q*, respectively, since it is the market price of Qq that 
matters to the importers, not PQCQ)» Equation (5-27) is 
also encumbered by terms unique to a quality uncertainty 
scenario. From the first order conditions, it can be 
deduced that Qq* will not be identical to Qq obtained in 
the standard profit maximization problem. As shown by 
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equation (5-26'), equation (5-26) can be rearranged and 
perhaps be interpreted more intuitively. 
(5-26') dTT/dQ = WP+(l-W)PQ+WQ(dP/dQ)-dW/dQ(P-Po)-dC/dQ = 0. 
From equation (5-23), the first two right hand side 
components of equation (5-26') are equal to P*, the price 
of contaminated high quality wheat. The third and fourth 
components indicate how P* changes as the supply of high 
quality wheat (Q) increases. The overall change in price 
is not everywhere negative on the demand curve for 
contaminated high quality wheat. This peculiarity can be 
attributed to the positive relationship between Q and W. 
However, given the concavity of W in Q, the benefits from 
increasing Q are rapidly negated by the downward sloping 
demand curve for high quality wheat. It follows that a 
rational exporter will not operate on the upward sloping 
portion of the demand for contaminated high quality wheat. 
Contamination and exporter's behavior 
In order to simplify the following comparative statics 
analysis, some restrictions are imposed; 
d^PQ/dQg^ = d^p/dQ^ = 0. 
These restrictions imply linear demand curves for Q and Qq.  
Assuming that the exporter operates on the negative portion 
of the demand for contaminated high quality wheat implies 
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that the magnitude of the third component of (5-26') 
exceeds the fourth, -WQ(dP/dQ) > (P-Pq)QdW/dQ. 
The above restriction and the concavity of W imply 
that 
(5-28) Pq > < P+Q(dP/dQ). 
Note that when the first weak inequality holds, (5-28) is 
stronger than the assumption required for a downward 
sloping demand curve for contaminated high quality wheat. 
At first glance, this case may seem inconsistent with 
profit maximizing behavior. One should remember that the 
•marginal revenue from the sale of contaminated high quality 
wheat (not high quality wheat) should be greater or equal 
to the price of the medium quality wheat. Equation (5-26) 
can still hold even when the second term of its third 
component is negative. 
The purpose of the following comparative statics 
exercise is to assess the impact of the licensing of new 
varieties of medium quality wheat on optimal export 
quantities of medium and high-quality wheats. This is 
basically the problem that the C.W.B. must confront if it 
allows the licensing of triple-m varieties. The 
introduction of triple-m wheat will involve a rise in a, a 
decrease in T and decreases in C(Qq,Q). All the other 
studies on the subject have focused on the benefits of 
higher yields (including the argument for a higher price 
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for high quality wheat would rise from lowering Q), 
neglecting the contamination and the reputation issues 
(Carter, Loyns, and Ahmadi-Esfahari, 1986; Veeman, 1987). 
These issues deserve additional consideration. Because the 
effects of da and -dT reinforce each other and are both 
felt through their impact on W, (i.e., -dQ/dT = 
(dQ/da)(dW/dT)/(dW/da)) only a change in a will be 
analyzed. The influence of an increase in a on Qq is 
determined by (5-29). 
(5-29) 
2(W+QdW/dQ)dP/dQ-d^C/dQ2+ (-dW/da-Qd^w/dQda)(P-Pg) 
(2dW/dQ+Qd2w/dQ2)(P-Pq) -dW/da(dP/dQ)Q 
(1-W-QdW/dQ)dPg/dQo -dW/da(dP/dQg)-d^w/dQda 
-d^c/dQdQo+dW/dQo(QdP/dQ) (P-Pg)Q 
(P-Pq)(dW/dQo+d^W/dQdQo) 
The expression in the upper left corner of the determinant 
is negative given the downward sloping demand curve for 
high quality wheat and the concavity of W in Q. Given the 
assumption about the slope of P* (or if (5-28) held almost 
as an equality), the sign of the expression in the lower 
left corner is clearly negative. Unlike the sign of the 
expression in the lower right corner, which is 
unambiguously positive, the sign of the expression in the 
upper right corner is in general ambiguous. However, 
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because of the magnitude of the expressions, it can be 
concluded that the determinant (5-29) is negative. 
The decrease in exports of Qq as a increases is 
positively related to the magnitude of the price elasticity 
of Qq. The market for wheat of medium quality being very 
competitive, underestimating or ignoring the contamination 
issue could seriously bias the results of a cost/benefit 
analysis of the licensing of triple-m varieties. This 
result is very intuitive given the negative impact of the 
medium-quality market on the high-quality market. This 
impact is twofold. First, is a weighted average of two 
prices, one of which is negatively correlated with QQ. A 
lower Qq implies a higher Pq which implies a higher P**. 
Secondly, the effect of Qq is felt through the weight W. 
Decreasing Qq will result in an augmentation in W. 
The effect of a on Q is in general ambiguous despite 
the fact that an increase in Q, holding Qq constant, 
inflates W. It should be noted that W increases at a 
decreasing rate with respect to Q while P is assumed to 
decline at a steady rate. The sign of (5-30) indicates the 
direction taken by Q following an increase in a. 
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( 5 -30 )  
(-dW/da-Qd^w/dadQ) (1-W-QdW/dQ)dPg/dOo 
(P-Pq)-dW/da(dP/dQ)Q -d^c/dQdQo+dW/dQo(QdP/dQ) 
(-W/dQo-Qd^W/dQQdQ)(P-PQ) 
-d2w/dQoda(P-Po)Q d2c/dQo2+(Qd2w/dQo2)(P-Pq) 
+dW/da(dPo/dQo)Q +2(l-QdW/dQo)(dPg/dQo) 
Assuming the term on the right hand side of (5-28) exceeds 
the left hand side terms, the sign of (5-30) could possibly 
be negative when W is large (low a, p, QQ,and large Q) and 
when dPg/dQQ and dP/dQ are small. Perhaps the intuition 
behind this result can best be explained graphically. The 
graph in Figure 5-2 is a simple, but instructive mapping of 
the first order conditions in Q-Qq space. For an 
equilibrium to be attained, the two first order conditions 
must hold simultaneously. The equilibrium occurs at the 
intersection of the two lines QQ and QQQo* The equilibrium 
is unique given the convexity of QQ and the concavity of 
QOQQ. One can see that a corner solution would imply 
operating on the vertical intercept of the QQ curve. When 
a increases due to the introduction of triple-m varieties, 
the two curves shift up. The shift of QQ is accompanied by 
an increase in its slope. The magnitude of the QQQQ iu^ip 
will depend on the slope of the demand for Qq. 
Alternatively, Figure 5-3 illustrates the impact of a 
change in a on the demand for Q. The most noticeable 
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qq qq 
Qo 
FIGURE 5-2. The effect of contamination and imperfect 
inspection services on optimal production levels 
of medium and high quality wheats 
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p(Q;q) 
Q 
FIGURE 5-3. The effect of a decrease in the importers' 
ability to discriminate between medium and 
high quality wheat on the price of high 
quality wheat 
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characteristic of this graph is the positive slope of P* at 
low levels of Q. When Q equals zero, is equal to Pq by 
definition (since W is zero). When Q increases, W 
increases faster than P decreases thus explaining the 
positive slope. W increasing at a decreasing rate, its 
effect inevitably ends up being offset by the negative 
linear slope of P. An increase in a will diminish the 
positive effect of W and increase the concavity of P*. The 
higher p, the more P* will change. At the same time, an 
increase in a will also induce a reduction in Qq which will 
generate an increase in Pq. Again, a large increase in Pq 
coupled with a change in the effect of W on P* will yield a 
higher demand for Q. Likewise a small increase in Pq will 
lower Q. 
Other effects of licensing 
As mentioned before, the introduction of the new 
triple-m varieties would also influence the exogenous 
contamination parameter T and the cost of producing wheats. 
The effect of T is essentially the same as the effect of a. 
The reduction in cost could be inserted in our model by 
including an exogenous cost parameter (fl) in the cost 
function. For example, if costs were specified as C = 
C(Q,QQ/n), this would favor the exports of medium quality 
wheat at the expense of high quality wheat. Results of 
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partial equilibrium models focusing only on this last point 
favor the introduction of triple-m varieties. 
If Canada were to license the triple-m varieties, it 
would have the alternative of substituting wheat of lower 
quality. The price for contaminated high quality wheat 
(P*) always exceeding the price for medium quality wheat 
(Pq) is not a sufficient condition for a high quality wheat 
market to exist. If substituting lower quality wheat was 
more attractive to the exporter than supplying quality q, 
knowledgeable importers would contract with another 
supplier or increase their domestic production of wheat. 
The optimal Q and Qq determined by solving simultaneously 
equations (5-26) and (5-27) are the quantities that would 
be exported when the exporter is supplying wheat of quality 
q. 
The importers who have full knowledge about production 
levels and cost of production of Q and Qq would suspect the 
exporter of cheating if the latter was to alter its 
production mix. If Canada were the sole exporter of high-
quality wheat and there were only two importers, a rich and 
a poor country, the two alternatives available to the 
exporter would be 
= [P*rQ*+PpoQo-C(Q*'Qo)Hl+r)/r, and 
TTD = a(P%Q*+P*pQo) + (l-a) (P%(Q*-QQ)+PJ.OQO+P*PQO) 
-C(Q*,Qo) + [(P"poQ"o)-C(Q%)/r. 
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The subscripts r and p designate the rich and the poor 
importers while the subscripts *, 0 and n are used to 
identify the contaminated high quality wheat, the medium 
quality wheat, and the medium quality wheat after 
substitution of qg. It is evident from these scenarios 
that the exporter can only sell medium quality wheat to a 
poor country, after supplying the rich country with wheat 
of lower quality than q. The optimal Qq is likely to 
change once it becomes a specialization. For a market for 
high quality wheat to exist, the price that solve the 
equations of the two scenarios must be less than or equal 
to P* defined by (5-23). P^ can be regarded as a minimum 
price for the importers to be convinced that the exporter 
has enough incentive to supply high quality wheat. On the 
other hand, P* is the maximum price that the importers are 
willing to pay for high quality (contaminated) wheat. It 
follows that for an equilibrium to exist must not exceed 
P*. 
Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to rationalize the behavior of 
U.S. and Canadian wheat exporters. Models of the 
reputation of the firm were used to achieve this end. At 
first, it was shown that a competitive market structure may 
not be optimal for the U.S. wheat export industry. If the 
166 
reputation of the firm is country-specific, all the 
participants will behave like free-riders by marketing 
lower quality wheat for high quality wheat. Licensing the 
number of firms or imposing quality standards or quotas are 
first-best policies. Given the history of the U.S. grain 
industry, enforcement problems would likely arise if quotas 
or quality standards were used. The reputation mechanism 
that accounts for the quality supplied by a firm and the 
average quality supplied by the country can be used as a 
potential explanation for the decline in the quality of 
U.S. wheat at the beginning of the decade. The development 
of new wheat varieties may have increased the variance of 
the estimated quality supplied by the firm which would have 
forced the importers to rely more heavily on the country's 
reputation to assess wheat quality. As more weight is 
placed on the reputation of the country, exporters tend to 
lower wheat quality. 
Secondly, risk was shown to influence the behavior of 
a wheat exporting firm. The probabilities of political or 
economic events deteriorating the relationships between the 
importers and the exporters can affect the choice of an 
exporter's strategy. Uncertainty about future prices and 
the probability of detection substituting lower quality 
wheat affect the exporter's attitude in opposite 
directions. 
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Contamination problems create uncertainty about 
quality, and as a result, exert an adverse effect on 
prices. Regulating the use of the triple-m wheat varieties 
creating a negative externality on the price of high 
quality wheat is indeed the first best policy available for 
the C.W.B., at least until the development of a new variety 
that can be recognized easily during inspections. From the 
above analysis, it is impossible to recommend or not 
recommend the introduction of triple-m varieties by C.W.B. 
However, it is safe to argue that the validity of the 
recommendations from previous studies on the topic is 
questionable. 
Additional research on the impact of different market 
structures should be conducted. Reputation in cartels is a 
topic that should receive attention in the future. In 
models where the series of profits are of uncertain length, 
the probabilities associated with the different lengths 
could be internalized. The quality level can enter as an 
argument in the probability distribution of the length of 
the series of profits. For example, it could be 
hypothesized that the high quality market is safer, and 
that the C.W.B.'s risk premium is large enough to delay or 
even forbid the licensing of triple-m varieties. 
Reputation models with different modeling techniques 
for quality (such as the one in Chapter Six) should be 
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used. The characteristic approach is appropriate for wheat 
characteristics like foreign material, dockage and wheat of 
other classes. It is not as satisfactory for protein 
content and flour yield. 
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CHAPTER SIX: RESERVATION QUALITY LEVELS 
AND TRADE RESTRICTIONS 
As mentioned in Chapter Five, some wheat production 
processes may demand a minimum quality threshold or a 
reservation level of quality. Wheat that does not meet the 
threshold could have a zero, or perhaps negative, marginal 
product. This is most likely why wheat grading systems in 
the U.S. and Canada are based on standards for minimum 
wheat quality characteristics that are thought to be 
meaningful in the marketplace. Though wheat is a 
heterogeneous product, blending is common practice among 
exporters because it can considerably reduce handling and 
storage costs. However, blending and, probably to a lesser 
extent, breakage, during the loading and unloading of a 
vessel causes wheat quality to be a stochastic variable. 
When e is the probability that imported wheat will 
meet a reservation quality q^^, it will vary between zero 
and one, and can be defined as 
(6-1) 0 = (2TTO^)'''^) (e"'^( (9''9M)/G)2)ag 
St 
^The expected changes in quality during shipment are 
either omitted or already included in the demand schedule 
of the importer. If the latter alternative is chosen, q^ 
should be interpreted as the reservation quality level 
considering in transit damages. 
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The first and second derivatives of (6-1) with respect to 
mean quality, qm, and the standard error of quality, a, 
depend on the relative location of the quality reservation 
level, q^, and qm. As Table 6-1 illustrates, when q^ is 
greater than qm, an increase in the variance of wheat 
quality can increase the probability that a required 
minimum quality threshold will be met. 
Blending and Consumer Behavior 
If blending does not create systematic bias in mean 
wheat quality, then the effect of blending on the standard 
error of quality is twofold. First, blending will lead to 
an increase in a, and, secondly, it appears that blending 
can create uncertainty about a. Importers are assumed to 
maximize consumer surplus^' defined here as the difference 
between a function characterizing willingness to pay for 
imported wheat, and expenditures for imported wheat. Bond 
(1984) and Bridgeman (1985) have recently exploited the 
convenience of the 'willingness to pay' function in their 
studies of gains from intra-industry trade when consumers 
fail to have identical preferences. 
The merits and demerits of consumer surplus as a 
welfare measure has been debated intensively over the 
years. For more details about consumer surplus and other 
welfare measures, the reader is referred to Samuelson 
(1983), Helms (1985), Willig (1976) and Choi and Johnson 
(1987) . 
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Table 6-1. Signs of the partial derivatives of 0 at six 
different locations of on the distribution 
of quality 
qm 
qma 
aa 
qmqra 
qm-(2a^)"® qm-o qm+a qm+(2a^)*^ +00 -co qm 
Though the current analysis is restricted by a partial 
equilibrium framework, the implications of the results are 
far reaching. The importer's maximization problem can be 
illustrated as 
(6-2) Max. W(8(qm,a;q^)Q)-P(qm)Q. 
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The volume of imported wheat with mean quality qm is 
represented by Q. Since the variance of quality is not a 
factor in the U.S. or Canadian wheat grading process, it is 
not an argument in the price of wheat, P. Only the grade 
(i.e., mean quality) is important in determining wheat 
prices. This is compatible with the small country 
assumption which demands that an importer's terras of trade 
be exogenous. The importing country cannot improve its 
terms of trade by reducing its volume of imports, nor can 
it force an exporter to discount its wheat based on 
' characteristics (such as a) that are not already in the 
grading system (qm). The assumption that an importer's 
terms of trade must be exogenous will be relaxed in a 
subsequent section of this Chapter. 
First order conditions with respect to Q and qm are 
given below. 
(6-3) We-P = 0. 
(6-4) Weq^Q-Pq^Q = 0. 
W is the first partial derivative of W with respect to the 
probability that the imported wheat will be 'usable'. 8q^ 
represents the first partial derivative of 0 with respect 
to mean quality. In the above equations, marginal utility 
from increasing Q or qm equals the marginal cost of Q or 
qm. 
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The second order conditions can be verified by 
imposing restrictions which guarantee that the determinant 
of the corresponding Hessian matrix will be positive. 
Imposing ^qmqm ^ ° was found to be sufficient for 
a maximum solution to exist. As noted earlier, the first 
effect of blending is felt through the standard error of 
quality, a. This effect can be analyzed using Cramer's 
rule and the positive sign of the determinant of the 
Hessian matrix. 
(6-5) dQ/da = (W"eQ+W)(Pcp,qm®a-W'0qmqtn®aQ) 
+W"W'eqm(GGqma-8qmGe)' 
(6-6) dq/da = (WWGQ) (0q„0p-00qj„^). 
As expected, the signs of dQ/da and dqm/da are somewhat 
ambiguous. Depending on the location of vis-a-vis qm, 
this ambiguity can be resolved. The comparative statics 
results obtained by using locations one (1) through six (6) 
at the top of Table 6-1 are summarized in Table 6-2. 
The uncertainty effect can be analyzed by taking the 
expectations of the first order conditions, (6-3) and (6-
4), and solving simultaneously. The presence of 
uncertainty about a makes 0 a random variable. The first 
order conditions can be expanded as 
(6-7) E[W']E[e]+cov(W',0)-P = 0, -and 
(6-8) E[W]E[eqj„Q]+cov(W',©qj„Q)-Pqjj,Q = 0. 
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Table 6-2. Effects of an increase in a on qm and Q 
Location Sign of dO/da Sign of dom/da 
1 + 
2 + 
3 ± ± 
4 + 
5 ± 
6 ± 
The relative magnitudes of the optimal qm and Q under 
uncertainty versus certainty are ambiguous and depend on 
the location of the reservation quality level. Given that 
the function W is concave, the covariance term in (6-7) 
will be negative, except when evaluated at q^ = qm where it 
will be zero. Consequently, it can be deduced that 
E[W*]E[e] is greater than E[W'0] = P. 
The sign of the covariance term in (6-8) will also 
change, depending on the location of q^ in the distribution 
of imported wheat quality. The covariance term is positive 
at locations 1, 2, and 4, and is negative elsewhere. All 
the terms in (6-7) and (6-8), except the covariance terms, 
can be differentiated. The resulting equations are given 
below. 
(6-9) W• • 02dQ+ (W • 'e^j^-Pg)dqm. 
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(6-10) (W '«8g,Q+M'eq^-Pg^)dq+(«' 'eg^^Q^+W Sg^^^Q-
Given the signs of the covariances in (6-7) and (6-8), 
Table 6-3 indicates that the above equations should take 
different signs at varying q,j. locations. Changes in Q and 
q must simultaneously satisfy the signs for equations (6-9) 
and (6-10) noted in Table 6-3. The last two columns 
indicate the resulting changes in Q and q. 
The changes in Q and q attributable to uncertainty 
appear to be ambiguous more often than not. Though it is 
not possible to arrive at a unique solution for the effect 
of uncertainty on Q and qm, additional information can be 
extracted from Table 6-3 and equations (6-9) and (6-10). 
Table 6-3. Sign of (6-9) and (6-10) at different q^'s and 
corresponding possible changes in Q and qm 
Sign of Sign of Change Change 
Location (6-91 (6-101 in 0 in crm 
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Setting (6-9) and (6-10) to zero, graphs of the first order 
conditions under certainty in Q-qm space can be drawn. The 
solution to the maximization problem under certainty is 
depicted by the intersection of the two dQ/dqm curves 
associated with (6-9) and (6-10). The signs of (6-9) and 
(6-10) in Table 6-3 are used to define the feasible sets of 
solutions. The sets of feasible solutions for the six 
locations of are illustrated in Figure 6-1. Mean 
quality increases and variance decreases at locations 1, 2, 
and 4. When qm-a < q^ < qm (location 3) and when q^ > qm+a 
(locations 5 and 6), an increase in Q implies a decrease in 
qm and vice versa. It is also possible for both Q and qm 
to decrease. The change in the sign of when q^ is 
positioned to the right side of qm gives rise to an 
ambiguity concerning the relative steepness of the slopes 
of (6-9) and (6-10). If the slopes were identical 
everywhere, a solution would not exist for location 4. 
Ruling out this possibility, when either Q or q moves in 
one direction, the change in the other variable must be in 
the opposite direction. 
It could be argued that in reality, the parameter q^. 
is more likely to be located to the right of qm. On this 
premise, importers would import a lower volume of upgraded 
wheat. This behavior is reflected in Table 6-4. The 
volume of Hard wheat (higher quality) exported by the U.S. 
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(6-9) 
(6-10) 
qm 
A. q^ at locations 
1, 2 and 4 
LDil 6-10) 
B. q^ at locations 
3, 5, and 6 
(6-10) 
qm 
C. q^ at location 4 D. q^ at locations 
5 and 6 
FIGURE 6-1. Possible solution sets for Q and qm at six 
different q^ locations when a is uncertain 
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Table 6-4. U.S. wheat exports by class (million bushels)& 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Hard Red Winter 754 679 704 717 525 555 636 
Hard Red Spring 205 239 221 183 154 169 231 
Soft Red Winter 460 325 222 253 162 129 151 
White 270 207 220 210 162 151 151 
Durum 82 59 62 61 51 70 59 
^United States Department of Agriculture, 1985-87; 
United States Wheat Associates, 1985-87 (projections). 
has remained fairly constant during the 1981-87 interval 
while a downward trend has characterized the movements of 
U.S. exports of Soft wheats (such as White and Soft Red 
Winter wheats). U.S total exports have decreased while the 
composition of these exports have shifted toward higher 
quality classes of wheat. 
Behavior of Exporters and Trade Restrictions 
The objective of the next model is to investigate the 
behavior of an exporter in a regulated environment (quality 
standards (qm fixed), quotas, and specific and ad-valorem 
tariffs). As before, a comparison of the magnitude of 
choice variables under certainty and uncertainty (when P is 
a random variable) is also discussed. Perhaps the origin 
of (or solution to) quality problems can be linked to 
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protectionism or to the uncertain nature of the environment 
wheat exporters operate in. The importers' strategy of not 
granting a long-term agreement to the exporter until the 
latter has proven itself may be inefficient. Long-term 
contracts could make the benefits of ethical conduct more 
appealing by stabilizing the exporter's returns. 
The impact of trade restrictions has been analyzed 
recently by Das and Donnenfeld (1987); however, the 
framework used here differs from theirs in two ways. 
First, quality is not defined only by its mean, but also by 
its variance. Secondly, the importers are assumed to have 
reservation quality levels, which is more compatible with 
feeding and bread-making purposes. 
In a free-trade environment, the exporter has control 
over the quantity Q, the mean quality qm, and blending 
proxied by a. The parameter q^ depends on the importers 
preferences, and is therefore exogenous. The model can be 
represented as follows; 
(6-11) Max. P(a;q^)eQ-C(qm,a,Q)-TQ2. 
The parameter a enters the price function on the grounds 
that the importers incur cleaning costs or losses in 
production positively related to the variance of the 
quality of wheat. The size of the partial derivative 
clearly depends on the importer's market power and ability 
to bargain. P should be interpreted as the price of a unit 
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of wheat meeting the reservation quality level q^. The 
introduction of 0 in the revenue function reflects the 
importers unwillingness to pay for foreign material and 
wheat of inferior quality. The exporter's market power 
issue was sidelined to ease the derivations and also 
because at this stage, U.S.- wheat exporters are perhaps 
behaving more like perfect competitors than oligopolists. 
This assumption should not damage too extensively the 
generality of the conclusions derived below. 
Transportation costs T increase in a quadratic fashion as Q 
increases. In a free-trade situation, the first order 
conditions with respect to Q, q, and a could be derived and 
expressed as 
(6-12) P8-CQ-2TQ = 0, 
(6-13) Pe^Q-C^ = 0, and 
(6-14) PgGQ+Pe^^Q-Cg = 0. 
The quota 
The first situation analyzed is one in which a wheat 
importing country imposes a quota on the volume of wheat 
imported from the U.S. The motive for trade restrictions 
is not rationalized. Political or economic arguments could 
be advanced but whether the importing country makes an 
efficient decision is irrelevant for the purpose of this 
181 
exercise.3 A binding quota invalidates equation (6-12) 
since Q is decided by the importer. The relevant first 
order conditions (6-13) and (6-14) can be differentiated to 
verify the second order conditions and for comparative 
static purposes. Again the derivations are complicated by 
the fact that the partial derivatives of 8 take different 
signs depending on the location of q^ relative to qm. The 
effect of a quota on the mean quality qm can be assessed by 
computing -dqm/dQ as in (6-15). 
1a| is the determinant of the Hessian matrix and must be 
positive. Note that from (6-13), P©qi„ = Cg/Q and from the 
convexity of the cost function, Cg/Q < Cq^^Q making the 
expression in the upper left corner unambiguously positive. 
The expression -P^e-Peg^+CQ^g could be simplified to -Cg/Q 
+Cqjjjjj < 0 from (6-14) . It can be shown that for the second 
order conditions to hold, the expression in the bottom 
right must be negative. This holds for the six locations 
of q^. The impact of a quota on mean quality is clearly 
positive when P^gingQ+Pgeg^Q-Cq^g is negative (or close to 
(6-15) 
-(|A|)-1 "^®qm'*'^qmQ ^®qma®"^^a®qm®"^qma 
-p^ e-peg+Cgg P(,(,80+2P(,e(,Q+P8(,(,Q-Cp(, 
^Beghin (1987) using a game theoretic framework has 
demonstrated that countries do not make efficient decisions 
even when political motives are taken into considerations. 
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zero) and ambiguous otherwise. If the cost function was 
written as C = f(Q)+c(qin,a) and if 
the quota would induce the exporter to lower mean quality. 
One would expect Feq^gQ+P^eq^^Q-Cg^,^ to be negative when the 
price of wheat meeting the reservation quality level is 
heavily discounted in response to a high degree of variance 
or when assumes a negative sign (locations 3 and 4) . 
The positive effect of a quota on the quality of wheat 
supplied is supported by the work of Falvey (1979), 
Rodriguez (1979), and Das and Donnenfeld (1987). 
The innovative part of the above model lies in the use 
of an additional variable defining quality and in the use 
of 0 in the revenue function. Therefore, one cannot 
conclude that a quota induces a rise in quality without 
considering the effect on a. It is conceivable that for 
some processes, the variance of quality is more important 
quality parameter than mean quality. The change in a 
following the imposition of a quota is determined by (6-
16) . 
^®qmqm®"^qmqm ~^®qm"*"^qmQ 
^a®qm^'''^®qma^~^qma 
As for (6-15), the multiplier in front of the determinant 
is negative. The expression in the upper left corner is 
negative when q^ < qm and is assumed to be negative for q^ 
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> qm. The first two terms in the bottom right expression 
are equal to -C^/Q which is assumed to be smaller than 
-Cgg. The expressions in the upper right and lower left 
corners have been investigated above and based on this 
information, it can be concluded that a quota will 
encourage the exporter to blend less when PGqmgQ+Po^qmQ" 
Cqmjy < 0. This result is reversed if Cq^Q and C^q = 0. 
The effect of a quota on the choice of a could be positive 
if the effect of a on the marginal cost of improving the 
mean quality is large and positive (PQqmaQ+^a^qmQ'^qma^®)• 
The positiveness of this latter expression is reinforced 
when is positive as in location 1. 
The wheat quality mean and variance can either 
increase or decrease after the imposition of a quota, 
depending on the importer's ability to negotiate a discount 
or a compensation that covers cleaning costs associated 
with a greater variance, as well as on the exporter's cost 
function. The ability for less developed countries 
(L.D.C.'s) to measure the mean let alone the variance of 
wheat quality is very limited. In addition, the dependency 
of some L.D.C.'s on U.S. aid probably restricts their 
bargaining power. It follows that, in the presence of 
market imperfections, a quota would not necessarily force 
the exporter to improve wheat quality as predicted by 
previous studies. 
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The minimum (mean) quality standard 
A popular and more subtle trade barrier is the minimum 
quality standard. Many agricultural products are subject 
to minimum quality standards. The political appeal of this 
particular type of trade barrier is the hidden implicit 
level of protection it generates to shelter domestic 
producers from foreign competition. The protection level 
associated with minimum quality standards cannot be 
measured readily by looking at a percentage or a nominal 
monetary rate as for ad-valorem and specific tariffs. It 
can also be argued by proponents of minimum quality 
standards that the latter are primarily aimed at protecting 
consumers. However, one should remember that consumers 
need protection only in the presence of a market failure 
(i.e., when quality is not observable ex-ante). In the 
absence of market failure, regulating quality constraints 
the consumers utility maximization problem and is not 
optimal by virtue of Le Chatelier's principle. 
The effects of a minimum quality standard on Q and a 
can be determined by differentiating equations (6-12) and 
(6-14). The comparative static analysis (dQ/dq, da/dq) is 
displayed in (6-17) and (6-18). Note that for the second 
order conditions to be respected, the following must hold: 
< 0 .  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  i f  C^/Q-Cq^ is 
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positive, it must also be 'small'. The latter is a 
necessary condition. 
(6-17) CO/Q-CQO 
(6-18) 
-CQQ-2T 
Cj/Q-CQa ~^o®qm®~^®qma®''"^qma 
The cost function being convex in Q and q, and in light of 
the restrictions imposed for the second order conditions to 
hold, it can be concluded that a minimum quality standard 
will force a decrease in the volume of exported wheat if 
Pa®qmQ''"P®qmaQ"^qma < the marginal costs of 
increasing quality and lowering the variance are 
independent of Q, then Q will increase.) The effect is 
ambiguous when P^eq^Q+peg^^^Q-Cg^g^ > 0. From (6-18), the 
change in the variance of the quality of exported wheat is 
negative when PoGqmQ+PGqmoQ-Cqmo < 0. However, when 
^o®qmQ+^®qmaQ"^qmcr^° which probably holds at q^<qm-(2a2) • 5, 
the likelihood of a diminution in a is smaller. The same 
argument applies if the cost function's convexity in Q is 
very pronounced.^ Because the variance of quality does not 
necessarily decrease, it cannot be concluded that importers 
^If the cost function was a Cobb-Douglas function, the 
exponent for Q would be large. 
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would be better off in terms of quality after the 
imposition of a minimum quality standard. 
The specific tariff 
The analysis of the specific tariff can be carried out 
by rewriting the revenue function of equation (6-11) as 
follows: 
(6-19) (P(a)e-T)Q. 
This particular formulation implies that the importer has 
to pay a tariff on the unwanted wheat.® Adding 
transportation costs to the tariff, the importer ends up 
paying dearly for dockage and foreign material. Equation 
(6-12) is slightly modified and becomes (6-12'). 
( 6 - 1 2 ' )  Pe-T-CQ - 2 T Q  =  0 .  
By totally differentiating (6-12'), (6-13), and (6-14), the 
exporter's response to the imposition of a specific tariff 
on its wheat can be determined. As opposed to the previous 
cases, the sign of |A| for the analysis of tariffs is 
negative. The restrictions imposed in the previous cases 
(P®qmaQ+Pa®qmQ-Cçpno > = < 0; P^^eQ+2Poe^Q+P0^^j-C^^ < 0; and 
Cg/Q-Cgg > 0) were used again. As expected, a specific 
tariff on exports will decrease the demand for exports. 
The apparent ambiguity is resolved when one glances at the 
®The tariff assessment is calculated on a straight 
tonnage basis as in the Economic European Community. The 
importing country's revenue is TQ not T8Q. 
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second order conditions. The effect of a specific tariff 
is represented by (6-20). 
(6-20) 
-1 
P8 
Qqm 
qmgmQ'^qmqm 
^a/®~^Qa 
^®qmaQ'*"^a®qin®~*^qma 
PggeQ+2PgegQ+P8gg-Cgg 
From (6-21), it is evident that the specific tariff should 
also force the exporter to upgrade the mean quality of its 
wheat if P0qinCTQ+I'o®qm®~^qm0 the marginal costs of 
increasing qm and lowering a were independent of Q, qm 
would decrease. When this inequality is reversed, the 
change in Q following the imposition of a specific tariff 
becomes ambiguous. 
(6-21) 
-1 
-Oqq-2T 
Qqm 
1 
0 
Ca/Q-C 
|C„/Q-C, Qa 
qmc 
^®qma®"^^a®qm®~*^qiaa 
PggGQ+2PgegQ+Pegg-Cgg 
Assuming P8qmaQ'''^o®qmQ"'^qmo 0, the determinant below 
shows^ that the exporter's response to a specific tariff is 
likely to include a decrease in the variance of the quality 
of its wheat. This strategy improves revenues by 
increasing P© more than it increases costs. Variance 
increases if = 0. When P8qm(,Q+P(,eqmQ-Cqmo>0' 
profit maximization may induce the exporter to increase a. 
The exporter's reaction for a is given by (6-22). 
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(6-22) -CQQ-2T Cq^/Q-Cgq^ 
1^1 ^ ^qin/®~'^Qqin ^®qitiqmQ"^qinqm 
1 
0 
0 
It is easy to see that transportation costs have the same 
effects as a specific tariff. The difference between a 
specific tariff and an increase in transportation costs 
lies in the relative magnitude of their effects. The 
column vector (1, 0, 0)' used in the comparative static 
analysis of a specific tariff is replaced by (2Q, 0, 0)' 
when the impact of transportation costs are under 
• investigation. 
The ad-valorem tariff 
The investigation of the effects of an ad-valorem 
tariff on an exporter's choice variables requires a 
modification of the revenue function in (6-11). 
(6-11') P0Q(l-t) 
This modification of the revenue function alters the first 
order conditions to the wheat exporter's maximization 
problem given by (6-12)-(6-14) . The new equations for the 
first order conditions are given below. 
(6-12") Pe(l-t)-CQ-2TQ = 0. 
(6-13") Peq^Q(l-t)-Cq^ = 0. 
(6-14") PgeQ(l-t)+PegQ(l-t)-Cg = 0. 
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The impacts of an ad-valorem tariff on the volume, mean 
quality and variance of the quality of exported wheat are 
all ambiguous as shown by (6-23) through (6-25). This 
clearly differs from the effects of a specific tariff or 
quota and from previous literature. The dissimilarities of 
specific and ad-valorem tariffs have been stressed by 
Falvey (1979) in a context similar to the one above® and by 
Lloyd and Falvey (1986) in a study on protectionism under 
price uncertainty. The sources of ambiguity in result come 
from the interactions in the cost function and in the 
interactions in 0, especially when one considers all six 
possible locations for q^, the reservation quality level. 
The results become determinate if the volume Q is assumed 
to be independent from mean quality qm and variance a in 
the cost function. For example, the cost function could be 
specified as follows; f(Q)C(qm,a). If this was the case, 
output would as usual fall when the tariff increases while 
mean quality and variance would decrease and increase 
respectively. Ad-valorem tariffs should not be used by 
importing countries as an attempt to raise quality and 
^Falvey argued that, in a world in which goods of 
different quality are traded, a specific tariff lower the 
relative price of higher quality varieties consequently 
alters the composition of imports. Relative prices remain 
the same after the imposition of an ad-valorem tariff and 
so does the composition of imports. 
190 
protectionist measures of this kind may have contributed to 
the "quality problem" in the world market. 
(6-23) 
-1 
qm* C„/Q-C, Qa 
P®qmqmQ(l-t) (PaW^^qmaQ) (I't) 
"•-qmqm ~ qma 
c^/i-t (P e Q+P0 Q) (P eQ4.2P^e^Q+Pe^^Q) 
(l-E)-Cqmo (l-ty-Cpp 
(6-24) 
-1 
-Cqq-2t 
^qm/®"'^qmQ 
Ca/Q-Cqo 
Çp+ZoO 
(T-t) 
Ca/Q-C, Qa 
^qm/^~^ ^^a®qm®"''^®qma®^ ~^qma) 
Cg/l-t (PgjjeQ+2P^j0^Q+P0çyj,Q) (1-t) 
-Coo 
(6-25) 
-1 
-Cqq-2t 
Cqm/G-C 
Cqm/Q"C Qqm 
q m Q  ^ ® q m q m ® ~ ^ q m q m  
CQ+20Q 
Cqm/^-^ 
^o/®~^Qo (^o®qm^^^®qmo^) (^"^)"'^qmo Cg/l-t 
Price uncertainty and cmalitv choices 
Hypothesizing that price uncertainty may be at the 
origin of the quality problem in the U.S. wheat export 
industry, this subsection will attempt to compare the wheat 
exporter's behaviors under price uncertainty and certainty. 
The source of the uncertainty stems from the uncertainty 
about the importers bargaining tactics and the way 
complaints are handled. For example, the importers may 
complaint after every purchase hoping to get a discount 
even when the quality of the wheat purchased meets quality 
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expectations. Alternatively, price uncertainty can 
originate from the adoption of a system for which quality 
is determined at the point of import. The uncertainty is 
totally exogenous to the model. An expected utility 
framework is used to facilitate the analysis of the 
exporter's response under uncertainty. It is assumed that 
the exporters goal is to maximize the expected utility 
derived from profits. Their expected utility is 
represented by (6-26).. 
(6-26) E[U(P(a)eQ-C(qm,CT,Q)-TQ2)]. 
Assuming the second order conditions are met, an optimal 
solution is reached when equations (6-27) through (6-29) 
simultaneously hold. 
(6-27) E[U'(P8-CQ-2TQ)] = 0. 
(6-28) E[U(+P8q^Q-Cq^)] = 0. 
(6-29) E[U(PjjeQ+P0^Q-Cjj) ] = 0. 
P being a random variable, the above first order conditions 
can be written as follows: 
(6-27') E[U'] E[P0-Cq-2TQ] + cov(U',P0-Cq-2TQ) = 0 
(6-28') E[U'] E[P0q^Q-Cqj„) + cov(U',P0(^Q-Cq^) = 0 
(6-29') E[U'] E[P^eQ+P0jjQ-Cjj] + COV(U' ,PgeQ+P0gQ-Cg) = 0 
For U'' <0, the covariance term in (6-27') will always be 
negative regardless of the location of the reservation 
level q^j. on the distribution of quality. Differentiating 
[P0-Cq-2TQ] in (6-27') and forcing the resulting equation 
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(6-30) to be positive, it becomes obvious that if qm and a 
remain at their 'certainty* level, Q must decrease. 
(6-30) (Peqm-Cqqm)dqm+(Pge+P0g-CQg)da+(-CQQ-2T)dQ>0 
The covariance term in (6-28') is always negative since 
is positive everywhere as indicated in Table 6-1. 
Differentiating the terms inside the second expectation 
component of (6-28'), the following must hold; 
(6-31) (P8qmqmG"^qmqm) (^®qma®''"^a®qm®~^qma) 
(P8qin-=Qqm)«>''-
The above dqm multiplier is assumed to be negative despite 
the change in the sign of ©qj^qm when q^>qm. This implies 
that when o and Q are fixed at their 'certainty' level, qm 
must decrease. The covariance term in (6-29') is clearly 
positive when q^ < qm, and ambiguous when q^>qm. The 
differentiation of [Pg8Q+P8gQ-Cg] in (6-29') yields (6-32). 
(6-32) (P8qmaQ+Pa0qmQ-Cqma) dqm+ (P^^0Q+2P^je^Q+Pe^^Q-C^^) da 
+(Pg8+P8g-CQg)dQ > = < 0. 
The multipliers for dqm in (6-30), dc and dQ in (6-31) and 
dqm and da have ambiguous signs under uncertainty. Unless 
additional assumptions are made, it is impossible to 
determine the changes in Q, qm, and a that can be 
attributed to uncertainty. Assuming that all the 
multipliers are negative, it can be conjectured that price 
uncertainty would cause a decrease in Q and an augmentation 
in qm and a. If the model was simplified to account only 
193 
for Q and qm (i.e Max. E[U(P(qin+5)Q-C(qin,Q) ] ) , it would not 
be difficult to show that uncertainty about 5, a random 
variable with mean of zero, would change the exporter's 
behavior who would then sell a smaller volume of higher 
quality wheat. Under price uncertainty, the increase in 
average quality can be seen as a way for the exporter to 
protect themselves against the occurrence of very low 
prices. The smaller volume under price uncertainty can 
also be seen as a deliberate attempt to minimize 
substantial losses in situations when prices below the mean 
are realized. 
Conclusion and Application 
In order to capture the demands of some production 
processes on input quality, a reservation quality 
parameter, was introduced in this chapter. The 
importers preferences are such that wheat not meeting the 
reservation quality level yield minute or even negative 
marginal utility. This assumption is used because some 
wheat characteristics cannot be substituted for by a larger 
quantity. Protein is a good example of such a 
characteristic. 
The importers response to exogenous changes in the 
variance of the quality of imported wheat could be 
characterized by a lower demand of higher quality wheat 
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when the reservation quality level or threshold is below 
the quality level, qm. The consequences of an uncertain 
variance depends on the location of q^. However, the most 
probable scenario suggests that uncertainty will induce the 
importers to buy a smaller volume of higher quality wheat. 
An attempt was made to determine the exporter•s 
behavior when the importers impose trade barriers. As 
expected different trade barriers generate different 
outcomes which are influenced by the importers' ability to 
negotiate a discount for higher variance and on the 
effectiveness of blending in reducing the exporter's cost. 
In the context of a reservation quality level, quality has 
to be defined by the mean and the variance. An increase in 
the mean quality will not appease the complainant importers 
if the variance also increases substantially. The effects 
of price uncertainty on the exporter's choice variable were 
in general ambiguous. However, in a special case, the 
volume and the variance were found to decrease and the mean 
to increase. 
Uncertainty about future prices and certainty about 
the length of the 'horizon' should give more incentives to 
the wheat exporters to improve quality. The institutional 
implication is for the price to be determined at the 
destination point instead of at the export point, and for 
the importers to offer long-term agreements. Perhaps such 
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long-term agreements can best be negotiated between 
countries since they are likely to involve other goods as 
well. This is supported by the fact that Canada has a 
higher proportion of long-term agreement than the U.S. 
(Carter, 1983). Once again, a single government regulated 
agency may be optimal. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study analyzed the implications of heterogeneous 
quality in the international wheat market and attempted to 
explain the decline in U.S. wheat exports between 1980 and 
1986. Theoretical models were used to determine the 
effects of heterogeneous quality on the behavior of 
importers and exporters. Two approaches were used to model 
quality. The characteristic approach developed by 
Lancaster (1966) was used in Chapters Three, Four, and 
Five. Chapter Six was based on the assumption that 
importers have a reservation quality level or threshold. 
While the former approach was adequate to investigate the 
effects of changes in characteristics such as the 
percentage of foreign material or dockage, the latter 
approach better suited the specific nature of 
characteristics such as protein content. 
The impact of an observable improvement in the quality 
of imported wheat depended on the letter's price 
elasticity. The volume of imports increased when the price 
elasticity exceeded one and vice versa. An indirect 
utility function was derived to analyze the welfare effect 
of observable quality changes. Using an extension of Roy's 
identity, the Marshallian demand for imported wheat was 
also derived. Quality uncertainty was shown to increase 
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the level of self-sufficiency in the production of domestic 
wheat in an importing country. 
When quality of imported wheat was not fully 
observable, the importers' purchasing decisions were made 
by assessing the reputation of exporters. Firm-specific 
and country-specific reputation mechanisms were used to 
explain the exporters' behavior. It was hypothesized that 
importers relied more heavily on a country's reputation in 
the early 1980s, following the adoption of new wheat 
hybrids in many exporting countries. The variance of the 
estimate of the quality supplied by exporters was 
consequently higher, which forced importers to depend more 
on the country's reputation when assessing quality. This 
outcome may have induced individual U.S. exporting firms to 
exhibit free-rider behavior by lowering quality, since they 
each assumed that the remaining firms would maintain the 
country's reputation. Profit maximizing and large volume 
of exports were not necessarily compatible objectives. 
The issue of licensing triple-m wheat varieties in 
Canada was also addressed. It was determined that when 
considering the exporters' and importers' ability to 
discriminate medium from high quality wheat, the benefits 
of licensing triple-m varieties has potentially been over­
estimated in previous studies. 
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When assuming that importers have reservation quality 
levels and that quality is normally distributed, an 
increase in the variance of quality appeared to discourage 
(encourage) importers to import more wheat if the 
reservation quality level was below (above) the mean 
quality. Uncertain variance had similar effects. As in 
Das and Donnenfeld (1987), trade policies and exporters' 
choice of quality were analyzed. The results depended on 
what assumptions were made about both the importers' 
ability to obtain a discount for high variance and the 
exporters' cost function. In attempting to determine the 
effects of price uncertainty on quality mix, the results 
obtained were ambiguous except when the model was 
substantially simplified. In this instance, the variance 
of quality was removed and price uncertainty was shown to 
lower the volume and increase the mean quality of wheat. 
We can conclude that if final wheat prices were determined 
at the port of import, the exporters would face greater 
uncertainty and would upgrade the quality of their wheat. 
Future Research 
Unfortunately, empirical tests of the hypotheses 
suggested by this study could not be conducted. It is 
hoped that in the future a hedonic price index will be 
built in order to test whether or not U.S. wheat is 
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discounted with respect to wheat from other exporting 
countries. More work also remains to be done on price 
stabilization and quality. For example, more complicated 
models with more goods and factors of production should be 
built to capture the substitution between goods and factors 
when quality of the goods or factors vary. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A-1. Derivation of the determinant of equation (4-6) 
under assumptions that and Ug > 0 and 
^22' Gyy < 0 
(^11^22-^12^)(Gy+P)^-2Ui2COV(Ui2,q)(Gy+P)Gy 
+(U22aq+cov(U22,aq)) 
+ U i U i i P ^ G y y - 2 U i G y y P ( ^ 1 2  '  9 )  )  " ^ ^ 1 ^ 2 2 y  
-2U22COV(U]^2,q) (Gy+P) +2U2^COV (U22 / q) PGy 
+2U12COV(U22/q)(P-Gy)-2U22COV(U22/q) 
-(cov(U22,q)Gy+(cov(U22,q) 
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Table A-2. Derivation of the determinant of equation 
(4-15) 
-(Gy+P)Q[U2iCOV(U22,q)P-U^gcov(U22,q)+U22COV(U12/q) 
-GOV (U22 , q) cov (U22 , q) -U^2COV (U22 , q) ] + (cov(Ug^2'q) ) ^PGyQ 
(Gy-P) [U22Ui2Q(^q+^i2°°v (Ugg , Cg) Q+U22COV (U2 , q) ] 
(GOV (U2 , q) +cov(U22 » Cfg) +U22Q*q) (U22""i1°yP) 
+(GOV(U22,q))2+GOV(U2,q)GOV(U12,q)Gy+cov(Ug,q) 
GOV(U22,q). 
